Evaluating the External Validity of Experimental Auctions: The Case of Hydroponic Lettuce by Ness, Meghan Leigh
  
EVALUATING THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF EXPERIMENTAL 
AUCTIONS: THE CASE OF HYDROPONIC LETTUCE 
 
A Thesis 
by 
MEGHAN LEIGH NESS  
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
Chair of Committee,  David P. Anderson 
Co-Chair of Committee, Marco A. Palma 
Committee Members, Daniel I. Leskovar 
 Luis A. Ribera 
Head of Department, C. Parr Rosson 
 
December 2014 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics 
 
Copyright 2014 Meghan Leigh Ness
  ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Agribusinesses have been investigating alternative methods for food and 
agriculture production as a way to differentiate their product to consumers. Although 
experimental auctions have increasingly become a popular tool for gathering information 
about consumers and their valuations of differentiated products, little is known about 
their valuations for vegetables that are grown using different methods and few studies 
have simultaneously studied external validity and the influence of outside prices. This 
study investigates consumers’ valuations of different agricultural production methods 
and provides a unique method for studying whether consumers’ purchasing behavior 
reflects their willingness to pay. Additionally, it provides insight into the relationships 
between consumers’ valuations and their prestige-seeking behavior and health-
consciousness. 
 A Vickrey 2nd price auction was conducted and immediately followed by the 
introduction of an on-site secondary market that used induced value theory and the retail 
prices of the auction products in surrounding stores in the Bryan-College Station area of 
Texas. Several econometric models were thereafter estimated using data collected from 
the experiment; however a random parameters tobit model proved to be most appropriate 
due to the heterogeneous nature of the data. Results indicate that consumers express 
deep discounts for red colored lettuce. While tasting the products did not have an impact 
on valuations, consumers did express significant premiums for organic lettuce after they 
learned about hydroponic lettuce production and the growing methods of the products 
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were revealed. The same can be said for valuations of mixed lettuce, which was 
hydroponically grown. 
 Consumers were also categorized using three applications of Latent Class Analysis 
and responses to scale-style questions about health-consciousness and prestige-seeking 
buying behavior. The willingness to pay for lettuce was estimated using a random 
parameters tobit model for each latent class in each application.  
 In addition to advancing the understanding of consumers’ valuations of 
horticultural production methods, this study contributed to the external validity of 
experimental auctions. By using an on-site secondary market, it was discovered that 
consumer surplus and the relative importance of the compensation fee affect an 
individual’s behavior in the experiment setting.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last three decades, experimental economic methods have allowed 
researchers to gather primary data about consumers and their purchasing behavior. 
Experimental auctions represent a subset of research tools within this field that have 
been thoroughly used over the past twenty years to elicit consumers’ willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) values for new products and differentiating attributes. These auctions operate off 
of the institutions of incentive-compatibility and utility theory – that is, real money is 
used and real economic consequences are enforced to incentivize consumers, through 
utility maximizing behavior, to reveal their truest valuations. Additionally, the ability to 
induce real markets in a laboratory setting affords economists the opportunity to amplify 
control, which is not normally found in markets. Overall, the elements of incentive 
compatibility and increased control are the principle differences between experimental 
methods and more orthodox value elicitation techniques, such as stated preference and 
observational methods. Aside from these appealing attributes, experimental auctions 
have the advantage of allowing researchers to fit the auction mechanism to the scope and 
objectives of the experiment and directly interpret participants’ valuations of the auction 
goods.  
From the beginning, the advantage of heightened control is utilized. If the 
researcher is interested in testing a theory, she may induce a stylized market by assigning 
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prices and roles to participants. However, if the researcher wants to know how much 
consumers would be willing to pay for a new product using an auction mechanism to 
elicit the raw values consumers bring in to the experiment, also called homegrown 
values, may be a more appropriate route. Another customizable feature of experimental 
auctions allows researchers to endow participants with the good and infer participants’ 
WTP values from the value they would be willing to forfeit to exchange the good for 
something else. The mechanisms themselves vary in information feedback and market 
prices, from being open out-cry auctions in which the last standing offer is the market 
price, such as the familiar English auction, to sealed bid auctions in which the second 
highest bid is the market price, such as Vickrey auctions.  
Regardless of the type of auction mechanism used, consumers’ homegrown WTP 
values can be directly inferred from their bid values. The effortless interpretation of 
consumers’ WTP values is appealing to researchers who are investigating the market 
potential for new products or specific differentiating attributes. Agribusinesses that 
gather market information and consumer demand data may find the application of 
experimental auctions valuable during the research and development stage of bringing a 
new product to the market (Lusk and Shogren, 2007; Lusk and Hudson, 2004; Hoffman 
et al., 1993; Urban and Hauser, 1993; Pride and Ferrell, 2014).  
Although experimental auctions have an attractive way of combining the 
advantages of stated preference and revealed preference methods to test theory and 
collect valuable marketing information, several issues must not be neglected when using 
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these mechanisms. These issues include external validity and the influence of outside 
prices and substitutes on participants’ behavior in the laboratory experiment.  
While a handful of studies have used post-auction outside secondary markets to 
account for outside influences’ effects laboratory behavior, others have addressed 
external validity separately by comparing data from field experiments and laboratory 
experiments. External validity refers to how well the results from the experiment mirror 
actual behavior outside of the experiment, in the real marketplace. The debate of whether 
or not experimental economics in general produce externally valid results has been a 
heated one, with input from behavior economists and psychologists (Loewenstein, 1999; 
Schram, 2005; Guala and Mittone, 2005; Brookshire, Coursey, and Shulze, 1987; Chang, 
Lusk and Norwood, 2009; List and Shogren, 1998). Secondary markets outside of the 
auction experiment have been used to investigate the influence of time in experimental 
auctions and the influence of outside options on participants’ bidding behavior (Haile, 
2001; Corrigan, 2005; Cherry et al., 2004). One study worth mentioning used induced 
value theory and a secondary market to analyze how outside substitutes affected 
consumers’ behavior in the laboratory (Cherry et al., 2004). The paramount faults of 
induced value studies are that the good being auctioned is not disclosed and participants 
are asked to assign value to unknown products in studies that use induced values to 
provoke homegrown values.  
Although the experimental economic literature attempts to address each of these 
issues separately, there has not been an attempt to combine secondary markets, induced 
value theory, and experimental auctions with real, identifiable products in such a way to 
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simultaneously address both external validity issues and the effects of outside influences. 
Furthermore, although studies have used experimental auctions to elicit consumer 
preferences and valuations for novel food products, little is known in general about 
consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for hydroponically grown leafy greens (Huang et 
al., 2002; Batt and Lim, 1999; Huang, Kan, and Fu, 1999). Additionally, the random 
utility framework developed by McFadden (1974), upon which many experimental 
economic studies have relied on, only assumes that the individual derives utility from the 
product and its attributes. Of course, the individuals’ idiosyncrasies and other 
unobserved factors are capture in a random error term, but what if a participant derives 
utility not only from the product and its attributes, but also from the fee they collect for 
their participation in the experiment? What if the participant derives more utility from 
maximizing the compensation fee than from the auction products and adjusts their 
behavior accordingly?  These questions prompt a deeper look into random utility theory 
as it relates to incentive compatible, compensation fee bearing auction mechanisms. 
The more practical objectives of this research relate to consumers’ vegetable 
purchasing behaviors. In spite of the fact that obesity arguably remains as one of 
America’s “heaviest” problems, several pieces of evidence point toward a trend of 
Americans making more informed, healthier food choices. A proliferation of programs 
have emerged in the last decade that aim to help people make healthier choices, such as 
First Lady Michelle Obama’s Let’s Move campaign, and popular television shows that 
promote health education. Menus of fast-food chains are starkly different now than they 
were even ten years ago, as they now showcase a bevy of healthy options and often 
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provide the calorie count beside each item (Food and Drug Administration, 2010).  In 
addition to changes at the food service level, Americans have been ditching carbonated 
beverages and preservative-laden snack foods and reaching for more natural options 
such as water and fruit (Hellmich, 2013). Conventionally produced fruits and vegetables 
now compete with organic and local produce for shelf space in farmers markets and 
supermarkets alike (Martin, 2009). Research has shown that consumer preferences for 
certain quality and credence attributes such as traceability, source information, and 
production methods are on the rise and have significant and imminent policy 
implications (Abidoye et al., 2011; Fatka, 2014).  
Likely recognizing this consumer trend, Texas agribusinesses and producers are 
investigating alternative methods for food and agriculture production as a way to 
differentiate their product. The temperate climates of the Texas Winter Garden Region 
and the Lower Rio Grande Valley provide ideal growing conditions for the almost year-
round production of most fruits and vegetables. In the past ten years, Texas has fallen 
from being ranked third top producing state in U.S. vegetable production to seventh due 
to the devastating impacts of consecutive periods of drought (Leskovar, et al., 2013).  
Although Texas remains in the top tier of national vegetable production, covering 
over 100,000 acres and generating over $360 million from vegetable production alone, 
producers have recently identified water supply and environmental stress as factors 
hindering the progress of the industry and have thus expressed interest in non-
conventional, water efficient technologies (Leskovar et al., 2013). The 2010-2014 
droughts and a lack of irrigation water in reserves have profoundly impacted Texas’ 
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agriculture industry – estimations of specialty crop production losses from drought range 
from $100 million to north of $200 million (Santa Ana, 2013; Ribera and McCorkle, 
2012). Foreseeing a water crisis and in a combined effort to conserve water and stall 
negative economic impacts from future water shortages, the Uvalde County 
Underground Water Conservation District and the Texas A&M AgriLife Research and 
Extension Center at Uvalde, Texas, have jointly expressed interest in assessing the 
market potential of hydroponic fruits and vegetables (Leskovar et al., 2013).  
Although scattered in use throughout history, commercial farms began 
successfully using hydroponics in the U.S., Europe, Africa, and Asia by the mid-1900s 
(Shrestha and Dunn, 2013). This unique production method is usually categorized based 
on whether or not a medium is used and even further specified by how the plant receives 
its nutrients.  A greenhouse structure allows producers to choose from several 
techniques: floating hydroponics, the nutrient film technique (NFT), aeroponics, the 
wick system, water culture system, the ebb and flow system, drip systems, and rockwool 
culture systems (Shrestha and Dunn, 2013).  
Over the past decade, hydroponic fruit and vegetable production has attracted 
more attention and provides an interesting area for market research (Huang et al., 2002; 
Haggerty, 2013). Hydroponics is a highly controlled method for growing vegetables, 
ornamental plants, and foliage plants in which soil is either entirely absent or replaced 
with a medium, such as brick shards, sand, or wood fiber (Coolong and Foran, 2012). 
This soil-less production method provides an alternative method for producing fresh 
fruits and vegetables in extreme, typically infertile climates. From a potential producer’s 
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perspective the hydroponic structure usually requires a greenhouse and the delicate 
nutrient balance demands more attention and maintenance than conventional production. 
However, the highly controlled environment provides a spectrum of advantages, from 
water conservation and reduced weather risk to faster growth time and the diminished 
presence of soil-related pests, fungi, and bacteria (Shrestha and Dunn, 2013; Coolong 
and Foran, 2012). Consumers may associate the soilless production method with an 
increase in food safety or certain health benefits and may find hydroponic fruits and 
vegetables appealing (Huang, Kan, and Fu, 1999; Haggerty, 2013). In contrast to these 
many advantages and the potential profits form a hydroponic venture, a hefty upfront 
investment, demanding nutrient management, and largely unknown market potential 
often discourage producers from investing (Shrestha and Dunn, 2013).  
Although the initial investments for the required infrastructure and marketing 
costs may be higher than conventional production, an increase in demand across 
America for leafy greens has been driven by the aforementioned trend in consumers 
making more informed, healthier choices and thus may provide significant returns to the 
producer. Potential markets have been identified as specific grocers, specialty food 
retailers, restaurant chefs, caterers, wholesalers, and schools, but little is known about 
how consumers view and value hydroponic lettuce (Cooligan and Foran, 2012; Huang et 
al., 2002). Many studies discover consumers’ WTP and preferences for food products, 
but few actually use experimental economics to focus on fresh fruits and vegetables that 
differ in production methods and varieties (McAdams et. al, 2013; Jaeger and Harker, 
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2005). Furthermore, little is known about consumers’ views and valuations of 
hydroponic products.  
The overall objective of this research is to advance understanding and external 
validity of experimental auction valuations. Secondly, this research will provide the 
fresh fruit and vegetable industry with valuable marketing information about hydroponic 
lettuce. External validity and random utility theory will be combined through an on-site 
secondary market that will also incorporate the essence of induced value theory in such a 
way that to this author’s knowledge has not been done before. In a combined effort to 
address the previously mentioned shortcomings of the current literature and aid in this 
market research, this study has multiple objectives: (1) evaluate the external validity of a 
Vickrey 2nd price auction by entwining the essence of induced value theory, real market 
prices, and a post-auction secondary market; (2) elicit consumers’ WTP values and 
compare preferences for differentiating attributes of lettuce such as production method 
and color; (3) compare results from sensory evaluations of hydroponic, organic, and 
conventional lettuces through a blind tasting treatment; and  (4) investigate how 
consumers’ behavior related to health and prestige influences their valuations of 
hydroponic and organic vegetables.   
 In conclusion, this study aims to utilize induced value theory and secondary 
markets to investigate the external validity of Vickrey 2nd price auctions and assess 
consumers’ WTP for hydroponic lettuce, in a unique way to fill a gap in the current 
literature. Ultimately, this research may provide insight into consumers’ decision-
making processes and bring up questions for future research involving random utility 
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theory as it relates to experimental auctions. Added benefits include providing marketers 
of hydroponic fruits and vegetables with evidence of consumers’ valuations of 
hydroponic lettuce and possibly uncovering a connection between higher WTP values 
from the auction and health conscious and prestige conscious grocery shoppers. Also, 
this study may have serious implications for policymakers, theorists, and future 
developments in experimental auction research. Any results will be used in any 
publications that come from this study and communicated to Texas Department of 
Agriculture, the Uvalde County Underground Water Conservation District, and Texas 
A&M AgriLife Research and Extension Center. 
 This study is structured as follows. First a literature review is warranted to 
provide the reader with knowledge of value elicitation methods, experimental auctions, 
the issues that come to light in the literature, and previous applications of experimental 
methods to elicit consumers’ WTP values for food products. Included in the literature 
review is a robust narration of the debate on external validity, as well as a description of 
induced value theory and secondary markets.  Next will be a review of the lettuce 
industry and the evolution of hydroponics, as well as a more detailed description of 
hydroponic systems. Special attention is paid to studies that have analyzed the 
differences of food products produced under organic, hydroponic, and conventional 
production methods. An explanation of the methodologies used and the procedures 
follows, with a subsequent discussion of the results. Finally, a conclusion will provide 
the reader with any implications of this research and suggest possible extensions for 
future research.
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Eliciting Consumers’ Values 
One might describe the modern-day economist as a scientist, a storyteller, and a 
problem-solver, fueled by copious amounts of coffee and a perpetual curiosity to 
observe, describe what is, and predict what will be. One of the more recent 
developments of this occupation, specifically in the area of consumer research, is 
discovering individuals’ true valuations in an effort to estimate the demand of a specific 
product. Determining these valuations for goods and services has traditionally been a 
challenge for economists because consumers’ truest, most pure valuations are difficult to 
uncover.  
The most widely accepted terms of value measurement are willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) values. Whereas WTP values are most 
commonly known as the maximum amount of income an individual would give up to 
obtain a good, WTA values are usually thought of as the minimum amount of 
compensation individuals would be willing to accept to give up a good. These concepts 
can be easily visualized in a market setting by thinking of WTP as the price at which 
consumers would be willing to purchase a specific good and WTA as the price at which 
producers would be willing to sell the good. Because this study primarily concerns 
consumers, we will say adieu to WTA and proceed with WTP value elicitation methods. 
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Revealing shoppers’ WTP values may be especially valuable to agribusinesses 
that are contemplating introducing a novel food product to the market. Several value 
elicitation methods and theories exist in the experimental economic literature. This 
review of literature aims to salute the evolution of consumer theory and provide the 
reader with a brief description of the most widely used value elicitation methods, an 
introduction to experimental economics and a robust discussion of experimental auctions 
and design issues, and concludes by suggesting the application of a harmonious blend of 
existing valuation methods that may advance the paradigm through which economists 
study consumer theory. 
 
The Evolution of Consumer Theory According to McFadden 
In an effort to predict the future of experimental economics, McFadden (2013) 
asserted that the history of consumer theory began over two hundred years ago with 
Jeremy Bentham’s (1789) idea of self-interest and increasing pleasure and reducing pain 
as the motivational forces for the choices consumers make. Bentham’s (1789) 
description of what we now call “utility” was attached to the process of increasing 
pleasure or reducing pain, not necessarily with the consequences of these actions as 
neoclassical theory suggests later. According to Bentham, intensity, duration, certainty 
(or uncertainty), and propinquity (or remoteness) were the four criteria that determine 
utility. Famous economists such as Adam Smith (1753) and Francis Edgeworth (1881) 
shared Bentham’s call for the inclusion of altruism and reciprocity as crucial 
  12 
components of utility. Unfortunately, it became difficult to recover utility from observed 
behavior under this definition. In the mid 1800s, Jules Dupuit (1844) and Hermann 
Gossen (1854) introduced the concept of using the marginal utility of money as a means 
for calculating maximized utility. Dupuit’s concept of relative utility (which later 
became known as consumer surplus) and William Stanley Jevons (1871), Edgeworth 
(1881), Alfred Marshall (1895), and Vilfredo Pareto’s (1906) development of the inverse 
problem (using demand to recover utility) forever changed economists’ relationship with 
utility. 
As McFadden’s (2013) narration moves into the mid 20th century, he explained 
that utility moved away from Bentham’s idea of pleasure, pain, reciprocity, and altruism 
and quickly drifted toward a more narrow definition. The new, neoclassical concept of 
utility was solely measured through revealed demand behavior and left no room for 
introspective explanations. Irving Fisher (1892), John Hicks (1939), and Paul Samuelson 
(1947) further developed the relatively new framework and established it as the go-to 
method for measuring utility. Eugen Slutsky (1915), Hicks (1939), and Samuelson 
(1947) developed the formal economic framework and Rene Roy (1942), Rudolph 
Auspitz and Richard Lieben (1889), Harold Hotelling (1935), Lionel McKenzie (1957), 
and Hirofumi Uzawa (1971) made significant contributions to the theory. Utility became 
a function of the good; attributes of the goods and the consumer’s experience, social and 
environmental cues, and information; and unobserved primitive characteristics of the 
individual such as heterogeneous tastes. McFadden (2013) claims that although the 
attributes of the good and the consumer’s surroundings and unobserved characteristics 
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were implicit in the framework, and although the former variables affected pleasure and 
pain, neoclassical theory failed to account for any influence on market demand behavior 
or the consumer’s well being. 
McFadden (2013) described the impact of technology on theory as the 1960s 
ushered in a new age of econometric data analysis and the advancement of technology 
that allowed variables such as attributes of the good and characteristics of the 
consumers’ surroundings to be accounted for in demand analysis. Richard Stone (1954) 
and Erwin Diewert (1971), among others, became the pioneers of consumer demand 
analysis through econometric demand systems. A new question was brought to the 
economics table regarding the effect of changes in a “consumers’ economic 
environment” on indirect utility. Dupuit, Marshall, and Hicks’ concept of consumer 
surplus was dusted off and revisited to help explain compensating variation or WTP. 
However, even with all of the theoretical advancements over the last century, the 
neoclassical framework still falls short in accounting for non-market attributes’ impact 
on observable consumer behavior. 
 
Value Elicitation Methods 
Throughout the last forty years, economists have tweaked the tools through 
which they study how consumers value certain goods and services (Lusk and Shogren, 
2007). The advancement of value elicitation methods can largely be attributed to 
environmental economists and their efforts in assessing damages or benefits of public 
goods.  Tietenberg and Lewis (2009) claim the question of valuation methods rose to the 
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surface in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska on March 
24, 1989. Economists were called on throughout the litigation process to calculate the 
value of the short-term and long-term damage done to the environment, the people, and 
the community, in an effort to determine the appropriate compensation due to the 
victims of the oil spill. This famous court case ignited a movement of value elicitation 
methods in the economic literature. What are consumers’ true values for public goods 
not observed in the market place, such as wildlife habitats and parks, and for private 
goods that are observed in the market place, such as a pint of strawberries or a coffee 
mug? The multitude of methods that have been developed in the past forty years to 
answer these questions can be grouped into two broad categories, stated preference 
methods and revealed preference methods.  
Stated Preference Methods 
Stated preference methods involve asking individuals to state their value for the 
good or issue at hand, usually in a survey format. One of the most fervently discussed 
methods is the contingent valuation method (CVM) in which subjects are directly asked 
to state the value they place on the good. A more complex version of CVM might 
establish upper and lower bounds by providing subjects with specific conditions and 
asking if they are willing to pay $X for the good (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009). 
Individuals’ values can also be inferred indirectly through hypothetical, attribute-based 
models such as the contingent ranking method and discrete choice experiments (DCE). 
The contingent ranking method takes the form of a survey, in which subjects are asked 
to rank-order different goods or bundles or attributes. If one of the goods or attributes is 
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expressed in monetary terms, the individuals’ value regarding tradeoffs can then be 
inferred.  Similar to CVM, a discrete choice experiment is a survey-based design, but 
instead of asking participants to state their value for the good, they are asked to choose 
between alternative scenarios or bundles of attributes. If the bundles or scenarios are 
associated with a specific price, marginal WTP values can be indirectly inferred from a 
participant’s response. 
Revealed Preference Methods 
If stated preference methods are at one end of the value elicitation method 
spectrum, revealed preference methods occupy the opposite end. Revealed preference 
methods are based on actual observable choices and values can be directly obtained 
through market prices and real transactions, such as scanner data, or indirectly obtained 
through the travel cost method, hedonic pricing method, and hedonic wage method. 
Scanner data records the price an individual pays at the point of purchase and is 
collected from most retail stores. The travel cost method and hedonic property values 
method have been particularly useful for environmental economists assessing the value 
of goods that are not usually traded in the marketplace. The travel cost method involves 
analyzing how much an individual spent, in terms of expenditures and opportunity cost, 
to travel to a recreational resource, such as the Grand Canyon National Park, whereas the 
hedonic property value model involves using existing market data and property values in 
the surrounding area to extract marginal WTP for components of a house, such as an 
extra bathroom. In a similar style, the hedonic wage method involves using wage data to 
assess the WTP to avoid working under certain conditions. 
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Advantages, Disadvantages, and Biases 
Revealed preference methods and stated preference methods have advantages 
and disadvantages. For example, Lusk and Shogren (2007) clarify that although stated 
preference methods provide the researcher with the freedom and flexibility to create 
hypothetical scenarios and goods, and therefore more control over the stimuli subjects 
are asked to act on, a major drawback is that subjects respond to the hypothetical 
questions by giving hypothetical answers – meaning that subjects may overstate or 
understate their true values, perhaps even unknowingly, because the entire situation is 
hypothetical and inconsequential in nature. Revealed preferences, alternatively, also 
have advantages and disadvantages. Lusk and Shogren (2007) briefly mention that one 
of the most attractive characteristics of revealed preference methods is their ability to 
observe actual behavior and real values in the market place. Although nonhypothetical 
behavior and choices are studied, they are observed after the transaction and still rely on 
inference and empirical patterns to implicitly derive consumers’ valuations for a certain 
good. Furthermore, the post-transaction nature of the data limits the amount of control 
researchers have compared to stated preference methods, in that they cannot instantly 
observe how consumers’ behavior changes when specific conditions change. 
One of the most widely published concerns with stated preference methods is the 
issue of biases. Economists have fervently debated CVM’s hypothetical structure and 
whether it is able to elicit consumers’ truest valuations. Tietenberg and Lewis (2009) 
identified five types of bias that may arise with stated preference methods: (1) strategic 
bias; (2) information bias; (3) starting-point bias; (4) WTP does not equal willingness-to-
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accept (WTA) bias; and (5) hypothetical bias. Strategic bias refers to the subject stating a 
value that will influence a particular outcome, while information bias occurs when 
subjects are required to value attributes for which they have little or no experience with. 
Starting-point bias may exist as a result of the spread and magnitude of a predefined 
answer range. Another crucial consideration in designing the plan for eliciting 
consumers’ values is choosing whether to elicit WTP or WTA values. List and Gallet 
(2001) conducted a meta-analysis of 29 experimental studies and, among other findings, 
discovered that WTP studies showed less overstatement of preferences compared to 
WTA studies. Hypothetical bias arises when subjects respond differently to hypothetical 
questions than to questions that have real consequences, and can generally be thought of 
as the difference between stated preference values and revealed preference values (Lusk 
and Hudson, 2004; Murphy et al., 2005). 
Whether or not hypothetical bias compromises the validity of stated preference 
methods, specifically CVM, has been hotly debated amongst economists for well over 
twenty years. Igniting this debate was Bohm’s (1972) study that compared hypothetical 
and real values. Among those who have found that hypothetical values eclipse actual 
values are Bishop and Heberlein (1979, 1986), Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström 
(1995), and List and Shogren (1998). Alternatively, studies that disagree with the 
existence of hypothetical bias include Dickie, Fisher, and Gerking (1987), Johannesson, 
Lilijas, and O’Conor (1997), Sinden (1988), and Smith and Mansfield (1998). Although 
the factors that cause hypothetical bias are largely unspecified due to a lack of theory 
and empirical shortcomings, several studies have conducted meta-analyses in an attempt 
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to identify the experimental design factors that can lead to bias (Carson et al., 1996; List 
and Gallet, 2001; Murphy et al. 2005; Little and Berrens, 2004; and Harrison and 
Rutström, 2008). 
List and Gallet (2001) used a calibration factor (mean hypothetical WTP divided 
by mean actual value) and regression analysis with the natural logarithm of the 
calibration factor as the dependent variable in their meta-analysis to investigate the 
experimental design characteristics that encourage a disparity between stated values in 
and actual values.  The wide range of design characteristics included the setting, type of 
good used, type of comparison, and the elicitation method enlisted. Their results 
indicated that on average subjects who responded to hypothetical questions in the studies 
of interest overstated their responses by a factor of three. Additionally, List and Gallet 
(2001) established several factors to consider when designing an experiment: (1) 
hypothetical WTP studies yield results that are more in line with subjects’ actual WTP 
values compared to WTA studies; (2) the disparity between hypothetical stated values 
and actual values is smaller when private goods instead of public goods; and (3) 
elicitation methods matter, as a first price sealed bid auction reduces bias between 
hypothetical values and real values. 
Little and Berrens (2004) revisited List and Gallet’s (2001) meta-analysis and 
expanded it to include more observations to analyze additional factors of experimental 
design, such as the impact of referenda, cheap talk scripts, and certainty corrections. 
Little and Berrens’ (2004) results supported List and Gallet’s (2001) conclusions that 
elicitation mechanisms matter, but were unable to confirm that private goods lessen 
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hypothetical bias relative to public goods. Their results from a calibration factor model 
and probit model suggest that certainty corrections and referenda seem to diminish the 
disparity between hypothetical stated values and actual values. 
Murphy et al. (2005) continued the trend of meta-analysis by analyzing twenty-
eight stated preference studies. All of these studies had similar themes in that they 
reported WTP values in monetary terms and used the same value elicitation mechanism 
to elicit hypothetical and real values.  They claimed choice-based elicitation 
mechanisms, specifically “dichotomous and polychotomous choice, referendum, 
payment card and conjoint,” were effective in narrowing the gap between hypothetical 
stated values and actual values. Additionally, they introduced the idea that using students 
in the sample may cause hypothetical bias and they find weak evidence to support List 
and Gallet’s (2001) claim that the use of public goods increases hypothetical bias. 
After investigating the existence of hypothetical bias in studies that use CVM 
and private goods, CVM and public goods, open-ended elicitation in the laboratory, 
dichotomous choice elicitation in the laboratory, social elicitation in the laboratory, 
Harrison and Rutström (2008) echo the sentiments of List and Gallet (2001) and Murphy 
et al. (2005) in that they agree that hypothetical bias undoubtedly exists and that the use 
of a private, deliverable good instead of a public good, such as a policy or environmental 
scenario, helps to reduce the amount of bias that may arise. Furthermore, they identify 
one of the causes of hypothetical bias to be “lack of real economic commitment” in the 
hypothetical settings. 
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Experimental Economics 
History of Field Experiments 
Levitt and List (2009) provided economists with a historical timeline of 
experiments in science, from Galileo to Rutherford, and identified three distinct time 
periods in experimental economics. The first is dubbed the dawn of field 
experimentation, in which experiments were conducted in the field to answer questions 
about agricultural productivity in the 1920s and 1930s. As previously mentioned by 
McFadden (2013), the 1960s changed the way data was analyzed. This change allowed 
for analysis of large-scale social experiments that evaluated government social 
programs. The third period related to the development of experimental economics, which 
emphasized control and blended characteristics of conventional lab experiments, social 
experiments, randomization and realism. 
The groundwork for experimental economic markets in the laboratory was 
largely the work of Vernon Smith’s (1976) seminal paper titled “Experimental 
Economics: Induced Value Theory.” He proposed that economics in the laboratory can 
be a vehicle to test theories before applying them to the outside world, where ceteris 
paribus is not easy to find. Furthermore, laboratory exercises help prevent researchers 
from tweaking and fitting the model to a random body of field data. Smith (1976) 
claimed that an increased level of control in the laboratory setting allows researchers to 
observe changes in participants’ behavior through fabricated reward structures, the 
application of different treatments, and as specific values induced on participants. By 
using the theory of neoclassical demand, nonsatiation, and the utility for money and by 
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inducing supply and demand on participants, Smith (1976) successfully created a 
functional market and observed competitive equilibria emerge in the laboratory. 
Later, in 1982, Smith formally established the theoretical underpinnings and 
structure for experimental economics in the laboratory. Smith (1982) extended beyond 
his earlier framework to define the components of an experiment and stressed the 
importance of incentivizing participants to reveal their true market behavior. Smith 
(1982) reemphasized that control and replicability were the primary differences between 
experimental economics and other methods of studying economics. He provided five 
necessary conditions for microeconomic experiments: nonsatiation, saliency, dominance, 
privacy and parallelism.  Nonsatiation refers to the theoretical concept that our utility for 
money is an increasing monotonic function – in other words, we prefer more money to 
less at all times.  The second condition, saliency, implies that an individual’s reward in 
the experiment is an indirect result of their actions in the experiment.  Dominance, the 
third condition, suggests that the reward structure in the experiment should offset any 
subjective costs of participating in the experiment. The fourth condition, privacy, says 
that each subject in the experiment is provided with information regarding only his or 
her own payoffs. The final condition, parallelism, refers to propositions about how the 
observations in the experiment relate to non-laboratory environments where similar 
ceteris paribus conditions hold.  These five conditions support control in experiments, 
which allows results of experiments to be replicated follow-up experiments – a 
characteristic not found in other methods of studying economics. 
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Additionally, Smith (1982) makes a strong case for microeconomic experiments 
by separating a laboratory experiment into two main components, the environment and 
the institution. While the environment describes physical characteristics of the 
experiment such as information about the participants’ utility functions and the types of 
goods being used, the institution establishes the language and rules that are meant to 
guide the participants’ decisions in the experimental marketplace. A participants’ 
behavior is a function of the institution and the environment and together, the institution, 
the environment, and the behavior form the microeconomic system in the laboratory. 
Smith extends beyond this framework to define two crucial components of an institution 
– a mechanism, which is a formal theory that encourages equilibrium behavior among 
subjects, and incentive compatibility, which he defined as the ability of an institution’s 
rules to produce Pareto optimal results (1982). 
Experimental Auctions 
Smith (1976, 1982) blazed the trail for a new theoretically sound, value 
elicitation method to emerge. Lusk and Shogren (2007) propose that perhaps the most 
effective tool for eliciting consumers’ truest values would combine the advantages of 
revealed preference methods and stated preference methods in an entirely novel method, 
experimental auctions. Experimental auctions were formally introduced as a viable value 
elicitation method in Smith’s (1976, 1982) studies and have become a popular tool for 
market research over the last twenty years, being used in more than 100 studies (Lusk 
and Shogren, 2007; Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu, 2007). Although auctions tend to lack 
context and create an unfamiliar environment for participants, they offer a plethora of 
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advantages – including increased control and straightforward interpretations of the 
participants’ valuations (Hoffman et al., 1993; Loewenstein, 1999; Lusk and Shogren, 
2007). This subsection addresses the broad groups experimental auctions can be divided 
into, the types of auction mechanisms, the incentive compatibility of auctions, salutes 
studies that have compared differing auction mechanisms with each other and with other 
methods, and explains homegrown values and induced values. 
Continuous Auctions, Sealed-Bid Auctions, Endowed, and NonEndowed 
Smith (1982) established two broad groups of auctions – continuous auctions and 
sealed-bid auctions. Continuous auctions can be thought of as a traditional English 
auction, in which a participant can change their bid in response to other participants’ 
bids (Smith, 1982). The rules of the institution, also known as the auction mechanism, 
allow for individuals (bidders) to change their WTP values (bids) based off of the 
messages that are exchanged between individuals and the auctioneer and also among 
other participating individuals in the auction setting (Smith, 1982). The second type of 
auctions, sealed-bid auctions, establish rules and a setting in which participants privately 
write down and discreetly submit their bid to a center or the auctioneer. No information 
is exchanged about valuations between the auctioneer and the individuals or between the 
individuals themselves. The bids are organized according to the auction mechanism and 
the buyer and the price is announced.  Smith (1982) noted that the most significant 
difference between these two styles is the amount of information available to the bidders 
and recognized the continuous auction provides “a message history between successive 
contracts.” 
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Additionally, Lusk and Hudson (2004) established that participants in 
experimental auctions can either be endowed with a good and subsequently asked to bid 
to be able to exchange the good for a new good, or not endowed with an existing good, 
and asked to directly bid on a selection of competing goods. In the latter case, one of the 
goods is randomly drawn to be binding and, according to theory, demand can be elicited 
for the binding good (Lusk and Hudson, 2004). 
Types of Auctions 
Smith (1982) identified several types of common auction mechanisms: English, 
Dutch, first price, and second price. Lusk and Shogren (2007) added in other incentive-
compatible mechanisms for consideration such as the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
(BDM) mechanism, Vickrey nth price auctions, and the random nth price auction. 
English auctions are continuous in nature and begin with the auctioneer announcing a 
relatively low price, believed to be lower than the participants’ maximum WTP for the 
good. The auctioneer calls for bids as he or she ascends in price and once a participant 
bids at a specific price that bid stands until it is displaced by another participants’ bid, 
which must be higher. The bidding ends when the auctioneer recognizes no higher bids 
are being elicited (Smith, 1982). The standing bid’s owner becomes the buyer and pays 
the associated price. The Dutch auction is continuous in nature and is similar to the 
English auction, except that instead of starting at a low price and ascending, the 
auctioneer begins at a high price, believed to be higher than the participants’ maximum 
WTP for the good. The auctioneer proceeds to lower the price in increments and goes 
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bids until a participant is willing to accept the auctioneer’s price or a pre-determined 
price floor level. 
Sealed-bid auctions include first price auctions and the incentive compatible 
mechanisms of Vickrey second-price auctions, random nth price auctions and BDM 
auctions. First price auctions are relatively simple – participants privately submit bids to 
a center, the bids are organized, and the person who bid the highest price for the good 
becomes the buyer and pays a price equal to their bid. Vickrey second-price auctions, 
random nth price auctions, and BDM auctions are incentive compatible by enforcing 
tangible monetary transactions and separating participants’ stated values in their bids 
from what they actually pay for the good. Additionally, they absorb some of the benefits 
of stated preference methods and revealed preference methods by directly observing 
stated values in the form of submitted bids and they avoid hypothetical bias through the 
incentive compatibility characteristic. 
William Vickrey (1961) introduced the concept of a 2nd price auction through the 
illustration of a marketing (brokerage firm) agency’s problem with determining the 
equilibrium price and quantity that will sustain a competitive environment between 
buyers and sellers. In a 2nd price auction, the award will be delivered to the highest 
bidder, who will pay the second-highest bid, which becomes the market price in the 
auction. Note that unless two or more participants bid the same price and that price 
ended up being the highest price, the second-highest bid indicates usually only one 
buyer. Vickrey (1961) points out that although the second-price auction is more 
sophisticated in nature and less self-policing than more simple auctions, such as the 
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English and Dutch auctions, the advantages of the Pareto-optimal properties of a second-
price auction are quite attractive to market researchers. Theoretically, any level of bids 
can be the designated indicator of the market price and also indicate the buyer(s) (i.e. 
fifth-highest bid, third-highest bid, etc.). For example, in a Vickrey style fifth-price 
auction, participants submit sealed bids and the four bidders who submitted bids higher 
than the fifth price become buyers and pay a market price equal to the fifth-highest bid 
(Lusk, Alexander, Rousu, 2007; Hoffman et al., 1993). The BDM mechanism is 
comparable to Vickrey auctions, but incorporates more of a random component. In a 
BDM mechanism, participants bid against a randomly established price and those 
participants who bid higher than the random price become buyers and purchase the 
good. A random nth price auction entices subjects to submit bids for the good being 
auctioned and randomly draws one of the bids to be the market price. Individuals whose 
bids exceed the randomly drawn price pay the market price for the good. The random 
nth price auction embodies characteristics of both the nth-price auction (as in the second-
price auction) and the BDM mechanism (Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu, 2007; Lusk and 
Shogren, 2007). 
Comparisons of Auction Mechanisms 
In the quest to improve value elicitation mechanisms, many studies have made 
comparisons between the theoretical properties and practical aspects of stated preference 
methods, revealed preference methods, and experimental auction mechanisms (Shogren 
et al., 2001; Lusk and Hudson, 2004; Noussair et al., 2004, Lusk and Rousu, 2006). 
Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) used a unique combination of stated preference methods, 
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auction mechanisms, and field experiments to compare elicited WTP values across 
settings, methods, and goods to examine the feasibility, reliability, and validity of the 
BDM mechanism. First they used the BDM mechanism and “price matching” in the 
form of open-ended contingent valuation to elicit consumers’ WTP values for a can of 
Coca-Cola on a beach in Kiel, Germany. In a second application, they employed the 
same methods but changed the good and the setting to be a piece of pound cake on a 
commuter ferry in Kiel. A third group’s WTP values were elicited for three pens using a 
hypothetical contingent valuation method in which they were asked whether they would 
buy or not buy at certain price points. A between subjects design was used and mean 
WTP values elicited in the first two applications were compared to measure the 
reliability of the BDM mechanism. To evaluate the internal validity of the BDM 
mechanism, researchers used a discrete choice logit analysis of the purchase 
probabilities. Researchers also investigated the effect of using candy as compensation 
relative to no compensation. Between the BDM subsamples, no difference seemed to 
exist, but the price matching subsamples were not equivalent.  The authors concluded 
that WTP values elicited through a BDM mechanism are unfazed by the level of 
compensation participants receive. Although this was a profound step in analyzing the 
incentive compatibility, reliability, and internal validity of BDM mechanism relative to 
CVM, compensation were bags of candy, not money. Money can be exchanged for 
something of value post-auction whereas the candy cannot, and thus may influence a 
different outcome. Regardless, Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) concluded that the BDM 
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mechanism is a feasible, reliable, and valid tool for eliciting consumers’ WTP values in 
point-of-purchase situations. 
Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu (2007) compared the theoretical properties, payoff 
functions, and cost of deviation of three popular incentive compatible value elicitation 
auction mechanisms: Becker, DeGroot, Marschak (BDM) mechanism, Vickrey nth price 
auctions, and the random nth price auction. They define on-margin bidding and off-
margin bidding and show that the mechanisms differ with regard to the expected cost of 
misbehaving (deviating from true values, or over and underbidding). They also illustrate 
that incentive compatibility relies on the distribution of other participants’ bids and their 
true values. In addition to this broader topic, Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu shed light onto 
the induced value second price Vickrey auction conducted by Shogren et al. (2001). 
Offering a more applied approach, Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004) used 
steaks to investigate how WTP values elicited from experimental auctions were 
influenced by certain factors, specifically auction mechanism, reference-dependency of 
preferences, and the presence of multiple goods influenced. Consumers submitted 
valuations for five different types of rib-eye steaks: generic, guaranteed tender, natural, 
USDA Choice, and Certified Angus Beef. The first treatment used an endowment 
approach and captured consumers’ WTP bids through four commonly used auction 
mechanisms: English, Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM), Vickrey second-price, and 
random nth price. The second treatment measured the endowment effect by repeating the 
first treatment sans endowment. In an effort to measure the influence of multiple goods 
the final treatment consisted of no endowment, and only used the second price auction 
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mechanism to elicit values for only the generic and guaranteed tenderness steaks. Results 
indicated that the type of auction mechanism significantly influenced WTP values (bids) 
of the steaks.  Bids became significantly higher following the first round of the second 
price auction relative to bids from the other three mechanisms. Lusk, Feldkamp, and 
Schroeder (2004) suggested the posting of prices, bidder affiliation, and competitiveness 
among bidder personalities could have caused this inflation in bids. When an endowment 
was provided, bids were significantly lower in all rounds of the random nth price auction 
than in the BDM and English auction mechanisms. Although divergent in terms of 
market feedback and price determination, BDM and English mechanisms generated 
statistically equivalent bids. The endowment effect significantly influenced prices in the 
second price and random nth price auctions, but not in the BDM and English. This could 
be due to the single round nature of the English and BDM mechanisms. 
Not only have comparisons been made between experimental auctions and other 
value elicitation methods, and between auction mechanisms themselves, researchers 
have juxtaposed econometric methods for analyzing different auction mechanisms. For 
example, Chang, Lusk, and Norwood (2009) compared the predictive performance of 
three popular value elicitation methods (hypothetical choice, non-hypothetical choice, 
and non-hypothetical ranking) and three econometric models (multinomial logit (MNL), 
independent availability logit (IAL), and random parameter logit (RPL)) by exploring 
whether consumers’ actual buying behavior in a grocery store mirrored their preferences 
elicited in a laboratory setting. Chang, Lusk, and Norwood (2009) concluded that the 
non-hypothetical choice and ranking methods were better methods for predicting 
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consumers’ behavior, while the RPL model was the best performing econometric model 
due to its flexibility and compatibility with the heterogeneity within the data. 
Incentive Compatibility 
Perhaps the most notable advantage of experimental auctions relative to other 
methods of value elicitation, such as stated preference, is the application of real money 
consequence and reward mechanisms. When an individual is asked to state how much 
they would be willing to pay per month to support a local park or how much they would 
be willing to pay for a rare bottle of Scotch whisky, their answer is not tied to any 
consequences or payment – the person will not have to shell out the money and thus is 
inclined to not give their most truthful valuation. 
One of the most attractive characteristics of experimental auctions is that they are 
incentive compatible, meaning they facilitate a live market with real money at stake and 
enforce payment and reward mechanisms and “a person has a dominant strategy to 
submit a bid exactly equal to his or her value for the good” (Lusk and Shogren, 2007). 
Real monetary rewards and consequences incentivize participants to submit their truest 
values and discourage any deviating behavior from their truest valuations. As evidenced 
from List and Gallet’s (2001) previously mentioned meta-analysis, several studies have 
confirmed that people often state their WTP values when there is no incentive to answer 
truthfully or exert the energy to give their truest valuations, compared to when a 
monetary reward or cost is linked to their answer. For example, in a Vickrey second-
price auction, the market price is equal to the second highest bid. The participant who 
bid the highest amount for the binding good becomes the buyer and must pay the second 
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highest bid (market price) for the good. Participants are unaware of where their bid falls 
in the distribution of bids for the binding good; therefore it is in their best interest to bid 
a value that is exactly equal to their maximum WTP. A mathematical proof is shown in 
Chapter IV. 
Induced Value Theory 
As previously mentioned, Smith (1976) established induced value theory to 
explain the theory behind market experiments in the laboratory. After defining the 
assumption of nonsatiation and a foundation of utility theory, Smith hypothesized that 
“if an individual is faced with a costless choice between two possibilities that are 
identical except that one yields a higher reward than the other, the alternative with the 
higher reward payoff is always preferred.” Generally, induced value experiments insure 
incentive compatibility by implementing reward mechanisms. For example, participants 
gain value, or profits, by selling a good back to the researcher for the market price and a 
participant’s profit is equal to the difference between the market price and the 
individual’s induced value (Lusk and Shogren, 2007). 
Smith proved his theory through a stylized trade experiment in which subjects 
were assigned (induced with) specific values for an abstract, nondescript good and 
assumed the roles of buyers and sellers. Participants naturally converged to market 
equilibrium through the assigned values and assumed roles. Induced value theory 
essentially provided researchers with the element of control in a market experiment and 
maintained incentive compatibility by enforcing real market consequences. 
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Traditionally, this customized characteristic of design has been useful for directly 
observing bidding behavior and can be used to explicitly test the demand-revealing 
tendencies of different auction mechanisms. Although several studies have used induced 
value theory to test the internal validity of auction mechanisms, including Coppinger et 
al. (1980), Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987), Shogren et al. (2001), and Lusk and Rousu 
(2006), fewer studies have used induced values to address the impact of goods outside of 
the laboratory on bidding behavior in the laboratory experiment. 
One of the studies that inspired this research’s methodology involved applying 
induced value theory in a unique way to assess the impact of outside substitutes on 
bidding behavior in the laboratory. The researchers investigated incentive compatibility 
as it relates to outside options and auction behavior – specifically, they looked at any 
effect private goods’ outside substitutes have on bidding behavior (Cherry et al., 2004). 
 This paper used an induced valuation experiment to detect any bid shaving behavior 
when an outside option is present.  Bid shaving behavior occurs when a participant 
adjusts his or her bidding behavior to account for outside substitutes and thus shave 
(move) his or her bid toward the price of the outside option. Auction goods with known 
substitutes outside of the laboratory may undermine the controlled setting. 
Cherry et al. (2004) used a second-highest bid Vickrey auction and treatments 
consisted of real and hypothetical payments, three outside option prices ($2, $4, $6), 
with a no outside option as the baseline measurement. The participants were assigned 
induced values that were considered “resale” or “redemption” prices at which 
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participants could sell the good back to experimenter after the auction and incur either a 
profit or a loss.  
These assigned, induced values were unique and, as a set, formed a complete 
induced demand curve for the private good. After the individuals were assigned a 
random induced value (also considered their resale value), they bid on the product up for 
auction. The highest bidder became the buyer and paid the second-highest bid, which 
was in line with the rules of a Vickrey second-price auction. The buyer could then keep 
the product and potentially sell it outside of the auction at the outside option price or sell 
it back to the monitor in the auction at their assigned resale value (also induced value) 
for a potential profit or loss. Cherry et al. (2004) stressed that, theoretically, the 
participants have an incentive to make their bid price equal to their induced value if the 
price of the outside option is greater than or equal to the induced value. Conversely, the 
bid price will be equal to the price of the outside option when the induced value exceeds 
the price of the outside option. Results indicated the availability of an outside option 
value significantly decreased bid levels in the auction compared to the baseline of no 
outside option. The authors suggested participants might have encountered fatigue in 
repeated hypothetical rounds, which could have affected the results. To further explain 
individual bidding behavior, a random effects tobit model was used. Once they 
controlled for hypothetical bias, bid shaving was not statistically different to bid shaving 
between the hypothetical rounds and actual rounds. 
Cherry et al. (2004) concluded that people incorporate outside options into their 
bidding behavior and move their bids toward the outside option prices. Although this 
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experiment used induced value theory in a unique way to address the impact of external 
forces, which is often forgotten by experimental economists, the experiment did not 
specify what the auction good was! The benefit of using an abstract good is often 
highlighted in studies using induced value theory because it allows researchers to focus 
solely on the demand-revealing properties of the mechanism being used. However, for 
value elicitation purposes, the good being auctioned and its substitutes are extremely 
important, especially if participants are familiar with the value of the good in the outside 
world, for example food products. Incentive compatibility and the influence of outside 
option values could vary greatly between food and non-food products. 
Homegrown Values 
Traditionally, induced value theory gave researchers the theoretical structure to 
conduct experiments in the laboratory that compared the demand-revealing abilities of 
auction mechanisms. However, consumers’ direct valuations of private goods were not 
necessarily the objective of induced value studies. One of the benefits of experimental 
auctions is the flexibility it provides to researchers, meaning the experiment can be 
designed to directly elicit participants’ true valuations for the good at hand. Lusk and 
Shogren (2007) and Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004) define homegrown values 
as values that are the values participants bring into the experiment, unknown to the 
researcher, can be directly elicited, and are not induced values. Whereas induced values 
are used in auctions where the good is abstract and indefinable, homegrown values are 
elicited in auctions that use real, identifiable products. 
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Secondary Markets 
In addition to experimental auctions being used to test theories and elicit 
consumers’ WTP values for goods, economists have also incorporated secondary 
markets to analyze the effect outside options or subsequent market opportunities have on 
behavior in auctions. Corrigan (2005) investigated how participants’ perceptions about 
the relative difficulty of post-auction transactions affected their WTP values in a random 
nth price auction. A group of students were asked to bid on an Iowa State University-
logo coffee mug in a random nth price auction and answer follow-up questions regarding 
how difficult they thought it would be to delay (buy later, outside of the auction) or 
reverse (resell later, outside of the auction) their transaction. Results from Corrigan’s 
(2005) study suggested that a dynamic component exists in experimental auctions and 
concluded that participants’ behavior in experimental auctions is influenced by a certain 
time component that is a function of the difference between option values of buying or 
selling the specific good in question. Furthermore, results indicated that participants who 
perceive buying the good later (delaying the transaction) outside of the auction to be 
relatively difficult, bid significantly higher than those who perceive buying the good 
outside of the auction to be relatively easy. Corrigan (2005) suggested that these results 
provide evidence that bidding behavior is affected by outside influences. 
Haile (2001) looked at how the opportunity to buy or sell in resale markets 
affected valuations in the U.S. Forest Service’s timber contract auctions. Haile (2001) 
developed a model that explained bidders’ bidding and participation behavior as a 
function of increased competitors entering the auction and applied the model in the form 
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of an English auction. Ultimately, Haile’s (2001) model and empirical analysis proved 
that when a post-auction resale opportunity is available, bidders’ valuations are 
endogenously affected by the value of this option. Haile (2001) concluded that bidders’ 
valuations are higher when there is a high value associated with selling in the resale 
market and lower when there is a low value associated with buying in the resale market. 
A third example of offering subsequent market opportunities to participants is the 
previously discussed study conducted by Cherry et al. (2004). When researchers 
provided participants with induced values that were to be considered “resale” or 
“redemption” prices at which participants could sell the good back to experimenter after 
the auction and incur either a profit or a loss, they essentially introduced another 
component in consumers’ decision making process and bidding behavior.  The 
opportunity for bidders who became buyers to buy or resell the good after the auction 
rounds were completed essentially introduced a secondary market into the experiment. 
Although these studies examine consumers’ behavior when additional opportunities are 
present, none of them use actual private goods or use secondary markets to test the 
deeper issues of experimental auctions as a valid method. 
Issues Associated with Experimental Auctions 
Although experimental auctions are useful for testing theories and eliciting 
consumers’ WTP values for goods, several issues have been discussed in the literature. 
Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004) brought to light three concerns plaguing 
experimental methods that elicit homegrown WTP values: field price censoring, 
affiliated beliefs about field prices, and affiliated beliefs about the quality of the good 
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being auctioned. The discussion of these matters will be a natural progression from 
Cherry et al.’s (2004) study. Additionally, internal validity and the debate on external 
validity will be visited. 
Reference Prices and Outside Substitutes 
When raw WTP values are being elicited for a common good that is available in 
the real market, outside of the laboratory, participants’ bids are prone to being influenced 
by the value of that good. The outside value of the auction good have several names that 
can be used interchangeably, such as field prices, reference prices, outside substitute, or 
field substitutes. Research has shown that outside values can significantly influence bids 
in experimental auctions (Cherry et al. 2004; Harrison, Harstad, and Rutstöm, 2004; 
Alfnes, 2009; and Drichoutis, Lazaridis, and Nayga, 2008). 
Alfnes (2009) took a theoretical look at auction design and constructed a model 
that illustrates how the value consumers place on a good in the auction and the price of 
the same good in the market place affect the surplus he or she receives. These 
components, in conjunction with consumers’ true valuation for the auction good and the 
retail prices of auction good outside of the laboratory ultimately make up a consumer’s 
bid. Using the theoretical model he constructed, Alfnes (2009) derived weakly dominant 
strategies in Vickrey auctions and conducted a sensitivity analysis to see how transaction 
costs, resale potential, the availability of auction products in the market, and auction 
products valued less than their field substitutes affect the model. Alfnes (2009) 
concluded that consumers are likely to have different outside substitutes for the same 
auction products and that these substitutes have a profound impact on the subjects’ 
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valuation of the good in the auction. He concluded that, with the presence of field 
substitutes, consumers’ bids were lower and bounded by the market price. 
Choosing a more applied route, Drichoutis, Lazaridis, and Nayga (2008) 
investigated if and how the presence of field price information (reference prices) 
affected experimental auctions through a multiproduct 2nd price Vickrey auction with 
two information treatments – one informing the participants of the products’ field prices 
and one not including the reference price information. A 6-inch sub sandwich, a wrapped 
pita sandwich, and a Mediterranean type of sandwich were the three products used in the 
bidding rounds. After the WTP data was collected, a random effects tobit model 
analyzed the values. Drichoutis, Lazaridis, and Nayga (2008) found evidence that the 
provision of reference prices had a statistically significant effect on consumers’ bids – 
specifically, the bids tended to be higher after the participants were presented with the 
three products’ actual field prices. This study provided empirical evidence of the effect 
of reference prices and suggested an awareness of the effects reference prices have on 
willingness to pay values in experimental settings. 
Harrison, Harstad, and Rutstöm (2004) suggested that homegrown values elicited 
in the laboratory experiment are not actually raw in nature; rather they are influenced by 
prices of the good outside of the laboratory and will be censored at the “perceived extra-
laboratory price of the good.” Additionally, they stressed the danger of revealing values 
or market prices in between auction rounds, as they too could be considered reference 
prices and taint consumers’ homegrown WTP values of the auction good. The revelation 
of values, such as announcing the market price in between rounds, would contaminate 
  39 
the subject’s thought process of submitting their true valuations and he or she may either 
raise or lower their true value and shave it toward the revealed price. Harrison, Harstad, 
and Rutström (2004) claim this is likely because, “a rational subject will not agree to 
obtain the same commodity in an experiment at a price that he perceives can be beaten 
outside the lab with sufficiently high probability.” 
These studies stress the importance of accounting for reference prices, whether 
they are in laboratory, in between auction rounds or outside of the experiment, in nearby 
retail outlets, when designing an experimental auction that elicits homegrown WTP 
values from consumers. Additionally, these studies showcase the attention that must be 
paid to auction designs that use real goods, especially food products, to elicit consumers’ 
WTP values, as consumers are often familiar with the retail value of close substitutes. 
Affiliated Beliefs 
Another issue brought up in experimental economics is that of belief affiliation. 
According to Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004), beliefs among subjects about field 
prices can be affiliated, as well as beliefs about the actual characteristics of the auction 
good, can influence other subjects’ bids. For example, Sally’s WTP value for the auction 
good may be influenced by John’s beliefs about the quality of the good being auctioned 
or their estimates of the good’s field prices. Alternatively, Sally may adjust her bid after 
viewing John’s bid for the auction good. If she does, her bid is now affiliated with 
John’s and is not her truest homegrown valuation of the good. Harrison, Harstad, and 
Rutström (2004) suggest that experiment designs that reveal market prices in the 
previous round, before the next auction round, and repeated choices may increase the 
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possibility of eliciting bids or preferences that have been influenced by other subjects’ 
opinions and perceptions. 
Internal Validity 
Internal validity is a crucial component in any science project – it forces 
researchers to ask themselves, “Does the theoretical construct used measure what it is 
supposed to measure? Is the experiment structure sound and does it produce results that 
theory says it is supposed to produce?” In general terms, internal validity can be defined 
as a cause-and-effect relationship – all of the independent variables of the experiment 
cause and explain the dependent variable. According to Schram (2005), “An internally 
valid design will yield results that are robust and replicable.”  Lusk and Shogren (2007) 
describe an elicited individuals’ WTP value as a function of their true value, and 
unknown variables like systematic error and random error. A method of measurement 
can be said to be internally valid if the systematic error and random error terms are 
equal, therefore the individual’s elicited WTP value is equal to their true value (Lusk and 
Shogren, 2007). This means that the tool of measurement has accounted all of the things 
that could possibly influence a person’s valuation, including unknown factors. Campbell 
and Stanley (1963) examined sixteen experimental designs in conjunction with several 
common threats to the validity of an experiment. The factors that affected internal 
validity are as follows: history, maturation, testing, instrumentation, statistical 
regression, selection bias, and selection-maturation interaction. Campbell and Stanley 
(1963) concluded that randomization is the key to avoid potential problems from these 
factors. 
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External Validity 
Whereas internal validity refers to the design and theoretical structure of an 
experiment, external validity of experimental auctions and other value elicitation 
methods refers to a model’s prediction abilities outside of the laboratory; that is how 
well the WTP values elicited from the experiment match the actual behavior of 
consumers in the real marketplace. As the issue of the external validity in any science 
project is paramount, for experimental economics it has been at the core of a fiery 
debate. 
Loewenstein (1999) compared behavioral economics with experimental 
economics and questioned the external and internal validity of the latter field of study. 
He challenged the relevance of laboratory experiments by claiming that mechanisms 
used in the laboratory rarely occur in the participant’s daily life and the lack of context 
makes economics in the laboratory an unrealistic measurement of human behavior. 
People rely on context, characteristics of the world around them, to make simple 
decisions and solve complex problems. Loewenstein (1999) argued that the laboratory 
environment of market experiments lack context and unfamiliar procedures confuse the 
participants. He suggested that experimental economists can achieve externally valid 
designs by striving to create “a context that is similar to the one in which economic 
agents will actually operate” in, instead of removing all of the environmental clues in 
favor of a more sterile setting. Loewenstein (1999) also made an interesting point when 
he suggested that monetary rewards are not necessarily the only forms of motivation in 
daily life. 
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Echoing Loewenstein’s (1999) sentiments regarding poor environmental cues, 
Schram (2005) offered a blistering critique and claimed that market experiments in the 
laboratory failed to mirror the context and incentives present in the real marketplace, 
outside of the laboratory. This lack of context, he claimed, is crucial in the consumer’s 
decision-making process when purchasing a good outside of the laboratory. Schram 
(2005) claimed that experimental economists are more focused on using market 
experiments in the laboratory to test existing theories and develop new ones and, as a 
result, tend to emphasize internal validity and empirical regularities more so than 
external validity. He calls for more robust discussion among experimental economists 
about methodological issues plaguing experiments in the laboratory. 
Somewhat answering Schram’s (2005) call for more discussion, Guala and 
Mittone (2005) defined and discussed external validity as it pertains to Alvin Roth’s 
(1986, 1988, 1995) three reasons for experimental economics: (1) speaking to theorists; 
(2) searching for facts; and (3) whispering in the ears of princes. Guala and Mittone 
(2005) discussed one of Roth’s (1986, 1988, 1995) three reasons, “Speaking to 
Theorists,” through two common replies made by economists: 1) the generalizability of 
economic theories in application and 2) economic experiments should mirror the 
assumptions of the model. Guala and Mittone (2005) replied by citing Plott (1991) and 
responded that general models that do not apply to the simplest of cases are not general 
by definition and cannot be considered as such. Guala and Mittone (2005) suggested: 1) 
the assumptions and conditions which allow a fundamental economic theory to be 
general are not actually general in application; and 2) the economic models may not be 
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“general in scope and application” but should be something to strive for. Guala and 
Mittone (2005) made an interesting counterpoint to Loewenstein (1999) and Scram 
(2005) by suggesting that if economic theories attempted to include all of the conditions 
and factors which validate their theories, then the field would rely more heavily on 
neuroscience and psychology, whose relationships with economics is fairly 
underdeveloped. Guala and Mittone (2005) suggest that market experiments help bridge 
the gap between theory and the buzzing, complex world. Guala and Mittone (2005) 
describe the gap between the theory and market experiments as the challenge of internal 
validity and the gap between the market experiment and the real, live world as gap of 
external validity, which is harder to close. 
Several studies have investigated the external validity of hypothetical 
experimental methods, specifically CVM, by comparing elicited responses from a survey 
with actual referenda results (Johnston, 2006; Vossler and Kerkvliet, 2003; and Vossler 
et al., 2003). Depending on the coding technique used, results from these studies 
indicated that CVM was a relatively well indication of voting behavior. However, the 
participants in these studies were responding to public goods; the use of private goods 
may have yielded a different outcome (Chang, Lusk, and Norwood, 2009). Experimental 
economists have also compared results from nonhypothetical methods used in the 
laboratory setting, such as experimental auctions, with field behavior to assess external 
validity (Brookshire, Coursey, and Schulze, 1987; and Shogren et al. 1999). 
Chang, Lusk, and Norwood (2009) chimed in on the external validity debate of 
experimental methods by exploring whether consumers’ actual buying behavior in a 
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grocery store mirrored preferences elicited in a laboratory experiment. They compared 
the external validity across methods, a hypothetical choice experiment, a 
nonhypothetical choice experiment, and a nonhypothetical ranking method, and 
compared the predictive performance of three popular econometric models used in 
experimental economic analysis, multinomial logit (MNL), independent availability logit 
(IAL), and random parameter logit (RPL). Researchers used the three methods to capture 
the preferences of random sample of Stillwater, OK residents for twelve products that 
were grouped into three categories: wheat flour, dishwashing liquid, and ground beef. 
Each of these categories contained three incumbent brands and one new brand. 
Following the collection of the experimental data, researchers gathered retail sales data 
from a local grocery store that had agreed to stock the same twelve products as were in 
the experimental setting. 
By comparing the predicted market shares from the experiment setting with the 
actual market shares at the retail level, researchers concluded that all elicitation methods 
showed a “reasonably high level of external validity.” Although each model at times 
performed better in one category than another, the nonhypothetical choice and ranking 
methods were better methods for predicting than the hypothetical choice method and the 
RPL model happened to be the best performing econometric model due to its flexibility 
and compatibility with panel data. 
In Germany, the external validity of hypothetical methods were examined when 
Grebitus et al. (2010) compared field purchasing behavior with responses from a 
hypothetical survey that questioned 700 pork consumers about the importance of 
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different pork attributes and their knowledge about the attributes of their actual pork 
purchases. They found a strong correspondence between the hypothetical survey 
responses and participants’ actual purchasing behavior. 
Following the trend of comparing experimental results with actual retail 
behavior, Shogren et al. (1999) tested the external validity of a hypothetical method in 
the form of a mail survey, and a nonhypothetical method in the form of a laboratory 
market experiment, against consumers’ behavior in a grocery store. Shogren et al. (1999) 
analyzed consumers’ acceptability and purchasing decisions regarding irradiated chicken 
and nonirradiated chicken in all three settings under different pricing scenarios. Results 
were mixed regarding external validity and design issues created concerns (Chang, Lusk, 
and Norwood, 2009). 
Shogren et al. (1999) and Chang, Lusk, and Norwood (2009) contributed to the 
existing literature by using grocery products and food products to investigate the issue 
external validity, but failed to incorporate experimental auctions. In an effort to address 
the external validity of experimental auctions, List and Shogren (1998) compared the 
market price of sports cards from a second-price Vickrey auction with the actual market 
book value of the cards to address the issue of and external validity in experimental 
auctions. List and Shogren’s (1998) concluded that the second-price Vickrey auction 
generated results that were highly externally valid. 
Specifically pertaining to experimental auction mechanisms, of the studies that 
compared laboratory results with field data to measure the external validity, few have 
used food products as the good of interest. Brookshire, Coursey, and Schulze (2007) 
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filled this gap in the literature by comparing the WTP values for strawberries elicited 
from a Vickrey auction in a laboratory setting to WTP values from door-to-door sales of 
the strawberries. Both sets of participants represented the 1980 Census block data for 
Laramie, Wyoming. Researchers failed to reject the hypothesis that the WTP valuations 
from the field sales data and from the laboratory auction were the same and concluded 
that the auction mechanism was externally valid. One of the largest concerns associated 
with this study was that the data sets from the field and from the laboratory were 
different because of the vector of bids obtained for several different pints of strawberries 
in the lab provided a different data set than the field data. This incongruity in data 
construction made direct comparison difficult. 
Experimental Auction Applications 
From the value of new food products to the value of information, economists 
have used experimental auctions to measure a variety of things. Knowing consumers’ 
values for a novel variety or new production method of a specific food product can be 
extremely valuable to agribusinesses in the research and development stage of 
introducing a new good to the market and can provide priceless information to 
marketers. 
Lusk and Hudson (2004) discuss why WTP values are important to 
agribusinesses and provide methods for incorporating cross-price effects into value 
elicitation methods. Lusk and Hudson (2004) suggest that many agribusinesses and 
producer cooperatives are becoming increasingly interested in making their products 
more attractive to consumers by introducing generic agricultural products with 
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differentiating qualities to the supermarket shelves. In a combined contribution to the 
marketing efforts of agribusinesses and the field of experimental economic research, 
Lusk and Hudson (2004) discussed the advantages, disadvantages, theoretical 
background, and practical application several hypothetical and nonhypothetical value 
elicitation methods, including choice-based-conjoint analysis, dichotomous and double-
bounded choice experiments, and experimental auctions. The study asserted that 
investigating consumers’ WTP values for food products has the potential to help 
agribusinesses estimate market demand for a good or a specific attribute and calculate 
own-price elasticity and price sensitivity of a product, and advised that consumer 
heterogeneity is mentioned as something agribusinesses should be aware of. 
 
Consumers’ WTP for Novel Products 
Alfnes (2007) formally introduced a theoretical model for analyzing how 
consumers’ uncertainty about a novel product affects bidding behavior in Vickrey 
auctions. Hoffman et al. (1993) asserted the importance of market measurement for 
businesses and suggested experimental auctions as a viable means for this assessing 
consumers’ WTP for new products. This article is one of the first to make the connection 
between experimental auctions and marketing research and its objective was to describe 
the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of using experimental auctions in “a pretest 
market research program for a new product.” The advantages and disadvantages 
reflected the statements of other researchers in the field of experimental economics, for 
example benefits include the ability of the auction mechanism to endogenously indicate 
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the consumers’ valuations for the product through their submitted bids and the structural 
design provides a disadvantage, due to the lack of context in the laboratory setting. 
Hoffman et al. (1993) demonstrated an application of a fifth-price Vickrey auction for 
market research with new vacuum-packaged beef. 
Jaegar and Harker (2005) investigated consumers’ WTP and preferences for a 
traditional variety of kiwifruit, Hayward, and a novel variety of kiwifruit, Hongyang. 
Researchers also investigated consumers’ concerns and associations about foods and 
genetic modification. The endowment method was used in a fifth-price Vickrey auction 
with four treatments, as well as a variety-seeking tendency mechanism, and 
questionnaires. On average, consumers were willing to pay a premium to exchange the 
traditional variety for the novel variety. The WTP data indicated a preference for the 
novel variety and consumers were willing to pay 191% more for the fruit. Results 
suggested that before the information treatment, consumers showed uneasiness toward 
the novel fruit because of they made an association with it and genetic modification. 
This changed after they were informed that the new fruit is in fact not genetically 
modified.  
McAdams et al. (2013) used an eleventh-priced sealed bid modified Vickrey 
auction and a nonhypothetical ranking method to elicit consumers’ preferences and WTP 
values for pomegranate products that differed in variety, growing location, and form and 
processing. The products were defined as novel due to the fact that most participants had 
scant experience with the fruit and they were not available at retail markets. Three 
randomized information treatments were used that involved a blind tasting, health and 
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nutrition information, and anticancer information.  A random parameters model was 
used to analyze the WTP information gathered from the auction part of the experiment 
and a rank-ordered mixed logit model was applied to the preference information 
provided by the ranking procedure. Results indicated that the two methods of value-
elicitation did not yield identical results. The authors suggested this incongruity might be 
a result of the cognitive complexity of the ranking procedure. Results indicated on 
average increases in WTP values for several of the novel products over the predominant 
pomegranate variety.  
 
Consumers’ WTP for Production Attributes 
Researchers have become increasingly interested in consumers’ preferences for 
different production methods and quality differentiating attributes of food products. 
Hypothetical experimental methods, such as choice experiments and surveys, have been 
used to estimate consumers’ WTP values for quality differentiating attributes in salmon 
and credence attributes of beef products (Abidoye et al., 2011; Alfnes et al., 2006). 
Alternatively, and more aligned with the objectives of this thesis, experimental auctions 
have proven very useful for eliciting consumers’ WTP for quality differentiating 
attributes for a range of food products (Kanter, Messer, Kaiser, 2009; Lusk, Feldkamp, 
Schroeder, 2004; Rousu et al., 2007).  
Kanter, Messer, and Kaiser (2009) analyzed consumer preferences and WTP for 
conventional milk (unlabeled milk and the majority of milk available on the market, 
which may or may not have been produced with recombinant bovine somatotrophin 
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(rBST)), relative to rBST-free milk and organic milk. Researchers investigated whether a 
stigma existed among consumers against conventional milk, as a repercussion of rBST-
free and organic labels. Consumers’ WTP was elicited through a BDM bidding 
mechanism and a within-subject design. A total of nine combinations through three 
flights of conventional, organic, and rBST-free milk, varying in fat levels and order 
presentation, were presented to participants. During each flight, participants were 
provided with production and nutritional information about the types of milk, similar to 
the actual labels consumers would see in the market. Although initially difficult to 
detect, results revealed that conventional milk was stigmatized by the presence of rBST-
free and organic milk in the market. After participants were informed about the 
properties of rBST-free milk, they showed a 33 percent decrease in WTP values for 
conventional milk. When subjects were provided with information regarding organic 
milk, they exhibited a 45 percent reduction in WTP values for conventional milk. From a 
revealed demand curve, researchers suggested the presence of organic and rBST-free 
milk not only stigmatized conventional milk, but also had a negative effect on all milk in 
general. Further research is warranted to determine how long this stigma lasts. This 
study is an example of consumers expressing preference for specific production 
attributes in food products. Also, a noteworthy result of this experiment shows that 
differentiation may have negative effects on whole industries and not just competing 
goods.   
As discussed previously, Brookshire, Coursey, and Schulze (2007) used Vickrey 
auctions to generate consumers’ WTP values for strawberries. Buhr et al. (1993) used a 
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technique that combined the endowment approach and repeated trials, Vickrey auctions, 
and a split valuation method to elicit consumers’ WTP and pros and cons of a good of 
ambiguous quality – a lean pork product produced with growth enhancers. Buhr et al. 
(1993) found that their sample of students were willing to pay a premium for the leaner 
product, even after they were informed of the growth enhancers.  
In addition to using experimental auctions as a vehicle to extract consumers’ 
WTP values for quality differentiating attributes of food products, Rousu et al. (2007) 
proved that auctions can be used to elicit consumers’ valuations of verifiable production 
information of food products. Several countries have adopted policies that mandate 
specific labeling for foods that are agriculturally bioengineered.  Currently, the U.S. 
employs a voluntary policy with regard to labeling genetically modified (GM) foods. 
Consumers are constantly receiving asymmetric information from biotech industries and 
environmental groups. Rousu et al. (2007) was curious whether verifiable information 
that is provided to consumers by an unbiased third party could be of value in a such a 
controversial market. This study used a random nth price auction design with six 
randomly assigned information treatments made up of one or a combination of 
perspectives from the industry (probiotech), environmental groups (antibiotech), and a 
third-party (verifiable information) and randomly sequenced products: “GM-labeled 
vegetable oil, plain-labeled vegetable oil, GM-labeled tortilla chips, plain-labeled tortilla 
chips, GM-labeled Russet potatoes, and plain-labeled Russet potatoes. Rousu et al. 
(2007) analyzed consumers’ responses to the introduction of verifiable information to a 
market that already circulates biased information from interested parties. Results 
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indicated the potential public good value of verifiable information to be approximately 
$2.6 billion annually and diminish over time. 
 It is apparent from the aforementioned review of literature that the use of food 
products in experimental auctions has become a popular way to investigate consumers’ 
valuations of differentiating attributes such as production methods and novel varieties. 
Despite the proliferation of these studies, or perhaps because of it, several criticize the 
external validity of experimental auctions and claim that the laboratory-environment 
does not yield realistic results.  Thus, a second-price sealed bid Vickrey auction will be 
used to investigate consumers’ valuations of differentiating attributes of vegetable 
products, specifically production method and color, and followed by a secondary market 
mechanism infused with elements of induced value theory and a distribution of the 
auction products’ actual retail prices in an attempt to address the external validity of 
experimental auctions. 
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CHAPTER III  
HYDROPONIC LETTUCE REVIEW 
 
Lettuce (Lactuca sativa) is believed to have been cultivated in the Mediterranean 
region and later transported to the Americas by Christopher Columbus (Jensen, 1997; 
Boriss and Brunke, 2005). The four forms that lettuce largely takes in the U.S. include 
head lettuce, such as iceberg, cos or romaine, leaf lettuce, and butterhead (Davis et al., 
1997). The different forms, textures, and tastes allow for lettuce to be incorporated in a 
variety of ways into Americans’ diets, from salads and on sandwiches to being used as 
wraps or even grilled. Leaf lettuce and romaine have become especially popular for their 
richer hues of green and benefits of vitamins A and C, compared to their butterhead and 
crisphead counterparts (Davis et al., 1997). Traditionally, this popular vegetable has 
been grown in the field, under direct sunlight and is vulnerable to pests and diseases.  
 
Economics of Lettuce Industry 
Lettuce is one of the most valuable fresh vegetable crops in the U.S. (USDA 
NASS, 2014). Head lettuce represented 44.5% of the total value of production of lettuce 
in 2013, while romaine and leaf cultivars shared the remainder (USDA NASS, 2014). 
Leaf lettuce is primarily grown in Arizona and California and in 2013, over 50,000 acres 
were harvested domestically, with the value of production exceeding $450 million 
(USDA NASS, 2014). On average, Americans consumed 18.6 pounds of lettuce 
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annually from 2000 to 2010 and although head lettuce continues to rule production, leaf 
lettuce and romaine have seen growth in demand in recent years (USDA ERS, 2014; 
Boriss and Brunke, 2005). Although China was the world’s largest lettuce producer in 
2010, the U.S. was a net exporter sending the majority of its lettuce exports to Canada, 
Taiwan, and Mexico (Boriss and Brunke, 2005).  
 
Hydroponic Fruit and Vegetable Production 
Covered food production was first recorded around the first century, when 
Roman Emperors had off-season produce grown under “transparent stone” (Jensen, 
1997). Although the production method offered an innovative way of protecting plants 
from frigid temperature, it was abandoned until around the seventeenth century, when 
various materials such as glass materials, bell jars, hot beds covered with glass, and oiled 
translucent paper were tested as suitable covers for food production (Jensen, 1997). In 
the eighteenth century, France and England were using glasshouses to grow melons, 
grapes, and strawberries (Dalrymple, 1973).  
Greenhouse food production really kicked off around the mid-1900s when 
polyethylene was discovered to be a less expensive and just as effective cover material 
(Jensen, 1997). Although scattered in use throughout history, the formal transition of 
hydroponics from the laboratory to the field for commercial production occurred in the 
late 1920s (Shrestha and Dunn, 2013). The term hydroponics was derived from two 
Greek words – ‘hydro’ translates into water and ‘ponos’ translates into labor (Shrestha 
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and Dunn, 2013). Throughout the twentieth century, scientists at experiment stations in 
New Jersey, California, and Indiana further developed hydroponics as the answer to 
fertilizer and soil problems (Jensen, 1997). This new method replaced soil with nutrient 
solution-based methods that used aeration techniques or artificial forms of soil (Withrow 
and Withrow, 1948). During World War II, the U.S. Army used this unique production 
method to provide troops with fresh foods on infertile islands and by mid-Century 
commercial farms were successfully using hydroponics in the U.S., Europe, Africa, and 
Asia. The skyrocketing oil prices in the early 1970s increased energy costs for many 
producers who used greenhouses and hydroponic production methods and, as a result, 
overall greenhouse production slowed. However, the widespread use of plastics renewed 
interest in controlled environment agriculture systems, as well as hydroponics (Jensen 
1997). By 1995, Asia shared over 50% of the total hectares occupied by plastic 
greenhouses in the world (Jensen, 1997).  
Types of Hydroponic Systems 
Since the 1920s, hydroponics as a viable commercial operation has been further 
defined into different types of operating systems. Hydroponics can be initially 
categorized based on the use of a medium liquid (non-aggregate) systems and aggregate 
systems. Liquid systems involve the most popular methods of deep flow hydroponics, 
nutrient film technique (NFT), and aeroponics. Deep flow systems were independently 
developed by Jensen and Massantini (Jensen and Collins, 1985; Massantini, 1976) and 
are good for lettuce and other leafy vegetables because the plants grow on a floating raft 
and “are spread in a single horizontal plane” over nutrient pools in large rectangular-
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shaped tanks. NFT was further defined by Graves (Winsor, Hurd, and Price, 1979; 
Graves, 1983) and involves a thin film of nutrient solution traveling through plastic lined 
conduits to the exposed roots, whereas aeroponics uses closed misting boxes over the 
roots to provide the plants with the necessary nutrient solution. 
Aggregate hydroponic systems involve a solid, inert medium that is soilless by 
design and provides support to the plants. Similar to how the materials used in the 
construction of a greenhouse vary in durability, costs, and popularity among producers, 
so do the materials used for a soilless medium. Several materials, such as peat moss, 
sawdust, perlite, rockwool, and coconut coir, can be used for the medium, but many 
producers rely on what is most cost effective in their location (Jensen, 1997). Both 
aggregate systems and liquid systems have the potential to be open systems (solution is 
recovered, but not used on the plants) or closed systems (nutrient solution is recovered, 
replenished to the correct balance, and recycled through the plants). 
Production Advantages of Hydroponics 
Many advantages are associated with hydroponic food production, including the 
ability to conserve water, faster growth time, higher yield, and more control of the 
growing environment compared to conventional field methods, as well as an alternative 
production method in extreme climates or areas where ground is infertile (Shrethsa and 
Dunn, 2013). Conventional methods often involve continuously growing plants without 
rotation or interruption in open fields can lead to a decline in soil quality and lead to soil-
borne pathogens that have the ability to make their way into the food chain via the 
plants, therefore the reduced soil-related variables in hydroponics prevent soil-borne 
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insects, fungi, and bacteria from entering the food chain or damaging yield (Jensen, 
1997; Shrethsa and Dunn, 2013). Additionally, the controlled environment minimizes 
pesticide use compared to conventional production method (Coolong and Foran, 2012). 
Kimura and Rodriguez-Amaya (2003) stated several advantages of hydroponic 
production, which ranged from a smaller production area that yields higher productivity 
and decreased water and fertilizer usage to a decreased chance of contamination from 
soil-borne microorganisms. The controlled environment of hydroponic production 
systems in greenhouses allows producers to achieve a higher quality crop. Tomatoes, 
cucumbers, and specialty lettuce respond especially well to the hydroponic system and, 
as a result, are the primary food crops grown hydroponically in the U.S. (Jensen, 1997). 
Europe and Japan have had commercial success in hydroponic food production through 
the aforementioned vegetables, as well as eggplant, peppers, melons, and herbs (Jensen, 
1997). 
Production Disadvantages of Hydroponics 
While hydroponic food production offers producers many advantages, it does 
come with its drawbacks. One of the most noticeable disadvantages of hydroponic food 
production is the hefty upfront capital required to establish the infrastructure.  Jensen 
(1997) notes that although higher yields and longer production cycles can be achieved 
through hydroponics, gross returns must be high enough to make up for the extensive 
capital investment. A second disadvantage of managing a hydroponic operation is 
finding and maintaining the optimal balance between major elements and micronutrients 
in the nutrient solution. Although computers can help to automate the production process 
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and provide valuable feedback about the efficiency of the system, technical skills and 
knowledge of the optima nutrient content is necessary in a hydroponic operation (Jensen, 
1997; Shrestha and Dunn, 2013). Each commercial grower has a unique recipe and this 
recipe is critical for the success of the plants and the operation (Shrestha and Dunn, 
2013). Heating and cooling a hydroponic system in a greenhouse can be costly, 
especially if oil prices spike as they did in the early 1970s. Although operating costs can 
be higher than conventional production, Jensen (1997) mentioned that solar energy and 
waste heat from nearby factories have been explored as options to mitigate energy costs 
of managing a greenhouse (Shrestha and Dunn, 2013). 
 
Quality Comparisons 
Bourn and Prescott (2002) conducted a thorough review of studies that compared 
organically grown foods to conventionally grown foods. They discovered four trends 
among the studies that compared the nutritional value of organic and conventional foods: 
(1) comparisons regarding chemical makeup; (2) how nutritional quality was affected by 
different fertilizer treatments; (3) analysis at the farm level; and (4) how human and 
animal health were affected by organic productions relative to conventional productions 
(Bourn and Prescott, 2002). Results from studies within these four themes proved 
difficult to compare due to differences in design. Given the large amount of mixed 
findings and issues with the study designs, the only conclusion Bourn and Prescott 
(2002) could confidently make was that some studies within the fertilizer theme showed 
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evidence lower nitrate levels in the crops that were produced organically compared to 
crops that were grown under conventional methods, in which mineral fertilizer was 
applied.  
In 2013, Ibrahim and Zuki investigated how using hydroponics, aquaponics, and 
conventional, soil based methods affected the quality of lettuce. Results indicated that 
hydroponics produced higher yield and better postharvest quality compared to the other 
two methods. Ibrahim and Zuki (2013) conducted a sensory evaluation in which lettuce 
produced hydroponically proved superior in terms of appearance, taste, texture, odor, 
and overall acceptability attributes. Regarding lettuce produced using conventional and 
aquaponic methods, results from the sensory evaluation showed no statistical significant 
differences (p>0.05) between the two products. Given the initial results and the findings 
from the sensory evaluation, Ibrahim and Zuki (2013) concluded that the hydroponic 
method produces higher yield and better quality lettuce compared to conventional and 
aquaponic methods. 
Antioxidant properties of organic versus conventional foods have also been 
addressed in the literature.  More specifically, and of particular importance to this 
review, Durazzo et al. (2014) compared the antioxidant properties of organic lettuce and 
conventional lettuce grown by conducting greenhouse experiments in the Bergamo 
province of Italy. Antioxidants, also known as phytochemicals, are compounds produced 
by plants that contribute to human health (American Cancer Society, 2013). The 
American Cancer Society (2013) suggests that consuming a diet that is rich in fruits and 
vegetables that contain health-promoting phytochemical compounds, like vitamin C, 
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carotenoids, such as vitamin A, beta-carotene, and lutein, and vitamin E, may reduce the 
risk of chronic diseases and cancer. Blasco et al. (2008) suggest that antioxidants have 
been shown to combat oxidative stress and prevent cardiovascular arteriosclerosis 
(hardening of the arteries), cancer, degenerative eye disorders, as well as Alzheimer’s 
and Parkinson’s diseases. Several studies had previously identified several factors that 
have the ability to affect the phytochemical properties of crops, including “climate, soil 
type, light intensity, irrigation, nutrient supply, pest control, weather, growing location, 
cultivation methods and time of harvest” (Amarowicz et al., 2009; Fallovo et al., 2009; 
Lima and Vianello, 2011).  Durazzo et al. (2014) contributed to this area of literature by 
finding evidence of organic lettuces having significantly higher levels of beta-carotene 
and vitamin C levels compared to lettuces produced under conventional conditions in a 
greenhouse.  
Although a multitude of studies have addressed the health-boosting 
phytochemical properties of lettuce, including Du Pont et al. (2000), Rattler et al. (2005), 
and Llorach et al. (2008), very few studies have compared the health benefits of 
hydroponic lettuce with conventionally grown lettuce. In the case of carotenoid 
composition, Kimura and Rodriguez-Amaya (2003) found that the conventional lettuce 
had significantly higher levels of carotenoids, specifically in the forms of beta-carotene, 
lutein, violaxanthin, than the hydroponic lettuce. One of the reasons, the authors suspect, 
for this difference is that the greenhouse covering led to less exposure to sunlight and 
lower temperatures could have affected the carotenogensis process (Kimura and 
Rodriguez-Amaya, 2003).  
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Despite Kimura and Rodriguez-Amaya’s (2003) findings that hydroponic lettuce 
came second to conventional lettuce in terms of carotenoid content, hydroponics have 
been used as a means to successfully increase the amount of other chemical 
characteristics in lettuce. For example, Neeser, Savidov, and Driedger (2005) showed 
that hydroponic systems could be used to produce calcium-fortified lettuce. In a similar 
manner, Blasco et al. (2008) proved that iodine application to hydroponic lettuce 
significantly increased the antioxidant profile, including the vitamin C and flavonoid 
content, in lettuce in Spain. 
 
Hydroponics and Consumers 
Although extensive data on the hydroponic crop industry is obscure, the value of 
the industry in sales in 2007 was estimated to be more than $553 million (Haggerty, 
2013). A small group of studies investigate consumers’ preferences and WTP values for 
hydroponic crops, thus warranting more research on this innovative production method. 
With a focus on consumer demand and marketing issues, Yiridoe, Bonti-Ankomah, and 
Martin (2005) provided a comprehensive review of the literature that compared organic 
and conventional products. Among the topics investigated, the magnitude of the 
premium consumers were willing to pay compared to conventional foods was 
investigated (Yiridoe, Bonti-Ankomah, and Martin, 2005). Unlike Bourn and Prescott’s 
(2002) inconclusive findings due to mixed results and designs, Yiridoe, Bonti-Ankomah, 
and Martin (2005) were able to make several conclusions from studies about consumers’ 
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WTP for organic foods relative to conventional foods: (1) consumers showed an 
increased WTP value for organic fruits and vegetables, compared to cereals; (2) 
consumers were sensitive to the magnitude of the premium on organic foods; and (3) 
although the compared studies varied in design and methods, premiums ranged from 10-
100% across several countries, but most consumers were not willing to pay a premium 
more than 10-20%. Despite this resolution, Yiridoe, Bonti-Ankomah, and Martin (2005) 
were not able to come to a conclusion about whether organic foods were perceived by 
frequent consumers to be a normal good or a luxury good.  
In the case of lettuce products, Wolf et al. (2002) surveyed head-lettuce (lettuce sold 
by the head) consumers in three different regions of California about their preferences 
for organic lettuce using a five-point desirability scale. Results revealed that 29% of the 
sample indicated an intention to purchase organic head lettuce in the near future. 
Although hydroponic lettuce was not included in the study, one point worth noticing 
from this study is that results from the desirability scale indicated that consumers value 
“environmentally friendly” characteristics more than “organically grown and certified” 
(Wolf et al., 2002).  
As Bourn and Prescott (2002) noted in their comparison of studies comparing the 
sensory qualities of organic and conventional foods, several postharvest factors may be 
responsible for consumers’ preferences toward a particular food produced either 
organically or conventionally that may not be a result of the production method, such as 
transportation and distribution factors. Zhao et al. (2007) used this statement as a 
springboard for a consumer sensory analysis of organic and conventional vegetables that 
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were produced in replicated side-by-side plots. Consumers were asked about their 
overall liking and perceptions of flavor and bitterness intensity of organic and 
conventional versions of red leaf lettuce, spinach, arugula, and mustard greens. A second 
consumer test was conducted using organically and conventionally produced tomatoes, 
cucumbers, and onions. Results from the overall liking analysis and consumer-perceived 
sensory evaluation indicated that, overall, no statistical difference existed between the 
two production methods, with the exception of tomatoes. Zhao et al. (2007) found that 
consumers associated a statistically significant stronger flavor with the conventionally 
grown tomato, relative to the organically grown tomato. This study also found that the 
over 70% of the consumers in the study perceived organic produce to be healthier; 51% 
perceived organically produced food to be more environmentally friendly compared to 
conventional production methods; and 28% of the sample perceived organic produce to 
taste better than conventional produce. 
In the case of hydroponic lettuce, aside from Ibrahim and Zuki (2013), a trivial 
amount of research has been done on consumers’ preferences and willingness to pay 
studies for hydroponic lettuce. Murphy et al. (2011) attempted to gauge consumers’ taste 
preferences for hydroponically grown lettuce by comparing it to its organic and 
conventional counterparts in a sensory evaluation. Echoing Amarowicz et al. (2009), 
Fallovo et al. (2009), Lima and Vianello, (2011), and Durazzo et al. (2014) findings, this 
study suggested that changes in environmental conditions can affect the nutritional 
quality of fruits and vegetables. Although limited in design, Murphy et al. (2011) 
discovered valuable information about consumer preferences for five different varieties 
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of lettuce grown in hydroponic methods, conventional lettuce, and organic lettuce. 
Murphy et al. (2011) found no differences among the lettuces and production methods 
tested.   
As one of the few studies that investigated consumer demand for hydroponic 
vegetables, Huang, Kan, and Fu (1999) elicited Tawainese female homemakers’ WTP 
for hydroponically grown vegetables through a consumer survey and analyzed the 
survey data using a binary-ordinal probit model. The survey collected demographic 
information, perceptions of pesticide residue as a health risk, and information about 
previous hydroponically grown vegetable purchases. Respondents in the study were first 
asked to indicate whether or not they would pay a premium for hydroponic vegetables 
and then, conditional upon them answering yes, they were asked to indicate how much 
more they would be willing to pay. Huang, Kan, and Fu (1999) referred to the binary-
ordinal probit model as a joint estimation of a probit and ordered probit model. This 
analysis revealed that socioeconomic variables drive how much more consumers were 
willing to pay for hydroponic vegetables. Results indicated that a respondent who had a 
family member suffering from a chronic disease in the household would be willing to 
pay 16% or more for hydroponic vegetables. Although this study is one of the select few 
that investigate consumers’ WTP values for hydroponic vegetables, it was a hypothetical 
survey and only displays consumers’ intentions instead of their incentive-based actual 
values. Regardless, this is the closest study to determining consumers’ willingness to pay 
for hydroponic lettuce. 
 Across the Indian Ocean, Batt and Lim (1999) investigated consumer demand for 
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hydroponic lettuce by asking Australian shoppers to complete a survey that included 
questions about their perceptions of hydroponically grown produce. More specifically, 
consumers were asked about their likes, dislikes, the perceived advantages and 
disadvantages, and how they were able to differentiate hydroponically grown produce 
from conventionally grown produce. Batt and Lim (1999) used Scheffe’s Test to analyze 
the data collected and results indicated that most consumers perceived a decrease in the 
use of pesticides in hydroponically grown produce and those who had a preference for 
hydroponic produce, superior taste was identified as the primary differentiating factor. 
Again, as with Huang, Kan, and Fu’s (1999) study, more research is warranted because a 
hypothetical method was used and the values elicited were potentially susceptible to 
hypothetical bias.  
In the early 2000s, Huang et al. (2002) investigated the demand for hydroponic 
lettuce and other hydroponically grown vegetables from local restaurants and 
wholesalers in the Nashville, Tennessee area. With regards to hydroponic lettuce, Huang 
et al. (2002) identified and evaluated the sources of supply and the economic feasibility 
of a hydroponic farm selling to a wholesaler. Researchers distributed a survey to 
restaurants and fruit and vegetable wholesalers. Responses revealed that wholesalers and 
restaurateurs viewed the major advantages of growing hydroponic lettuce as more 
consistent product attributes, such as appearance and taste, a shorter growing period 
(about 35 days) compared to conventional field production, and year-round availability 
as a product of the controllable environment greenhouses offer. Huang et al. (2002) 
concluded that a relationship is feasible between hydroponic producers and wholesalers, 
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but not necessarily between hydroponic producers and restaurants. Furthermore, Huang 
et al. (2002) concluded that limited opportunities exist in the Nashville area due to a lack 
of demand at the wholesaler level, however they did establish that opportunities exist for 
hydroponic tomatoes and cucumbers in the market. Similar to previous studies that have 
investigated consumer demand for hydroponic vegetables, Huang et al. (2002) used a 
hypothetical value elicitation method and not an incentive compatible one.  
Although Coolong and Foran (2012) failed to reveal their method, they identified 
potential markets for hydroponic lettuce as chefs, schools, local grocers, specialty food 
retailers, restaurant chefs, caterers, and wholesalers. Coolong and Foran (2012) claimed 
that hydroponic lettuce is of particular interest to chefs and schools because it is 
uniquely harvested and sold with its roots intact, which offers an extended shelf life 
compared to conventional and organic lettuce. Additionally, Coolong and Foran (2012) 
suggested that another attribute consumers who are concerned with food safety and 
sanitation may find attractive is the fact that the absence of soil in the production process 
prevents the transmission of any soil-borne pathogens that cause food illnesses.  
 
Hydroponics and Food Safety 
As mentioned throughout this chapter, one of the most significant differences 
between hydroponic, organic, and conventional production methods is the absence of 
soil in the growing environment. Continuously growing plants without rotation or 
interruption in open fields can lead to a decline in soil quality and lead to soil-borne 
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pathogens that have the ability to make their way into the food chain via the plants 
(Jensen, 1997). Because hydroponic production relies on a liquid, water-based solution 
to nourish the plants instead of soil, pathogens and microorganisms in the soil that cause 
illnesses are virtually absent, thus creating a more hygienic product (Kimura and 
Rodriguez-Amaya, 2003).  
The CDC investigated a decade’s worth of data, from 1998 to 2008, that 
documented over 125,000 illnesses, hospitalizations, and deaths caused by nearly 4,900 
food-borne illness outbreaks (Hallock, 2013). Leafy greens were identified as the 
primary vehicle for most food-borne illnesses, causing 23% of the food-related illnesses 
and 14% of the hospitalizations (Hallock, 2013).  Hoffmann and Anekwe (2013) 
compared two recent estimates of the cost of foodborne illnesses that estimated the total 
costs of food-borne illnesses to be between $14.1 billion and $152 billion. Hoffmann and 
Anekwe (2013) analyzed the comparable pathogens used in the two estimates and 
recalculated the average costs of recent foodborne illnesses to be between $14.1 billion 
and $16.3 billion.  
The costs associated with a food-illness outbreak also have lingering effects on 
consumption. For example, Arnade, Calvin, and Kuchler (2009) analyzed the 
consumption effects of the Food and Drug Administration’s 2006 warning against 
consuming fresh spinach due to concerns of an E. coli outbreak in bagged spinach. 
Arnade, Calvin, and Kuchler (2009) used pre-FDA-announcement revealed preference, 
scanner retail data for six leafy greens and post-outbreak they used an AIDS model with 
shock variables and simulated expenditures to estimate changes in consumer demand. 
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From the simulation, spinach expenditures seemed sharply decline immediately 
following the FDA’s announcement. Results indicated that expenditures on other leafy 
greens decreased as well. These expenditures seemed to return to near their normal 
levels about four months after the outbreak, with the exception of bagged spinach 
consumption. Arnade and company (2009) concluded that although spinach expenditures 
were depressed, expenditures on other leafy greens recovered quickly enough in 
expenditures to nearly cancel out the negative effects the outbreak had on bagged 
spinach expenditures.  
In addition to the damage control and the mounting costs that need to be 
addressed after a food-borne illness outbreak, farmers who produce foods that are the 
root of a food-borne illness outbreak may face legal prosecution, as in the Jensen Farms 
cantaloupe outbreak that left 33 people dead (Danovich, 2014). Consumers have 
expressed value for safer food in the laboratory, as well as in the market place. Fox et al. 
(1995) proved that consumers placed value on safer food by using experimental auctions 
to elicit consumers’ WTP for food safety. Outside of the laboratory, food illness 
outbreaks such as E.coli and salmonella in spinach, scallions, chiles, cantaloupes, and 
other fresh fruits and vegetables and an increased demand for local lettuce during the 
off-season inspired hydroponic lettuce operations in Northeastern Pennsylvania 
(Haggerty, 2013). Although hydroponic lettuce and other vegetables may not provide a 
difference in the phytochemical health attributes relative to conventional and organic 
production methods, consumers may find value in food safety attributes of the former.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Theoretical Foundation 
Thus far, a review of the associated literature has been conducted and, from it, a 
new method that intertwines a selection of theories and mechanisms has been proposed. 
Moving forward, this chapter will use the literature review as a springboard to delve 
deeper into the theoretical underpinnings of consumer utility theory, induced value 
theory, and Vickrey second-price auctions and discuss their contribution to the 
theoretical foundation of this study. Additionally, a detailed explanation of the 
experimental procedures and the econometric models used for analysis will be provided 
for the reader’s understanding.  
Willingness to Pay 
As mentioned previously in the literature review, a modern way of measuring a 
consumer’s value for a good is through WTP values – that is, how much money an 
individual would be willing to pay to obtain a specific good or service.  The magnitude 
of an individual’s maximum WTP for a good can be derived from an indirect utility 
function, which was born from a marriage of traditional Marshallian demand curves and 
the individual’s original utility function. An indirect utility function reveals the 
maximum utility that can be attained given the market prices, income, and quantity 
(Lusk and Shogren, 2007). In other words, an individual’s maximum WTP, in theory, is 
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largely a function of the maximum amount of satisfaction she derives from the good or 
service in question. 
Random Utility Theory 
Consumers are presented with a vast array of goods and services to choose from 
upon entering the marketplace. How and why do they choose which goods and services 
to buy? Historically, economists have based their study of consumer behavior on the 
aforementioned idea of utility. This concept of measuring satisfaction and calling it  
“utility” may appear as a vague concept, but it has allowed economists to formally place 
a measurement on what motivates individuals’ tradeoff and purchasing decisions. While 
utility plays a role in consumers’ decision-making process, it is not the only component.   
Among modern economists, it is a widely accepted notion that people face 
certain constraints, such as budget constraints, which restrict their available choice set. 
Maximizing utility while satisfying a given budget constraint is at the core of consumer 
theory and provides the theoretical foundation for most experimental economic studies. 
Although economists have attempted to identify every microscopic detail of the inner 
workings of consumers, several motivating factors remain random in nature and are 
largely a mystery. McFadden (1974) attempted to better incorporate this random 
component of consumer behavior when he established Random Utility Theory (RUT), 
which was specifically formulated for analyzing consumers’ utility in discrete choice 
experiments. Consider the following RUT framework that describes the utility individual 
i derives from a specific product, product j in this case: 
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(1)                    
 
Where Vij are all of the deterministic factors that are visible to the economist’s eye and εij 
represents everything else – that is, all of the independently and identically distributed  
(iid) factors that are random and known to the individual (i), but largely unobserved 
from the economist. The factors that are obvious (Vij) to the researcher and those factors 
that are unobserved (εij) jointly form individual i’s utility for product j (Uij). The 
economist’s goal is then to shrink the incomplete information gap by specifying all of 
the known factors (Vij) and minimizing the unobserved factors (εij). In other words, by 
identifying more of the variables that are contained within the random component and 
including them into the deterministic component, economists may reveal more of the 
factors at play in a consumer’s thought process and empirically inch closer to answering 
the question of why do consumers do the things they do. 
In an incentive compatible experimental auction setting, like the one in this 
study, participants assign value to the products available to them in the form of bids and 
at the end of the experiment, subjects gain compensation in the form of U.S. dollars less 
any purchases made. Essentially, any market actions or purchasing decisions affect the 
level of compensation the participants receive at the end of the experiment, which tees 
up the question of how does the participation fee of the experiment affect consumers’ 
utility-based behavior during the experiment? What if individuals participated in this 
study and derived more utility from the participation fee than from the product attributes 
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of the lettuce products? Furthermore, can the RUT model be further specified to account 
for the fee and potentially explain more of the randomness in participants’ behavior? 
Vickrey Second Price Auction 
As mentioned previously in the literature review, Vickrey (1961) introduced 
second-price auctions in an effort to gather more information about the consumers’ 
willingness to pay for a specific, indivisible good. The designs of simple auctions were 
described and thoroughly developed before arriving at the article’s more interesting part, 
“the sale or purchase of a single lot by sealed bids.” First, three assumptions were made: 
(1) each individual has their own independent private value; (2) there is one divisible 
unit for sale; and (3) bidders have a smooth, differentiable utility function that is 
supported by expected utility theory. Upon these pillars, Vickrey designed an auction in 
which the award will be delivered to the highest bidder, who becomes the buyer and 
pays the second-highest price in the auction. Because bids are sealed upon submission 
and delivery, each bidder has an incentive to make his or her individual bid equal to 
nothing more or less than their true valuation of the good being auctioned. This auction 
design is not guaranteed to elicit bidders’ truest homegrown values; rather it provides an 
environment that is conducive to individuals bidding their truest values for the good. 
Lusk and Shogren (2007) showed the theoretical framework that ensures 
incentive compatibility in a Vickrey second price auction. Let    be the value that 
individual i places on the good being auctioned,    denote individual i’s bid for the good, 
and   denotes the market price of the good. Therefore, individual i derives utility Ui 
from the difference in value between their true value,   , and the market price of the 
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good,   such that: 
 
(2)               
 
As a result of uncertainty – that is, not knowing others’ bids, who the highest 
bidder will be, or how high the market price will be – Lusk and Shogren (2007) suggest 
that a bidder’s optimal strategy is to submit a bid bi that will maximize her expected 
utility. To construct her utility, an individual may use her expectations of the market 
price distribution          , represented by their cumulative distribution function and 
probability density function,        and      , respectively. Lusk and Shogren (2007) 
illustrate the expected utility function for individual i as: 
(3)                                  
    
  
  
  
  
                          
    
  
  
  
  
 
Lusk and Shogren (2007) first point out that U is a function increasing in income.  The 
first integral is taken over all prices less than the individual’s bid (the individual bids the 
highest, becomes the buyer, and wins the auction) and the second is taken over all the 
prices greater than the individual’s bid (in which case the individual does not bid the 
highest, does not become the buyer, and derives zero utility from the good). An 
individual’s optimal bid can then be determined by taking the derivative of expected 
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utility (equation 3) with respect to individual i’s bid, bi, and setting it equal to zero: 
 
(4)  
      
   
                    
 
Individual i’s optimal bid is the value at which his or her expected utility is maximized, 
which in turn is when bi = vi. In other words, it is in individual i’s best interest to submit 
a bid that is exactly equal to their value for the good, because this is when his or her 
expected satisfaction from that good will be maximized. Lusk and Shogren clarify that 
“the optimal strategy of ‘bidding one’s value’ does not depend on the bidder’s risk 
preferences, the number of rival bidders, initial wealth levels, or any of the other 
bidders’ bidding strategies” (see Milgrom and Weber (1982) for more information). The 
highest bidder becomes the buyer and pays the market price for the good, which is equal 
to the second-highest bid that was submitted. If two participants bid an identical amount 
that ended up being the highest bids, both of the subjects would become the buyers and 
pay the second-highest bid for the good being auctioned. 
Lusk and Shogren (2007) provide several possible payoff scenarios in which 
individual i under-bids (she bids less than her true value, i.e. bi < vi), over-bids (she 
submits a bid for more than her true value, i.e. bi > vi), and truthful bidding (she submits 
a bid exactly equal to her true value for the good being auctioned, i.e. bi = vi). Lusk, 
Alexander, and Rousu (2007) describe the expected payoff structure of a risk-neutral 
individual in the following form: 
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(5)                                                              
 
where       reflects the expected profits or level of payoff, vi is equal to the individual 
i’s value for the auction good,                        represents the expected price 
individual i would have to pay given that they won the auction with their bid, bi, and 
                            is the probability of individual i winning the auction, given 
that they submitted a bid value equal to bi. That is to say, the expected payoff an 
individual would receive is equal to the difference between their true value and any price 
they would have to pay if they win the auction multiplied by the chance of them winning 
the auction, given their bid value. Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu (2007) stress that in most 
auction mechanisms, it is an individual’s weakly-dominant strategy to submit a bid equal 
to their true value for the good (bi = vi) because it yields a payoff that is at least as great 
as the expected payoffs from all other strategies and, given that the individual does not 
know the distribution of other bids, it does not depend on other rivals’ bids. 
Vickrey (1961) affirmed that although the second-price auction is more 
sophisticated and less self-policing than the more simple auctions, such as the English 
and Dutch auctions, the advantages of the Pareto-optimal properties of the second-price 
auction are quite attractive to market researchers. For example, the structural separation 
between what individuals bid and what they pay helps to reinforce incentive 
compatibility. For comparison purposes, participants in a first-price auction may deal 
with conflicting factors of increasing their bid and essentially decreasing their utility 
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from an increased potential payout because an individual’s bid value is directly coupled 
to what they potentially have to pay upon becoming the buyer. 
Induce Value Theory 
As described earlier in the literature review, induced value theory was formally 
introduced by Smith (1976) and used as a method of controlling the participants’ 
behavior to induce market equilibrium through assigned roles and prices. Although 
Smith’s (1976) induced value experiment was a stylized market and not a completely 
free market atmosphere, it provided a useful method for testing the external validity of 
economic theories. Vickrey (1961) suggested that an individual’s dominant strategy is to 
bid exactly their induced value when an outside option is not present. Several studies 
have addressed field-price censoring and the influence of outside options on subjects’ 
bids and, including Alfnes (2009) and Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004). 
However, as there is rarely a product for which no substitute exists, Cherry et al. 
(2004) used induced value theory to describe the expected behavior when outside 
options are present as: 
(6)        
                                 
                          
  
 
where a bidder’s optimal bid is represented by bi, which will equal either the induced 
value, vi, or the price of the outside option, poo. Profit (Π) is equal to the induced value 
less the price paid (Π = vi – price paid). In the case of a second-price Vickrey auction, 
the highest bidder becomes the buyer of the auction and pays the market price for the 
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good, which is the second highest bid. Cherry et al. (2004) identified profit as the 
motivating factor for bidding. It can also be thought of as consumer surplus. If the price 
of the outside option is greater than or equal to the induced value (poo ≥ vi), the 
individual’s bid will be equal to the induced value (bi = vi). Alternatively, if the price of 
the outside option is less than the induced value  (poo < vi), it will be in individual i’s best 
interest to set their bid equal to the price of the outside option (bi = poo). 
For example, if Susan is participating in a second-price Vickrey auction and has 
an induced value of $6 (vi = $6) and knows she can get the product outside of the auction 
for  $5 (poo), she will set her bid equal to the price of the product outside the laboratory 
(bi = poo). If she followed the framework and bid $5 and became the buyer, she would 
gain $1 in consumer surplus (Π = vi  − price paid). According to theory, pay if the good 
was offered outside of the experiment for less than the individual’s induced value inside 
the experiment, the individual would gain by setting their bid equal to the lower of the 
two prices, which would be the outside price. From a researcher’s perspective, one of the 
most attractive qualities of using induced value theory lies in the amount of control it 
gives the researcher. The ability to easily assign values to each bidder and then directly 
observe bidding behavior allows researchers to test whether an auction mechanism is 
demand revealing in nature. 
Combined Approach 
A sealed-bid second-price Vickrey auction will be this study’s auction design of 
choice, largely because of its incentive compatibility properties and relatively simple-to-
explain procedures. Additionally, it provides the most information given the objectives 
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and budget of this study. The induced value theory framework mentioned previously is 
usually applied in experiments that are testing whether or not a specific auction 
mechanism is demand revealing. However, this study will use elements of induced value 
theory to connect the individual’s valuations of the products to their actual behavior in 
an on-site, post-auction secondary market. 
The essence of induced value theory will be used in conjunction with a uniform 
distribution of prices that reflect the current retail prices of the auction products 
(organically grown, hydroponically grown, and conventionally grown red and green 
lettuces and spinach as a control product). This combination will act as the primary 
catalyst that will shed light on whether or not the subjects generate utility in equation 1 
from the participation fee. More explicitly stated, following the sealed-bid second-price 
auction rounds, participants were offered the opportunity to purchase the binding lettuce 
product at a “market” at the back of the room. Participants were instructed to treat this 
stand at the back of the room like they would a farmer’s market stand. It is worth noting 
that this on-site, post auction secondary market was not made available to participants 
until after the auction rounds had concluded. Each participant had a unique “assigned 
price” that was offered to him or her for one head of lettuce – a price that fell within the 
distribution of outside option prices at the time of the experiment. 
Participants’ were induced by an assigned price to either forego or make a 
transaction in the secondary market. The combination of the pseudo induced value 
framework and the prices of lettuce outside of the experiment in conjunction with a 
secondary market that had zero transaction costs aimed to test the laboratory WTP utility 
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specifications. Theoretically, an individual should make a purchase if their WTP value, 
or their bid, is greater than the price they are offered in the secondary market, also 
known as their assigned values, vi. More specifically: 
 
(7)                               
                                   
 
Participants who’s maximum WTP value (bid, bi) is greater or equal to the price they 
would have to pay in the secondary market (assigned value, vi), they would be 
incentivized to make a purchase because the product is being offered to them at a lower 
price than they were originally willing to pay. However, if an individual’s WTP (bid, bi) 
is less than her individual price in the secondary market (assigned value, vi), it does not 
make sense for her to make a transaction in the secondary market. In this case, the 
individual would have to pay more than her maximum WTP and could suffer from a 
consumer deficit, as opposed to a consumer surplus. 
What if individuals who were theoretically supposed to make transactions in the 
secondary market, based off of the aforementioned framework, did not? What if those 
who were induced to behave a certain way in the secondary market had other 
motivations for behaving unexpectedly? If Lusk and Shogren (2007) stressed that the 
utility function that Vickrey second-price auctions rely on, equation 3, is a function 
increasing in income, should McFadden’s (1974) utility framework that explains choice 
behavior reflect some sort of utility for money? More simply asked, what if subjects who 
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were theoretically supposed to make transactions in the secondary market did not 
because they valued the utility gained from the compensation fee at the end of the 
experiment more relative to the utility they would have gained from purchasing the 
lettuce in the secondary market? Perhaps McFadden’s (1974) random utility theory for 
choice behavior needs to be further specified to include the participation fee in the 
laboratory. Incorporating utility gained from the fee would reduce the unobserved 
factors in the error term and provide analysts with greater insight into why individuals 
may deviate from utility maximizing behavior. Adding a fee component to equation 1 
would result in the following: 
 
(8)                                   
 
Where Uij is jointly composed of the utility individual i gained from the product, 
Ui(product), and the utility gained from the participation fee, Ui(fee). All random factors 
that are unobserved by the analyst are still represented by εij. The primary difference 
between equation 1 and equation 8 is the inclusion of a variable that represents 
individual i’s utility gained from the fee. This framework introduces the question of 
whether the individual’s actions in the experiment are more a result of the utility for the 
product or the utility for the fee. Fortunately, the previously discussed secondary market 
and induced value theory may act as the first step for determining which utility function 
individual i operates off of. 
Transactional behavior in the secondary market as described in equation 7 can 
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now be further explained to incorporate equation 8: 
 
(9)                                                  
                                                       
 
Theoretically, if individual i’s utility for the product, in this study’s case lettuce, is 
greater than the utility gained from the fee and if her WTP value (bid, bi) is greater than 
or equal to the price being offered in the secondary market (induced value, vi), then she 
should make a transaction in the secondary market. It can then be inferred that all other 
participants who did not make a transaction in the secondary market either valued the 
lettuce products less than the price that was being offered to them, vi, or they gained 
more utility from the participation fee than they did from the lettuce1. 
Because each individual’s assigned price in the secondary market (coded as psm) 
and WTP value in the last round (either post-tasting treatment or post-information 
handout treatment) are both known, a measure of consumer surplus can be established. 
 
(10)                                    
 
                                                 
1 Theoretically, transaction costs of participating in the secondary market were equal to 
zero, because the market was located on-site. However, in reality, some participants may 
have had other reasons that increased their transaction costs, which influenced their 
decision to participate in the secondary market (i.e. they were not going home after the 
experiment and purchasing the lettuce meant an increase in the transaction cost of 
delivering it home). 
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where csurplus represents the difference between what individual i was willing to pay 
for product j after a specific treatment (either the blind tasting or the information) and 
the price they could have purchased product j for in the secondary market, psm. If 
csurplus is positive, theoretically, the consumer should have made a purchase in the 
secondary market because they were offered product j at a lower price than what they 
were willing to pay after learning about the product. On the other hand, if csurplus is 
negative, theoretically the individual should not have made a purchase in the secondary 
market because the price being offered to them was more than what they were willing to 
pay after learning about the product. This variable, csurplus, will help identify which 
transaction the individual should theoretically make. 
Health and Prestige Scales 
Organic food represents a multi-billion dollar industry that grew 11.5% in 2013 
alone (Stampler, 2014). Historically, more affluent households have been the main 
consumer segment of organic foods, but increased availability and a narrowing price 
differential between organic and conventional foods have made organics more accessible 
(Watson, 2014). Another market that has seen recent growth is the packaged produce 
industry, which is projected to increase in value from $4.8 billion in 2012 to $5.7 billion 
by 2017 (Brezosky, 2014). Although this growth primarily stems from consumers’ 
desires for convenient fruits and vegetables, analysts also suggest healthier eating habits 
as one of the driving forces for the growth (Brezosky, 2014). 
Hydroponic lettuce is currently differentiated at the retail level not only by its 
production method, but also by its appearance on the shelves. It is sold in plastic 
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clamshell containers, similar to strawberries. If hydroponic lettuce continues to be sold 
in this product form, its producers and marketers could benefit from the forecasted 
growth in the packaged produce industry. 
As these industries gain media attention and become more popular among 
consumers, it is worth investigating if there is a health-consciousness motivation or, 
equally as interesting, a prestige-sensitivity motivation behind consumers’ purchasing 
decisions. Are consumers are conveying status through their food purchases, as Dubois, 
Rucker, and Galinsky (2012) suggest? Investigating these issues may have profound 
implications for the marketing efforts of the fresh produce industry. 
One tool that is commonly used by market researchers to gain market feedback 
and classify consumers is a Likert scale. Developed in the early 1930s, this popular 
research tool takes the form of carefully constructed questions, known as Likert items, 
and a provision of 5-point or sometimes 7-point possible responses that vary in degrees 
from least to most (Allen and Seaman, 2007). Consumers indicate the degree to which 
they agree or disagree, or approve or disapprove with each Likert item. Bearden, 
Netemeyer, and Haws (2011) provided a thick compilation of the many scales that have 
been developed over the past eighty years. 
With an exploratory spirit, this research will take a step toward discovering if 
lifestyle factors play into consumers’ WTP for hydroponic lettuce. To accomplish this, 
subjects provided answers to two sets of Likert-scale questions that occurred at the end 
of the questionnaire in APPENDIX B. Out of all the motivating factors one might have 
for purchasing hydroponic lettuce, the uniqueness, novelty, and marketed food safety 
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attributes of said lettuce products may spur a particular interest in two motivating forces 
in shoppers, health-consciousness and prestige-sensitivity. 
Several constructs have been developed that describe how people respond to 
price cues, however this investigation will be using the prestige-sensitivity scale, which 
is a subscale within the price perception scale, developed and validated by Lichtenstein, 
Ridgway, and Netemeyer (1993) and also documented in Bearden, Netemeyer, and 
Haws (2011). In an effort to better understand consumers’ buying behavior for health 
reasons, a health-consciousness scale that was developed by Gould (1988) will be used 
in the survey. The prestige-sensitivity scale will help identify the individual’s proneness 
to purchase goods for the “feelings of prominence and status” from others (Lichtenstein, 
Ridgway, and Netemeyer, 1993), while the health-consciousness scale will help identify 
how aware and conscious an individual is of their own health. Responses to these two 
sets of questions will be used in a Latent Class Analysis to identify and characterize 
subgroups of different types of consumers within the sample. The prestige-sensitivity 
scale and health-consciousness scale can be found at the back of the questionnaire in 
APPENDIX C. 
Auction Procedures and Details 
 A total of 201 members of the Bryan-College Station, Texas community 
participated in this study (n=201), which took place over three days at the Horticulture 
Gardens on the campus of Texas A&M University in late February 2014. The study was 
designed for a total of 200 participants over eight sessions, with an average of 25 
subjects in each session. The budget permitted a last-minute ninth session to take place 
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during the afternoon on the last day, which allowed individuals who had previous time 
conflicts to participate. Actual attendance averaged 22 subjects per session, with a range 
of n=21 to n=25. While recruiting a sample chock full of college students may have been 
convenient and albeit less expensive, one of the objectives during the recruitment 
process was to attract a sample that is representative of Bryan-College Station grocery 
shoppers. Toward this end, a series of advertisements were issued in a local newspaper, 
The Eagle, prior to the experiments. Additionally, email correspondence was established 
with interested parties. A copy of the advertisement used can be found in APPENDIX A.   
Upon arrival, participants were checked in using a database that contained the 
participant’s details, such as their name, age, whether or not they were the primary 
shopper in the household, and their email address under the appropriate session time. 
After check-in, participants were asked to read and sign a consent form that was required 
by the Texas A&M University Institutional Review Board (IRB). Contingent on the 
individual signing the consent form, they were next seated and provided with a 
participant identification number which secured anonymity, a participation packet which 
included a questionnaire and a description of the auction procedures, and a smaller 
packet that contained blank bid sheets and an order form to be used after the auction 
rounds in the secondary market.   
A within-subjects and between-subjects design was used for the experiment. The 
experiment was largely a between-subjects design, which means that all individuals did 
not receive the same treatment – half of the subjects participated in a blind tasting as the 
treatment and the other half of the sample learned about hydroponic production and 
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received labeling information. The within-subject design of each treatment group 
permits comparisons to be made between bids submitted during the baseline round and 
the specified treatment round, but bids from the blind tasting treatment and those from 
the production information treatment must not be compared because all individuals were 
not exposed to the same stimuli. Several reasons are behind this experimental design and 
chief among them is simplicity. It was straightforward to explain consumers’ behavior in 
the secondary market as a function of their WTP in the only treatment round.  
 Following a script, the monitor explained how a second-price Vickrey auction 
worked and provided two simple examples on the white board.  It was stressed to the 
subjects that it is their weakly dominant strategy to set their bid exactly equal to the 
maximum amount they would be willing to pay for each item on the auction table. After 
explaining the procedures and answering any initial questions, two practice rounds of 
auctions were completed. The first practice round consisted of bidding on three pen 
products (Paper Mate, Pilot B2P, and BIC pen) and filling out a short quiz that tested the 
subjects’ knowledge of the recently explained procedures. One of the pen products was 
randomly chosen to be binding and the bids for the binding product were sorted from 
highest to lowest to determine the hypothetical buyer and market price, per the rules of 
the Vickrey second-price auction. During this time, the monitor reviewed the quiz with 
the participants and provided explanations for the correct answers. The monitor then 
revealed the binding product, the hypothetical buyer, and market price of the practice 
round and answered any questions the participants had.  
Next, participants completed a second practice round in which they submitted 
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bids on four glue products (Instant Krazy, Elmer’s Glue, 3M Scotch Gel, and Elmer’s 
Clear). The monitor once again revealed the binding product, the hypothetical buyer, and 
market price. Any questions the participants had were answered promptly before the real 
auction rounds. 
In the first round of real auctions, participants in all sessions bid on eight 
vegetable products: organically produced green lettuce; organically produced red lettuce; 
conventionally produced green lettuce; conventionally produced red lettuce; 
hydroponically produced red lettuce; hydroponically produced green lettuce; 
hydroponically produced red and green mixed lettuce; and spinach. The seven heads of 
lettuce and one bunch of spinach were laid out on a table at the back of the room and 
randomly given an identification number.  The organic and conventional varieties were 
purchased at the same time at a local Kroger grocery store, while the hydroponic 
varieties were grown by Texas A&M AgriLife Research and Extension Center at 
Uvalde, Texas. Researchers grew Progreen and Kremlin varieties of lettuce using 
hydroponic methods, which were the respective green and red varieties used in the 
experiments. The hydroponic mixed lettuce was a red and green variety that had been 
planted together and grew intertwined with one another to form one head of lettuce. 
Spinach was used as the control product, as it is often considered a substitute for lettuce.  
 During the first round of vegetable auctions, the baseline round, all of the 
products were displayed on the auction table at the back of the room and participants 
were able to pick up and examine each product before submitting their bid sheet. 
Participants did not know the name of the product or how it was produced and they were 
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asked to submit their bid such that it is exactly equal to their maximum WTP value for 
each vegetable product. Bids from this first vegetable auction round were considered the 
baseline level of bids, against which all subsequent bids were compared. To minimize 
order effects, participants in all sessions only participated in a total of four rounds – 2 
practice rounds and 2 vegetable auction rounds (a baseline and a treatment round). 
 Up to this point in the experiments, all participants in all sessions have been 
exposed to the same explanation of auction procedures and the baseline round. 
Participants in Group A (sessions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9) participated in a blind tasting as the 
treatment. During the blind tasting, participants were provided with bite-size samples of 
each lettuce product in a numbered plastic cup, unsalted crackers to cleanse the palate, 
and a cup of water. Numbers on the sample cups corresponded to representative heads of 
lettuce on the auction table. For each sample they tasted, participants were asked to 
evaluate six sensory characteristics (appearance, color, smell, taste, freshness, and 
overall acceptance) on a 9-point scale that ranged from “extremely dislike” to 
“extremely like” in a tasting report in the participation packet. Following the completion 
of the tasting report, participants were asked to examine the auction products once again 
and submit bids for the vegetable products for a second time. A copy of the tasting report 
and questionnaire Group A received can be found in APPENDIX B.  
Instead of participating in a blind tasting as the treatment, the second half of the 
sample, Group B (subjects in sessions 5, 6, 7, and 8), received a production information 
treatment in which each participant was given a sheet of paper with bullet points about 
hydroponic production of vegetables. This information was provided to the monitor by 
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the Texas A&M AgriLife Research and Extension Center at Uvalde, Texas. While the 
subjects read the handout, labels that identified the products were placed in front of each 
of the eight vegetable products on the auction table. Now, participants knew the 
production method (organic, conventional, or hydroponic production) and color of each 
lettuce product (red, green, and mixed). After reading the hydroponic production 
information handout, participants were asked to examine the auction table as they did in 
the baseline round and submit bids once again for all eight products. Group B received 
the same participation packet as the one in APPENDIX B, only without the tasting 
reports. All consumers received a packet of blank bid sheets and order form, which have 
been provided in APPENDIX C. The hydroponic information handout Group B received 
can be found in APPENDIX D. 
Following each group’s treatment, one of the two vegetable auction rounds in 
each session was randomly chosen to be binding and the bids for the binding product in 
that round were sorted from highest to lowest. The hydroponic red lettuce was chosen as 
the binding product based on availability and remained as such throughout the entire 
study. Complying with the second-price Vickrey auction framework, the highest bidder 
became the buyer and paid the market price (which was the second highest bid) for the 
product. Participants were made aware that the vegetable auction rounds were real and if 
they became a buyer, an amount equivalent to the market price would be deducted from 
their compensation fee and they would receive the binding product to take home.  
 The auction portion of the experiment concluded after participants submitted 
their second round of bids.  At this point, all subjects in all sessions filled out a 
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questionnaire that collected information about demographics (age, income, employment, 
marital status, race, etc.) and vegetable-buying behavior (purchase outlet, frequency, 
importance of factors when purchasing lettuce, etc.). In addition, participants answered 
the aforementioned scale-style questions that related to perceptions of their individual 
health awareness and prestige-sensitivity behavior. Following the completion of the 
questionnaire, the buyer(s), the market price, and the binding product and round were 
unveiled.  
Next, the experiment transitioned into studying external validity using induced 
values and an on-site secondary market. The monitor acknowledged the completion of 
the auctions and offered the participants a chance to purchase the binding product at a 
“market” at the back of the room. Previously hidden from participants, this market now 
displayed several units of the binding product (hydroponic red lettuce). Participants were 
instructed to look at their individual order form in what used to be the packet that 
contained blank bid sheets and observe the written price listed on the order form. Each 
individual had received a unique value within a distribution of actual retail prices 
           . This distribution represented the retail prices of hydroponic, conventional, 
and organic lettuce in local grocery stores such as Kroger, Wal-Mart, and HEB. Values 
were pre-assigned to the participation packets prior to the experiments in $0.25 
increments, such that i=101 received an induced value (also referred to in this research 
as the price in secondary market or psm) equal to the first number in the distribution, 
psm101 = $0.5, individual i=102 was assigned the next highest price in the distribution, 
psm102 = $0.75. If need be, the distribution was repeated. An individual’s psm value 
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represented the unique price at which she may purchase any of the heads of lettuce from 
the secondary market at the back of the room. Theoretically, all transaction costs were 
essentially lowered to zero because the secondary market was on-site. This allows an 
easier comparison between the final WTP values with the individual-specific induced 
values.  
Participants were instructed to treat the secondary market at the back of the room 
as they would a Farmer’s Market stand. They were then told to indicate on their 
individual order form how many products they wished to purchase in the secondary 
market (keep in mind that zero was an acceptable answer). Compensation fees were $30 
per person, less any purchases made including those from the secondary market. To 
collect the compensation fee, participants were told to fill out the order form and 
exchange it for the compensation fee with the cashier before exiting the study.  
WTP Data Organization 
After all of the data had been collected, before running any sort of econometric 
analysis, a step must be taken back to visualize the study’s objectives and properly 
organize the data. The overall objective of this study is to identify the significant factors 
that affect consumers’ willingness to pay for the focal products and estimate their 
impact. This being said, WTP was the dependent variable (on the left hand side) in the 
estimations. Generally, willingness-to-pay models in experimental economics stem from 
the previously described random utility framework developed by McFadden (1974) and 
it can be inferred that a rational individual will consume product j if the utility gained 
from product j is greater than or equal to the utility accrued without product j (Collart, 
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2013). Segovia (2014) provides a useful illustration of what an individual’s WTP 
function may look like:  
 
(11) 
                                                            
                                    
 
Socio-demographic factors relate to variables such as age, income, household size, race, 
employment, education, marital status, and sex. Behavioral characteristics reflect all of 
the factors that provide insight into the consumer’s fruit and vegetable consumption 
patterns, such as weekly food expenditures, fresh fruit and vegetable expenditures, outlet 
of fruit and vegetable purchases, how often fruit and vegetables are purchased, and the 
amount of fresh vegetables on hand. Product characteristics describe any characteristics 
of the product, such as its color and its method of production.  
Finally, depending on the session, WTP estimates may be affected by either the 
blind tasting treatment or the production information treatment. All subjects participated 
in a baseline round which acted as the control, then half of the subjects received a blind 
tasting as a treatment and the other half received information about hydroponic 
vegetable production as a treatment. Therefore, any effects from the treatment will be 
seen in the full bids. Table 1 provides a description of the demographic and behavioral 
variables used for econometric analysis. 
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Table 1. Demographic and Behavioral Variables 
 
 
 
Dummy variables were used to further specify the raw quantitative and 
qualitative information that was collected. For example, the variable MARRIED is a 
dummy variable that represents an individual’s marital status and will take a value of 1 if 
the individual is married and 0 otherwise. Another binary variable, FEMALE, will take 
the value of 1 if the individual is a female and 0 if the individual is a male. Additionally, 
several dummy variables were generated to represent categorical information. Due to the 
nature of the data, the demographic variable representing race was further defined into 
three mutually exclusive dummy variables: DRACE1, DRACE2, and DRACE3. If the 
individual is white/Caucasian, the dummy variable DRACE1 will take a value of 1 and 0 
if the individual is not white. If the individual is Hispanic, the dummy variable DRACE2 
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will take the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, if individual is any other race 
(Asian/Pacific Islander, African American, Native American/ Indigenous, or other), the 
dummy variable DRACE3 will take the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. Education and 
income information were also represented by three dummy variables each: DEDU1, 
DEDU2, DEDU3; and DINC1, DINC2, DINC3. Individuals were asked to indicate the 
highest level of education they had completed. If the individual had obtained some high 
school or a high school diploma, DEDU1 will take the value of 1 and 0 otherwise, 
whereas if the individual had completed some college, a 2-year/ Associates Degree, or a 
4-year/ Bachelor’s Degree, the dummy variable DEDU2 will take the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. Alternatively, if the individual completed some graduate school or a Graduate 
Degree, the dummy variable DEDU3 will take the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. The 
income dummy variables of DINC1, DINC2, DINC3 were coded in a similar manner and 
represented annual incomes of less than $49,999, incomes between $50,000 and 
$79,999, and incomes greater than $80,000, respectively. 
 Quantitative data points are represented by the numerous continuous variables. 
These were coded to represent the corresponding question in the survey. Examples of 
these continuous variables can be found in WFV and HHSIZE, which respectively 
represent the weekly average amount spent on fruits and vegetables and the number of 
individuals in the household. 
 In addition to providing valuable demographic and behavior information, each 
participant also submitted WTP information in the form of bids. Each session contained 
two vegetable auction rounds, which garnered a total of 16 bids on vegetable products (8 
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from the baseline round and 8 from the treatment round) from most individuals. The 
treatment rounds in the experiment are designated by indicator variables: Baseline 
(Base), Blind Tasting (Tasting), and Production Information (Info). According to theory, 
these bids can be directly interpreted as the individual’s homegrown, WTP value for 
each product (Lusk and Shogren, 2007).  The product attributes that were analyzed 
included the color and production method of the lettuce products: red color (Red), green 
color (Green), mixed color (Mixed), organic production (Org), and conventional 
production (Conven). These variables took a value of 1 if the attribute was found in the 
product and 0 otherwise. 
Although there are several ways to analyze the mounds of data collected from the 
experiments, this study will initially apply the more simplistic estimations such as 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and tobit models for pedagogical purposes, but will 
eventually ramp up to the more precise, complex econometric models by explaining the 
random parameters linear and random parameters tobit models.  
Ordinary Least Squares Model 
After cleaning and organizing the data, the first step in data analysis is often OLS 
estimation. An OLS model is considered a fundamental way to obtain estimates for the 
true value of the parameters, also known as the coefficients of the exogenous variables. 
Estimation of the intercept and slope values in a simple OLS regression can be done by 
minimizing the sum of squared residuals. Although an OLS model can be applied to a 
variety of data sets, it is not recommended for data with several observations censored at 
zero in the dependent variable and does not account for the potential correlation that may 
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occur when individuals submit multiple bids for various products in several rounds.  As 
a result of informing the participants that they could submit any value for their bids, 
several WTP observations were zero. 
Tobit Model 
Actual data, especially primary data collected from experiments, often resembles 
real life in that it is unorganized, messy, and complicated. Just as one would not fit a 
frame to a picture before measuring the picture, one would not impose an econometric 
model on to a dataset before becoming acquainted with the data. As previously 
mentioned, OLS estimation could not accurately represent a data set with a large portion 
of the observations taking the value of zero and after getting to know the data, several 
observations of the dependent variable, WTP bids, revealed themselves to be zero. 
Through a household expenditure application, Tobin (1958) introduced an econometric 
model that properly and statistically accounted for these values. Appropriately named 
the tobit model, this econometric model recognized the importance of observations that 
defy conventional limits and has the ability to account for observations in the dependent 
variable at zero. 
Greene (2003) provides a more current explanation of the tobit method by 
addressing the differences between truncation and censoring. Often used 
interchangeably, these two terms represent the two primary methods of dealing with 
observations that take on zero values. Truncation is defined by drawing a sample from a 
population’s subset that may leave out crucial observations that, upon inclusion, could 
better represent the whole population, whereas censoring refers to including all data 
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points but modifying or transforming those that are outside of a certain range to take on 
a single value (Greene, 2003). 
Greene (2003) describes the distribution of the tobit model, also known as the 
censored regression model, as a fusion of discrete and continuous distributions. First, a 
new variable, yi, must be developed that will represent all observations, including the 
transformed, censored observations. The original observations, including the zero values, 
are represented by the hidden, latent variable yi*. An illustration of this can be seen by 
 
(12)                         
                         
 
That is, if y*, the original observation, is less than or equal to zero, it takes on a value of 
0. If y* is greater than 0, the observation remains as is. Greene (2013) points out that if 
y* is normally distributed with a mean of μ and a variance of σ2 (y* ~ N [μ, σ2]), the 
following distribution is assumed 
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Otherwise, if y*>0, y takes on the density of y*. The standard normal cumulative density 
function (cdf) is represented by ϕ   . Discrete and continuous components still contribute 
to a total probability equal to one – only the full probability in the censored region is 
assigned to the censoring point, which is zero in this case (Greene, 2003). 
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If the distribution described above has been censored at zero (a = 0), the mean is shown 
as: 
 
(14)                
 
 
         
 
where   is further simplified to 
 
(15)      
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Where   is a ratio of the population density function (pdf), represented by     , and the 
cdf, once again represented by     . As Greene (2003) and Tobin (1958) note, the tobit 
regression is secured by making the mean correspond with the mean of a classical 
regression model. By doing so, the following equations are produced: 
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where xi’ represents a vector of behavioral and demographic variables for individual i, 
that are hypothesized to explain an individual’s bid, yi. A vector of coefficients is 
represented by β, and any unexplained effects are represented by the error term, εi. If the 
data has been censored, the expected value of the latent variable, y*, can be thought of as 
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However, if an observation is randomly drawn from the population and it is unknown 
whether the data has been censored, Greene (2003) suggested the expected value of y 
provides a more useful description. 
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where    is simplified into 
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Greene (2003) structured the marginal effects of xi on yi as 
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However, McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposed the marginal effects equation 
above, such that the slope vector was broken down into two parts 
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The forefront of this decomposition shows xi’s marginal effect on the conditional mean 
of yi* in the uncensored, positive section of the distribution and the remaining 
component shows that effects due to a change in xi will be felt in the probability that the 
observation will reside in that area of the distribution. 
The likelihood function from which the model can be estimated is specified by Greene 
(2003) to be 
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The aforementioned tobit model in all of its estimation provides analysts with a 
finer tool that has the statistical power to account for observations that might have 
previously been abandoned.  This type of estimation is more sophisticated in nature and 
is one step closer to properly representing all of the data’s complexities. 
Participants in this study were instructed to bid their true value for the products, whether 
it was positive, zero, or negative. Although participants were allowed to bid negative 
values in the auction, no one did. Therefore, the results from the tobit regression will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
Random Effects Tobit Model 
This study’s data set, like similar WTP studies, is multidimensional with more 
than one observation from each individual and has been organized in a panel structure to 
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make the individual’s bids the dependent variable the data (Greene, 2003; Lusk and 
Shogreen, 2007). Experimental economic literature provides evidence of different 
econometric models that have been used for analyzing WTP data. The random 
parameters linear, random effects model, and the random parameters model have 
recently been used with panel data (Corrigan and Rousu, 2006; Lusk, Feldkamp, and 
Shroeder, 2004; Segovia, 2014). What makes these models special and highly useful for 
this study is that they specialize in accounting for potential correlation and heterogeneity 
that is likely to occur in experimental auctions with multiple products and multiple 
rounds of bidding. Furthermore, a random effects tobit model will account for bids 
censored at zero and any unobserved randomness that occurs with each random effect 
(sessions; individuals). 
Unlike a fixed effects model, a random effects model accounts for randomness 
by assuming a zero correlation between the unobserved individual effects and the 
explanatory variables by implementing a specific random element for each individual. 
This new element is tied to the constant such that it absorbs randomness and any 
differences between individuals will be observed as parametric shifts of the function 
(Wooldridge 2009). Greene (2003) specified the following random effects model by 
reformulating a fixed effects model to account for the unobserved heterogeneity: 
 
(23)              
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where α is considered a constant term and ηi the added constant random element that 
accounts for the individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity for individual i, product j, 
and treatment s. What is needed is a hybrid of equation 23 and the tobit model that 
accounts for the bids censored at zero and the unobserved randomness in the data. 
Segovia (2014) offers a unique solution to this problem by combining the random 
element from the random effects model (equation 24),       , with the tobit model 
(equation 17). The following is a specified random effects tobit model: 
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where y*isj is the uncensored latent variable that represents individual i’s bid value for 
product j in round s and unobserved randomness is accounted for by       . 
While the random effects tobit model explains unobserved randomness that may affect 
an individual’s WTP values, it does not take into account any unobserved randomness 
that is associated with the treatment effects or product attributes. That is to say, the 
random effects tobit model only adds a random constant term to the regression, when 
much more could be done to account for the dynamic nature of the data. Greene (2003) 
suggested expanding the general random effects model to, in addition to making the 
intercept random, allow coefficients to vary randomly across individuals. Segovia (2014) 
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supported this notion by pointing out the random effects model assumes treatments have 
the same effect on each individual, but in reality this is likely to not be the case. Thus, a 
model that is further specified to account for the unobserved differences between rounds, 
within each individual will be estimated next. 
Random Parameters Linear Model 
A random parameters linear model, also known as a random coefficients model, 
accounts for individual differences that are a product of treatments or changes in 
preferences for certain product attributes. Willingness-to-pay experiments often contain 
multiple rounds, in which a single individual submits sequential bids that are most likely 
correlated (Segovia, 2014). The analyst cannot possibly observe all of the factors that are 
affecting an individual’s WTP values across rounds. One solution to account for these 
unobserved effects is to allow the individual parameters to vary randomly in the 
econometric analysis. By implementing an element that would allow coefficients to vary 
randomly over a specified distribution, a random parameters linear model accounts for 
any unobserved differences in preferences within each individual between rounds, that 
stem from the treatment or the product attributes (McAdams, et al., 2013). Toward this 
end, a random parameters linear model is specified to be: 
 
(25)                                    
 
where yisj represents individual i’s bid (WTP valuation) in round s for product j, θ 
denotes a set of constant coefficients for all bids, the intercept for all bidders is 
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represented by α and ηi describes the variation in α for each individual, whereas βxisj 
captures the variation in the set of explanatory variables for each individual, and, finally, 
εisj represents the normally distributed error terms with a mean equal to zero and 
variance of σ2 (Segovia, 2014). The parameters follow a pre-specified distribution, with 
the normal distribution being the most widely used, and βxisj considers individual-
randomness for the parameters, which relaxes the assumption of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives of RUT (McAdams, 2011). Note that the error introduced by ηi 
and βxisj are independently distributed of and not correlated with the general error term, 
εisj (McAdams, 2013). Although more of the unobserved randomness has been explained 
through this model, bid values censored at zero must still be accounted for, thus a tobit 
form of this model is warranted. 
Random Parameters Tobit Model 
An appropriate model for this study’s data would take into account the 
heterogeneity that may arise between and within individuals across rounds, and the 
censored bid values at zero. These features are found in the following random 
parameters tobit specification: 
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The above model is simply equation 25 with a latent variable, y*isj, which allows for 
treatments and product features to have different effects on individuals, and also allows 
for censored WTP values. 
The random parameters tobit model is described in detail by Collart and Palma 
(2013) as 
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where y*isj is an         column vector of latent values associated with each 
observation,   represents an         column vector of 1s,    denotes the mean 
intercept for the pool of observations submitted by individual i,   takes the form of a 
scalar that represents the grand mean of observations from all individuals, and    
captures the variation or deviation of the mean intercept for individual i from the grand 
mean,   . Segovia (2014) notes that these random intercepts are distributed with a mean 
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of zero and variance   
 . The variable        consists of a         matrix with K 
random covariates and the coefficients vector,   , which is made up of   , the sum of the 
grand mean coefficients from all individuals, and   , the associated individual-specific 
deviations of the mean coefficients from the grand mean coefficients. As it applies to 
each individual, it is assumed that these deviations are distributed with a mean of zero 
and variance-covariance matrix of   (Segovia, 2014). It is worth noting that the random 
elements of    and    follow a multivariate normal and normal distribution such that 
           ) and          
   if        Finally,      consists of a         matrix 
of L set covariates and   represents a vector of coefficients that are constant across all 
individuals. Finally, the error term,   , is normally distributed with a mean of zero and 
common variance matrix of   
 . Additionally, Segovia (2014) and others assume that the 
random effects of        and   are uncorrelated (Moeltner and Layton, 2002; Swamy, 
1970). 
Implied Differences Model 
Several analyses have focused on differences in an individual’s bids before and 
after treatments or across like goods (Alfnes, 2009; Kanter, Messer, and Kaiser, 2009; 
McAdams, 2011; Segovia, 2014). Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004) named these 
differences “implied differences” and defined the differences in WTP with regard to 
individual i for product j for treatment s as 
 
(28)                                    
  107 
 
where s ≠ Base, maintaining that the treatment and the control baseline round are 
separate. The above equation for the implied difference in WTP can also be thought of 
as 
 
(29)                                           
 
where C acts as a constant and X is defined as a vector of product features, demographic 
and behavioral characteristics, and any treatments providing information to the bidders 
(McAdams, 2011). The variables Cs and CBase can be condensed and re-specified, while 
the explanatory vector of X can be factored out to reveal 
 
(30)                                  
 
The framework above describes the magnitude of change in WTP bids between the 
baseline and the treatment, thus censorship is not necessary and all bids can be included, 
even negative values. The treatment (either the blind tasting or production information) 
provided the participant with information and could have influenced their bids either 
positively or negatively after the baseline round of bids was submitted. As an example, a 
participant in sessions 1,2,3,4 or 9 submitted bids during the baseline round (control), 
and once again after the blind tasting (treatment). If individuals disliked the taste or any 
other sensory factor of one of the lettuce samples, their WTP was expected to diminish 
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and expected to translate into lower bids for that product relative to the previous baseline 
round bid. Hence, the treatment negatively affected the individual’s bid. In this example, 
the opposite is expected to be true for those who had a positive experience during the 
blind tasting treatment. 
The other half of the sample received a treatment in which they learned about 
vegetable production methods. Similar to the blind tasting treatment effects, participants 
may have negatively viewed the use of hydroponic techniques for vegetable production 
and reflected this sentiment in their WTP values.  Thus, because implied differences 
simply address the magnitude and direction of change, and are not restricted to data that 
is positive or negative, the previously discussed random parameters linear (mixed linear) 
model will be sufficient to be used in the implied differences analysis. 
Latent Class Analysis 
Another method for studying consumer behavior is through Latent Class 
Analysis (LCA), where n consumers are classified into a number of S latent classes. By 
identifying potential underlying themes among certain groups of participants and sorting 
participants into latent groups, the analyst can add clarity to the data and even extract 
common characteristics among members in each class. 
LCA operates off the premise that a population can be categorized into two or 
more subgroups. It uses a combination of classical regression and Bayesian analysis to 
estimate the probability of an individual belonging to one of those subgroups, also called 
a latent class, based on similar observed variables (Lanza, Tan, and Bray, 2013; Greene, 
2003). This style of analysis will be necessary in categorizing participants based on their 
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responses to the health-consciousness and prestige-sensitivity scale questions. Beyond 
identifying different types of consumers and participants in experimental studies, LCA 
has also been used to identify the mixture of observed variables that have the potential to 
predict which class the individual merits membership to (Lanza, Tan, and Bray, 2013; 
Collart, 2013). 
Consider the latent class model specified by Segovia (2014), in which c = 1,…, 
k,… C latent classes defined from a number of j = 1,…, J observed variables, also known 
as the indicators. The number of possible outcomes associated with the variable j is 
denoted by Rj for individuals i = 1,…, n. The observable data, the individual i’s 
observed responses to the J indicators, is represented by vector Xi = (Xi1,…, Xij), where 
the possible outcomes of Xij are known as r and r = 1,…, Rj. Let          act as an 
indicator function that is equal to 1 if the response to indicator j = r, and 0 if not. The 
probability density function of an individual demonstrating a specific membership 
profile is given as 
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where the distribution and parameters of the indicator variables,   , is equal to the 
probability of individual i qualifying for membership in class c (    
 
   , multiplied by 
the associated conditional probability density function (            ) for all classes. The 
density function is further defined as the product of the indicator (J) and possible 
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outcome (Rj) vectors. Segovia (2014) clarifies that the parameters of the density 
function, (      , represents the indicator-response probabilities of a specific response, rj 
to the indicator variable j, given the individual’s membership in class c. Therefore, if the 
observed indicators, X, and the number of latent classes, C, are known, then the idea is to 
solve for the parameters        . This can be done through the following likelihood 
function for  : 
 
(32)                      
 
   . 
 
The parameters   can be estimated through the Expectation-Maximization (EM) 
algorithm because the individual’s class membership is uncertain and thus may be 
regarded as missing data (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin, 1977; Collart, 2013). The log-
likelihood application is specified as: 
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From this equation, the EM algorithm can be used on        after imprinting random 
initial estimates of    and             on a Bayesian calculation of the posterior 
probability, all in an effort to determine the class membership parameters,  (Collart, 
2013). The following describes this process. The first equation describes the Bayesian 
approach to determining the class membership probability that individual i belongs to s 
class, given the observed k indicators: 
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Next, applying the random initial estimates yields an estimated value,     
   , for the 
unknown class membership probabilities 
 
(35)               
         
    
 
Following this estimation, Collart (2013) proceeds to describe the second part of the EM 
algorithm as the maximization of the              with respect to  , subject to: 
 
(36)        
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This maximization yields maximum likelihood estimates of    and    for s = 1,…S. 
Collart (2013) suggests these estimates are useful for recalculating the posterior 
probabilities in equation 35. 
Because the actual number of existing subgroups, also referred to as S or latent 
classes, is unknown, certain criterion tests are used to gain a more accurate estimation of 
S. In general, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973) favors larger models, 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) accounts for sample size and 
favors more parsimonious models, and the Adjusted BIC (Sclove, 1987) are the primary 
  112 
methods for estimating which level of S is most appropriate. Collart (2013) suggests 
using the final posterior probability estimates,     , to sort individuals into the S latent 
classes by comparing the highest individual-specific posterior probabilities. For 
example, individual i has membership to class k if            for all s ≠ k. 
 
Secondary Market Data Analysis 
 As previously discussed, external validity of the experimental auction 
mechanism used in this study was tested with an on-site secondary market that 
immediately followed the conclusion of the vegetable auction rounds. In this test of 
external validity, inspired by farmers markets and Cherry et al.’s (2004) application of 
induced value theory, participants were assigned an individual price from a uniform 
distribution of outside prices of lettuce and then asked whether or not they would like to 
purchase the binding lettuce product at their unique price from the “market” at the back 
of the room.  
A measurement of consumer surplus, explained in Equations 7 and 10, indicates 
the expected behavior of participants’ in secondary market. It simultaneously accounts 
for the individual’s WTP value after all information has been distributed and the 
individual’s assigned price in the secondary market. In an effort to identify the factors 
that motivate people to purchase in the secondary market and thus move closer to 
answering the question of whether or not the Vickrey 2nd price auction is an externally 
valid value elicitation mechanism, the probability that an individual would make a 
purchase in the secondary market is described as  
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(37)                                                   
                                              
                            
A ratio of the study’s compensation and an individual’s hourly income shows the 
relative importance of the fee. If an individual’s has a high income, then the fee becomes 
relatively unimportant, whereas if an individual’s has a low income, then the fee 
becomes relatively more important. Therefore, if an individual places relatively high 
importance on gaining the full fee, they are hypothesized to be less likely to purchase in 
the secondary market because any purchases made will decrease the amount of the fee 
they receive at the end of the study. Due to this reasoning, the fee-to-income factor is 
hypothesized to negatively impact the probability of an individual making a purchase in 
the secondary market.  Behavioral characteristics, such as the last time an individual 
purchased produce is expected to impact whether an individual decides to purchase the 
binding lettuce product after the auction rounds. Consumer surplus, as mentioned before, 
provides the theoretical foundation behind whether or not people make a purchase in the 
secondary market. Finally, sociodemographic characteristics refer to age, gender, and 
form of employment. Table 2 provides the name and description of the variables used to 
estimate the probability of an individual making a purchase in the market. 
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Table 2. Description of Variables used in Secondary Market Behavior Analysis 
 
 
 The factors take dummy and continuous forms and illustrate the primary factors 
that were hypothesized to affect an individual’s purchase in the market.  The variable 
feetoinc takes the form of a ratio of the total compensation an individual received and 
their average hourly income. Recent fruit and vegetable purchases were described by a 
dummy variable, dlast1, that takes the value of 1 if the last time an individual bought 
fruits and vegetables within four days prior to the experiment, and 0 if they have not. 
The variable csurplus is continuous and is the difference between the individual’s bid in 
treatment round (which was also the full information bid) and the individual’s assigned 
price. Sociodemographic factors were represented by continuous and dummy variables: 
age which is measured in years, female which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
participant is a female and 0 if the participant is a male, hhsize which indicates the 
number of individuals in the household, and student which is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the individual is a student and 0 if they are not. Students were of 
particular interest, as they were hypothesized to participate in the experiment primarily 
for the fee and thus expected to be less likely to make a purchase in the market.  
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 These variables were used in a probit model, a random effects probit model, and 
a heteroskedastic probit model to estimate their impact on the probability of a participant 
making a purchase in the secondary market. These models were also estimated using a 
condensed set of the variables in Table 2, which included feetoinc, dlast1, csurplus, and 
student.  Likelihood ratio tests will be performed to assess which version of each model, 
either the full or condensed version, is most appropriate.  
Probit Model 
Random Utility Theory (RUT) is also useful in accounting for the unobservable 
factors that influence individuals’ choice behavior. RUT allows for researchers to 
specify utility as a function of observed factors, such as the attributes of the alternatives 
and attributes of the decision maker, and unobservable factors that known to the decision 
maker but not to the researcher. Discrete models are particularly useful for estimating 
the probability on a scale of 0 to 1 of an individual making a decision of “yes or no.” 
The probability that an individual decides to choose one option over another can be 
defined by the advantages offered by the unobservable and observable factors associated 
with each option. Train (2009) illustrates choice probability as 
 
(37)                                    
 
Equation 37 states that the probability that person n chooses alternative i depends on the 
advantage that alternative j has over alternative i in unobservable factors is not better 
than the advantage alternative i has over alternative j in factors that are observed by the 
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researcher, given that the two alternatives are mutually exclusive. The models used for 
analyzing consumers’ choice behavior differ in how the density of the unobservable 
factors is specified. Among the most common models used is the probit model, which 
assumes that the unobserved factors are normally distributed.  By assuming    is 
distributed normally with the covariance matrix of Ω and the mean vector equal to zero, 
Train (2009) specifies the probit model by first illustrating the density of    as 
 
(38)           
 
             
       
      , 
 
then the choice probability is 
 
(39)                                    
                                      . 
The statement inside the parentheses provides the theoretical justification for an 
individual’s decision to choose to buy in the secondary market or not. The variable I acts 
as an indicator and takes the value of either 1 or 0, with 1 being that the statement inside 
the parentheses holds and 0 if it does not. Given that the statement holds, the integral is 
taken over all values of   using simulation (Train, 2009). 
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Random Effects Probit Model 
By estimating a random effects probit model, one can determine if random 
effects in different groups (sessions) explain the variance in the model. In the random 
effects probit framework, developed by Heckman (1981), the error term is decomposed 
into two components: 
(40)             . 
 
Guilkey and Murphy (1993) explain that   indicates all of the unobservable factors, of 
which there are those that do not vary within the sampling unit (  ) and those that do 
vary within and across the sampling units. If    is normally distributed, StataCorp (2013) 
specifies the choice probability as 
 
(41)   
                             
    
     
 
     
 
  
                
  
        
 
where 
 
(42)             
            
                 
  
 
where   is the cumulative normal distribution. 
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The panel level likelihood and integrals are estimated using Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature methods, which approximates a weighted sum of the function’s values at 
specific points and is useful when there are no more than four or five available 
alternatives (Train, 2009). Interested readers are referred to Guilkey and Murphy (1993), 
Geweke (1996), and StataCorp (2013) for a more detailed explanation. 
Heteroskedastic Probit Model 
In estimating the probability that an individual chooses one option over another, 
the variance of the unobservable factors (error term) may be different for different 
groups of individuals. This difference in the variance of the error term is often referred 
to as heteroskedasticity. To adjust for heteroskedastic errors and allow the comparison of 
choice probabilities for two sets of individuals for the same set of alternatives, a 
researcher may adjust overall scale of utility by “normalizing” the variance of one group 
and then estimating the variance for the other group relative to the first group. Train 
(2009) provides a good explanation of this index approach by using commuters from 
Chicago and Boston. The original utility functions for person n’s mode of transportation 
j are specified as 
 
(43)                      
               
                 
                 
That is, for a traveler in Boston, the utility they gain from mode of transportation j is a 
function of time,    , cost (money),   , and unobservable factors that are specific to 
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Boston travelers,    
 . The same can be said for travelers in Chicago, only the 
unobservable factors influencing their decision,    
 , are specific to Chicago and the 
variances of    
  and    
  are not equal. To adequately compare these two utilities, they 
are scaled by a ratio of the variances such that the variance of the error term for travelers 
in Chicago is set relative to the variance of the error term for those in Boston. The ratio 
is as follows: 
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The variable k now provides a scale measurement of variances and the parameters of the 
utility function of travelers in Chicago can be divided by   . By doing so, the variance 
of the unobservable factors becomes equivalent in both cities. Train (2009) specifies the 
newly adjusted utility functions as 
 
(45)                                   
                                           
This scale of utility through normalization of heteroskedastic errors now allows the 
comparison of error terms between the two cities. The variance of the unobserved factors 
in the two cities can now be explained in relative terms. 
In an effort to compare the two groups of individuals in the secondary market, 
those who should have purchased and those who actually did make a purchase, the scale 
of utility will be set by normalizing the heteroskedasticity in one of the group’s 
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unobserved variables and estimating the variance of the other group relative to the first 
group. The scale-adjusted utilities might take the form of 
 
(45)                                          
     
 
  
                                     
where 
 
(46)        
       
       
        
          
 . 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 This chapter will provide results from the proposed analyses. The demographic 
and behavioral characteristics of the sample will be visited, followed by a description of 
the bid values. Next, findings from the aforementioned models will be provided and 
discussed. Lastly, this chapter will be rounded out through a juxtaposition of the various 
models and estimation techniques.  
 
Demographic and Behavioral Characteristics 
The experiment produced a total of 201 responses. Although a typographical 
error resulted in a loss of observations, several pieces of information were recovered and 
proved useful in the analysis.  One of the goals of this experiment was to elicit 
consumers’ willingness to pay for lettuce, thus the type of consumer targeted by the 
experiment’s advertisement was a household’s primary grocery shopper. Table 3 
provides a description of the demographic and behavioral characteristics of the 
participants. It can be seen that roughly 84% of the participants were the primary grocery 
shopper for their household and over 57% of the sample was female. Nearly 44% 
identified with being married. Caucasians (73%) and Hispanic individuals (12%) largely 
made up the sample. Generally speaking, individuals were highly educated. The highest 
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level of educational attainment was at least some college or a Bachelor’s degree for over 
58% of the sample and over 34% had at least taken some graduate course. The average 
participant was approximately 41 years old, earned around $51,599 per year, and lived in 
a household of 2.54 individuals. On average, participants spent $126 on food per week, 
of which around $29 was spent on fruits and vegetables. Moreover, fresh vegetables 
composed of more than a third of the average participant’s full stock of food. 
 
Table 3. Demographic and Behavioral Characteristics of Experiment Participants 
 
 
Variable
Mean Percent Mean Percent Mean Percent
Age (years) 40.94 37.40 33.90
Household Size (individuals) 2.54 2.64 2.84
Education High School Diploma or Less 6.74 41.70 43.80
Bachelor's Degree or at least some college 58.43 47.50 47.20
Graduate Courses or More 34.83 10.90 9.00
Gender Female 57.59 50.80 50.30
Male 42.41 49.20 49.70
Marital Status Married 43.72 48.00 49.40
Not Married 56.28 51.90 50.50
Yearly Household Income ($) 51,599 71,317 70,730
Race 4.05 5.17 4.11
4.62 12.52 11.74
Caucasian/ White 72.83 64.20 44.99
Native American/ Indigenous 1.16 0.68 0.24
Hispanic 12.14 17.24 38.79
Other 5.20 0.20 0.12
Primary Shopper Primary Shopper 84.08
Secondary Shopper 15.92
Household Weekly Expenditures on Food ($/week) 125.87
Household Weekly Expenditures on Fruits and Vegetables ($/week) 29.29
Fresh Vegetables on Hand (out of full stock) 35.51
(a)Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2012 American Community Survey 1-year Estimates
Texas Population(a)Category
Asian/ Pacific Islander
African American
U.S. Population(a)Sample
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In addition to questions about basic demographic information and vegetable 
purchasing habits, subjects were asked to rate the relative importance of nine attributes 
that play a part in decisions when buying lettuce. This was included as a means of 
gaining information about the different factors that may contribute to an individual 
buying a specific lettuce product in the grocery store. Factors represented physical 
characteristics (i.e. size, visual appearance, and freshness), and product information (i.e. 
nutrition, growing location, and certified production practices), as well as marketing 
attributes (i.e. price and convenience) and experience features (taste). The scale of 
importance ranged from 1 to 4, with 1 representing “Not Important at all” and 4 being 
“Very Important.” Table 4 displays a list of all factors, as well as their mean rating and 
an interpretation of each factor’s importance.  
Participants rated freshness (3.871) as the most important factor, followed by 
taste (3.706) and visual appearance (3.677). Relative to the other factors, participants, on 
average, cared least about where or how lettuce is grown, as they rated growing location 
(2.226) and certified production practices (2.585) as the least important factors when 
buying lettuce. An interesting result can be found when taking a closer look at the factor 
of convenience. With this being said, it is worth noting that participants had very distinct 
views regarding certified production practices, as a large amount of variability can be 
seen in responses. Although a more in-depth analysis is warranted, knowing which 
factors consumers view as most important when buying lettuce presents significant value 
to the lettuce industry. 
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Table 4. Rated Relative Importance of Factors in Lettuce Purchases (a) 
 
 
Willingness to Pay Models with Experimental Auction Bids 
Participants’ bids from the auction rounds were pooled for all treatments and 
resulted in a total of 3,193 WTP observations. As specified in the methodology chapter, 
the eight products used were heads of lettuces that varied in color and production 
method: organic green lettuce, organic red lettuce, hydroponic red lettuce, hydroponic 
green lettuce, hydroponic mixed lettuce (red and green), conventional red lettuce, and 
conventional green lettuce. The conventional and organic heads of lettuce, as well as one 
bunch of spinach were purchased simultaneously at a local Kroger grocery store, while 
the hydroponic heads of lettuce were grown by Texas A&M AgriLife Research and 
Extension Center in Uvalde, Texas. Spinach was included in the product mix as a 
control.  
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 Recall from the methodology chapter that the experiment was a between-subjects 
design. Nine sessions of participants were split up into two groups. Group A (Sessions 1, 
2, 3, 4, and 9) participated in a baseline auction round and received a blind tasting as the 
treatment, whereas Group B (Sessions 5, 6, 7, and 8) submitted bids in a baseline round 
and received hydroponic production information as the treatment. Participants’ baseline 
bids for each product are described in Table 4, as well as the bids for each treatment 
group. The experiment produced bids that ranged in value from $0.00 to $5.50. Organic 
green lettuce received the highest average bid of $1.58 in the baseline round across all 
participants and hydroponic mixed lettuce was valued second highest at $1.55.  
Group A signaled a preference for organic green lettuce after the blind tasting treatment 
and gave it the highest average bid of $1.66. Additionally, subjects exhibited relatively 
high WTP for conventional green lettuce and hydroponic mixed lettuce in the blind 
tasting round.  In Group B’s information round, hydroponic mixed lettuce and organic 
green tied for the highest valued product, as they both received the highest average WTP 
of $1.90.  
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Willingness to Pay (WTP) Bids 
 
 
 A graphical representation of the mean bids for each product by treatments is 
provided in Figure 1.  In viewing the graph, the blind tasting treatment increased mean 
WTP for most products, but decreased mean WTP for organic red lettuce. This indicates 
that some participants disliked the taste of the organic red leaf lettuce. From the baseline 
to the blind tasting, Figure 1 shows the largest jumps in average WTP among 
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conventional varieties. Alternatively, organic varieties, as well as hydroponic red and 
hydroponic mixed lettuces showed visible increases in WTP from the baseline to the 
information treatment. It is unclear as to why the hydroponic green lettuce did not follow 
suit.  
 
 
Figure 1. Mean Bids for Lettuce Products by Treatment 
 
As previously mentioned, one of the goals of this analysis is to investigate whether 
production method is valued by consumers. Table 6 shows the mean WTP by production 
method and treatment for the lettuce products. It is clear that on average, over the course 
of the experiment, participants valued organic products highest, followed by 
hydroponics, and lastly conventional products. Overall, average bids for conventional 
varieties ($1.33) were in line with the average local retail price for conventional leafy 
lettuce at the time of the experiment ($1.38). However, mean bids for organic ($1.55) 
and hydroponic ($1.51) varieties were well below the average retail prices of $2.29 and 
$3.00, respectively.  
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Table 6. Mean Willingness to Pay (WTP) Bids by Production Method and 
Treatment 
 
 
On average, participants expressed a premium for conventionally produced products 
after the blind tasting, while average bids for organic and hydroponic varieties either 
remained steady or only slightly increased after the blind tasting treatment. In the 
information treatment, participants learned about hydroponic production and, prior to 
bidding, also learned the production method and color of each auction product; 
therefore, it was expected that average bids during the information round would not be 
equal to average bids during baseline round. Relative to the baseline, conventional 
products minimally decreased in average WTP and, as expected, large increases in 
average WTP for organic and hydroponic varieties were detected after learning about 
hydroponic production. 
 In addition to summary statistics for the bids and treatments, distributions of the 
bids were also constructed for comparison purposes. Figures 2-7 display the distribution 
of bids for each product by treatment, as well as the average bids for each method of 
production by treatment. Before any of the distributions were estimated, a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) test was used to test whether the bids for each product were normally 
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distributed. A null hypothesis that the bids are normally distributed was tested and the p-
values are organized in Table 7. The null hypothesis was rejected (P < 0.05) for the bids 
of all products in the baseline round, which means that they are not normally distributed. 
However, the null hypothesis was not rejected for the bids of four products in the 
production information round (hydroponic mixed lettuce, conventional red lettuce, 
conventional green lettuce, and hydroponic green lettuce) and four products in the blind 
tasting round (organic red lettuce, hydroponic red lettuce, conventional red lettuce, and 
hydroponic green lettuce), which indicates that these products have normal distributions 
in the respective rounds. 
 
Table 7. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Normality P-values2 
 
α = 0.05 
 
After the K-S test was applied, distributions for the bids were estimated using the 
Gaussian kernel density form in Simetar©. Kernel density estimation is a procedure that 
assigns each observation a unique distribution and the accumulation of these smaller 
                                                 
2 Boldface values indicate the null hypothesis was not rejected, which reveal the 
respective products and rounds that produced normally distributed bids.  
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distributions ultimately builds up the familiar normal probability distribution. 
Essentially, this function acts as a smoothing technique so that the distributions appear 
as a fluid form. Although not all of the bid distributions are normally distributed, for 
comparison purposes and simplicity’s sake all distributions take the form of normal 
distributions.  
 
 
Figure 2. Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution of Baseline Round Bids for 
Vegetable Products 
 
It is evident in Figure 2 that conventionally and organically grown red lettuce 
products appear to have the highest degree of bids censored at zero. A clustering of 
hydroponic red lettuce and hydroponic green lettuce secures the second-highest degree 
of censored bids, and organic green lettuce appears to have the least amount of bids 
censored. The mean bid for conventional red lettuce is shown farthest to the left, which 
means participants clearly valued it the least in the baseline round compared to all the 
other products. The mean bids of hydroponic mixed lettuce and organic green lettuce 
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were farthest to the right, which implies they were the highest valued products in the 
baseline round.  
 
 
Figure 3. Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution of Blind Tasting Round Bids for 
Vegetable Products 
 
During the blind tasting treatment, bid distributions show organic red as single-
handedly receiving the largest degree of bids censored at zero, followed by a clustering 
of hydroponic and conventional varieties of red lettuce. Bids for conventional green 
lettuce, organic green lettuce, and hydroponic mixed lettuce had the lowest degree of 
censoring and follow similar distributions. This implies that, compared to red lettuce, 
participants were more familiar with the taste of green lettuce and awarded it fewer 
negative or bids that equaled zero. It is also evident that regardless of the production 
method, red lettuce received the lowest mean bids, whereas organic green remained 
among the highest valued products. 
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Figure 4. Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution of Information Round Bids for 
Vegetable Products 
 
 After participants learned about hydroponic production, as well as the production 
method and color of each product, three large clusters of censorship can be seen in 
Figure 4. It is most obvious that conventional red had highest degree of censored bids, 
followed by hydroponic green lettuce, hydroponic red lettuce, conventional green 
lettuce, and organic red lettuce, and lastly organic green lettuce and hydroponic mixed 
lettuce with the lowest degree of bid censoring at zero.  As mentioned in the discussion 
of the bids’ descriptive statistics, hydroponic mixed lettuce and organic green lettuce 
were valued the highest after consumers learned about them, with both nearly receiving 
an average of $2.00 in WTP. When comparing bids in the information round to the 
baseline, the rollercoaster-like distributions of the former show more variation and 
distinction across products. Perhaps participants took into account the knowledge 
accrued from the information round and exercised more discretion when submitting their 
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bids. Bids for products of each production method were compiled and their distributions 
can be seen in Figures 5-7.  
 
 
Figure 5. Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution for Conventionally Grown Lettuce 
Products by Round 
 
In Figure 5 bids for conventional products in the information round exhibited the 
highest degree of censoring while the baseline and blind tasting rounds clustered at a 
lower degree. Despite the cluster effect, the mean WTP in the blind tasting treatment 
exceeded the mean bids of the other rounds. This implies that participants on average 
liked the taste of conventional products and placed higher values on conventional 
products. 
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Figure 6. Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution for Organically Grown Lettuce 
Products by Round 
 
Unlike the distributions in Figure 5, bids for organic products changed the most 
after the information treatment, which can be seen in the rightward movement of the 
mean bid in the information round from the baseline. No wide disparities in the degree 
of bid censoring across the rounds can be seen in Figure 6. Organic products saw little 
change in mean WTP after the blind tasting from the baseline, but the average bid value 
in the production information round was clearly greater than the other two rounds. 
Compared to the conventional product bid distributions in Figure 5, the flatter, wider 
distribution of bids from the information round in Figure 6 indicates greater variance 
among the bids for organic products after the dissemination of production information.  
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Figure 7. Gaussian Kernel Density Distribution for Hydroponically Grown Lettuce 
Products by Round 
 
Several similarities can be drawn from Figures 6 and 7. First, organic products in 
Figure 6 and the hydroponic products in Figure 7 both saw increases in mean WTP in 
the information round. Additionally, for both types of products, there was minimal 
change in bids from the baseline round to the blind tasting round. In comparing the 
distribution of bids across all production methods, the blind tasting treatment changed 
mean WTP more for the conventional lettuce than the information treatment and the 
information treatment moved average WTP for organic lettuce and hydroponic lettuce 
more than the blind tasting treatment did. This implies that consumers were willing to 
pay more for conventional lettuce after tasting it, but seemed unaffected by the taste of 
the hydroponically and organically grown products. However, the hydroponic 
production information and the disclosure of the products’ color and production methods 
proved to be impactful when consumers bid for organic and hydroponic products, but 
not so much for the conventional products.  
  136 
Although mean values and censorship can be extracted from Figures 2-7, caution 
should be taken when making further assumptions and implications.  To analyze which 
factors affect consumers’ WTP for the vegetable products, a more sophisticated analysis 
of the bids is necessary.  
First, an OLS model of the WTP bids will next be estimated, followed by a tobit 
model to account for any negative bid values and the zero-valued bids. Then, a random 
effects tobit model, random parameters model, and finally a random parameters tobit 
model will be estimated to account for any unobserved randomness. Following the 
estimations using full bids, this chapter will take a look at the implied differences in 
WTP. Afterwards, the prestige-sensitivity scale and health-consciousness scale questions 
will be used in a Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to identify the subgroups of consumers. 
Indicator variables will be formed that will characterize each individual’s prestige and 
health tendencies and will be included in the econometric models. Finally, a random 
parameters model will be estimated using information from the LCA. 
Bid Censoring 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, participants were allowed to bid any 
value for the auction products, even negative and zero values. Negative bids for a good 
can be interpreted in one of two ways – either the individual would be willing to pay to 
not consume the good or the negative bid is the amount of money they would have to get 
paid to consume the good. Generally, negative bidding behavior is found in valuation 
studies in which the focal products have controversial or undesirable attributes, such as 
genetically modified foods and irradiated meat (Parkhurst, Shogren, and Dickinson, 
  137 
2004). This study produced no negative WTP observations, however several bids took 
the value of zero. Table 8 shows the percentage of bids equal to zero for each product by 
treatment. The amount of zero bids ranged 1% to nearly 13.5% for the products. Table 8 
also reflects the censorship observed in the probability distributions of Figures 2-4. 
 
Table 8. Percentage of Bids Censored at $0.00 by Round and Product 
 
 
Subjects’ pooled WTP bids for the lettuce products were modeled as a function 
of product attributes (production method and color) and treatment variables (blind 
tasting and production information treatments), as well as demographic and behavior 
characteristics (age, education, income, race, gender, marital status, household size, and 
average weekly fruit and vegetable expenditures). Any interaction effects were detected 
through implied differences in bids for each model, which are discussed later. 
Conventionally grown green lettuce was used as the baseline for all econometric models. 
See Table 1 for definitions of the demographic and behavioral variables used in the WTP 
econometric models. 
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Ordinary Least Squares Model 
Initially, the bids for the lettuce products were pooled and used in a rudimentary 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model. Although OLS estimation provides a good first step 
in analysis, it is just that. It fails to account for bid censoring and any unobserved 
correlation or heterogeneity that may affect bids. Therefore, any estimates obtained from 
the OLS model have the potential to be biased and unreliable. Regardless, output from 
OLS estimation is a first look at which factors may play a significant role in the more 
advanced models to come. 
Results from the OLS estimation of WTP for the lettuce products can be seen in 
Table 9. Several factors are revealed as significant in consumers’ WTP valuations. 
Compared to conventional green lettuce, consumers were generally willing to pay more 
for organically grown lettuce and less if the lettuce was red (P<0.10 and P<0.01, 
respectively). Evidently, hydroponic production seemed to have no significant effect on 
WTP. The same can be said for both of the treatments. However, mean bids for 
organically grown lettuce and mixed color lettuce increased significantly after 
individuals learned about hydroponic production and each of the lettuce products’ 
production methods (conventional, organic, or hydroponic production) in the production 
information treatment. It is worth noting that only one product was mixed in color and it 
was hydroponically grown. Therefore, the variable “Mixed” also represents the impact 
of the hydroponically grown mixed lettuce product. 
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Table 9. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Willingness to Pay (WTP) for 
Lettuce Products 
 
 
 
  140 
Regarding the demographic and behavior factors, the OLS estimation reveals 
several interesting points. In general, older individuals and subjects who are married 
express significant price discounts for the lettuce products (P<0.01). Individuals who 
earn more than $49,999 annually, larger households, and females are willing to pay 
significant premiums for the lettuce products. Plausible explanations for the direction of 
each significant factor will be included in discussions of the more advanced models. 
Tobit Model 
Using the same regressors that are in the OLS model, a constant parameters tobit 
model is estimated to account for the previously ignored censored bids. Table 10 
presents the results from the tobit estimation, as well as the marginal effects of each 
variable, the standard deviation of residuals (σ), and the value for the maximized log-
likelihood function. 
When comparing output from the two estimations thus far, the OLS and tobit 
models, hardly any differences exist. Both models are similar in the sense that of the 
variables that were statistically significant in the OLS model continued to be significant 
in the tobit estimation (P<0.05). The signs of the significant variables’ coefficients did 
not change across the two models, but minute differences in the magnitudes can easily 
be seen. Although being a female and married still significantly affect bids, the 
confidence interval decreases from 99% to 95%. 
Unlike the OLS output, only the direction of change can be interpreted from the 
coefficients in the tobit output. Table 10 displays the magnitude of change as the factors’ 
marginal effects on the dependent variable        . Regarding production and color 
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attributes, organically produced lettuce and mixed color lettuce had a positive marginal 
effect on consumers’ bids. However, red-colored lettuce caused a negative marginal 
effect, which suggests consumers prefer the baseline color, green lettuce.  This negative 
reaction may mean consumers are unfamiliar with red lettuce, compared to the common 
green color of lettuce, or it could imply that consumers view red lettuce as a 
complementary lettuce product to be used with green lettuce and not necessarily 
consumed alone. However, the blind tasting continued to have no significant effect on 
consumers’ WTP. This could be for several reasons, one of which is that the lettuce 
samples were prepared without dressing, which may not be how the participants usually 
eat lettuce. Another reason may that the lettuce samples were not different enough to 
affect consumers WTP valuations. This hypothesis will later be addressed in the random 
parameters tobit model. 
One structural difference between the OLS model and the tobit model is that the 
tobit estimation reveals a large amount of censored bids (165 bids censored at $0.00 out 
of 2,699 total observations), which confirms the hypothesis that the OLS model ignores 
several observations. Another attractive quality of the tobit model, relative to the OLS 
estimation, is that a calculation of the standard deviation of residuals is included, which 
indicates the tobit model’s predictive ability. In this case, the standard deviation of 
residuals was estimated to be 0.900, which was statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence interval. 
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Table 10. Constant Parameters Tobit Model Estimates of Willingness to Pay (WTP) 
for Lettuce Products 
 
  143 
Random Effects Tobit Model 
The constant parameters tobit model accounts for censored bids, but it is still a 
relatively low-powered analysis of the WTP data. Experimental auctions like the ones in 
this study usually produce bids for several similar products over multiple rounds, which 
result in panel data that is multilayered and complex in nature. Lusk, Feldkamp, and 
Schroeder (2004) advise that bids submitted by the same participant for repeated 
products across multiple rounds are most likely strongly associated. In an effort to 
remedy this correlation and to pay heed to any unobserved randomness that may affect 
individuals’ bids, a modified version of the constant parameter tobit model was 
estimated. The resulting unrestricted model is a random effects tobit model, which 
accounts for random differences within individuals while continuing to recognize the 
censored bids. Results from the random effects tobit estimation are organized in Table 
10. 
Because this model takes the tobit form, it can easily be compared to the constant 
parameters tobit model. A likelihood ratio (LR) test was used to compare the fit of the 
two tobit models. This comparison test stems from Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE), which is a method that uses random sampling to measures whether all necessary 
variables are included. In other words, out of all of the possible values the parameters of 
the random sample can take, the value that has the highest probability of resembling the 
observed data should be chosen (Wooldridge, 2009). 
In a LR test, one of the models is assumed to be a restricted version, while the 
other (in this case, the one incorporating random effects) is considered as the 
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unrestricted model. The following LR test statistic is estimated as twice the amount of 
difference between the log-likelihood functions of the restricted and unrestricted models, 
LR and LU, respectively (Wooldridge, 2009). 
 
(34)           
  
  
                    
 
The LR test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with as many degrees of freedom as 
there are restrictions and with a null hypothesis that the omitted variables’ coefficients 
are not statistically significant, which means that there is minimal difference between the 
two maximized likelihood functions and that the unrestricted model is statistically 
sufficient (Greene, 2003). In an LR test that compared the random effects tobit model to 
the constant parameters tobit model, the null hypothesis (          was rejected, 
which implies that random effects exist in the data and the random effects tobit model is 
sufficient (P<0.01). 
In addition to the standard deviation of the individual specific randomness, σ(u), 
and the standard deviation of the overall error term, σ(e), the percentage of total variance 
that stems from individual random effects, ρ, is included in Table 10. McAdams (2011) 
states that ρ takes a value between zero and one and is interpreted as the percentage of 
variance that is due to randomness. If ρ is equal to zero, none of the existing variance 
originates from individual random effects. On the other hand, if ρ takes a value of one, it 
can be implied that 100% of the variance in the data is due to randomness at the 
individual level. In this case, ρ is 0.537 and statistically significant at the 99% 
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confidence interval, which means that 53.7% of the variance in the data is caused by 
individual random effects. 
With regard to the product characteristics, treatments, and interaction effects, 
several differences exist when comparing the standard tobit model and the random 
effects tobit model. In addition to slight adjustments in the magnitude of the significant 
variables’ effects, organic production becomes more significant. Increases in 
significance are also detected in the interaction effects, which can be seen in the impact 
of the information treatment on consumers’ bids for organically grown lettuce products 
and mixed color lettuce products. 
Several differences can be seen between the two models when analyzing the 
effects of demographic and behavioral factors on WTP. Because the most recent analysis 
is performed at the individual level, the demographic and behavior characteristics that 
were significant in the standard tobit model (Table 10) are not detected in the random 
effects tobit model’s output (Table 11). 
Like the constant parameters tobit model, the marginal effects should be used to 
make inferences about the size of the variables’ impacts on WTP. Table 11 shows that 
individuals were willing to pay $0.09 more for organic lettuce compared to conventional 
lettuce. However, consumers were willing to pay $0.23 less for red lettuce than they 
were for green lettuce. After learning about hydroponic vegetable production and 
following the revelation of the production method of each lettuce product, consumers are 
willing to pay $0.17 more for organic lettuce products and $0.25 more for the mixed 
product, which is hydroponically produced. 
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Table 11. Random Effects Tobit Model of Willingness to Pay (WTP) for Lettuce 
Products 
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Random Parameter Linear Model 
To account for randomness individual-specific heterogeneity in the coefficients, 
a random parameter linear model, also referred to as a random parameters linear model, 
was estimated using simulated maximum likelihood estimation methods in NLOGIT 
5.0©. This estimation’s results are shown in Table 12. 
Unlike the previously discussed tobit models, this linear estimation allows for 
direct interpretation of the coefficients’ magnitudes and signs. Participants expressed 
price premiums of $0.10 for organically grown lettuce and a deep price discount of 
$0.28 for red lettuce. Hydroponic production and the treatments continue to have an 
insignificant impact on consumers’ WTP for lettuce. However, consumers’ bids for 
organically grown lettuce significantly increased after they learned about hydroponic 
production. The significant increase of $0.18 suggests that the more consumers know 
about specific products, the more they are willing to spend on them. A similar result can 
also be seen in the significant price premium of $0.30 for mixed lettuce (which is 
hydroponically produced) following the information treatment. 
Almost all demographic and behavior characteristics become statistically 
significant (P<0.10) in the random parameters linear estimation. Positive effects are 
found among females and individuals earning more $49,999 annually, as well as 
Hispanic consumers and those who have completed some graduate school (P<0.05). 
Furthermore, females are willing to pay $0.14 more than males in WTP and Hispanic 
individuals are willing to pay $0.10 more than Caucasian shoppers. In contrast, older 
consumers and those who are married expressed price discounts of for the lettuce 
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products. An interesting result arises in married individuals, who are willing to pay 
$0.24 less for the lettuce products than consumers who are not married. 
Estimates of the standard deviations of the random effects at the individual level 
(   
 ), which shows that not only are there significant random effects between individuals 
in general, but also individual-specific effects emanating from the treatment and specific 
product characteristics, are also reported in Table 12. Other measurements included in 
Table 12 are the standard deviations of the random variables, which measure the 
differences in the intercept and the coefficients between individuals, and otherwise 
recognize any unobserved individual heterogeneity (McAdams et al., 2013; Segovia, 
2014). It is clearly seen that the product attributes and treatment variables, except for 
mixed color, as well the interaction effects of the blind tasting and information 
treatments on hydroponic and organic lettuces have statistically significant standard 
deviations, which means that the random effects of the product attributes and treatments 
varied from participant to participant and responses are, therefore, heterogeneous. 
In comparing results from the random effects tobit model (intercept is random) to the 
random parameters linear estimation results, (intercept and coefficients are random) 
several differences must be addressed. Organic production and the information treatment 
become slightly less significant after coefficients are allowed to vary randomly in the 
random parameters linear model. Other changes emerge in analyzing the demographic 
characteristics; specifically age, income, post-graduate education, race, gender, marital 
status, and household size become significant (P<0.10). Now, being older and married 
have a significantly negative impact on WTP, while being Hispanic, a female, and 
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earning a higher income cause positive effects on WTP for lettuce (P<0.01). Married 
individuals may be willing to pay less for lettuce than their non-married counterparts as 
a result of the influence of the tastes and preferences of their spouses.  
 
Table 12. Random Parameter Linear Model Estimates of Willingness to Pay (WTP) 
for Lettuce Products 
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Random Parameters Tobit Model 
While the random parameters linear model accounts for heterogeneity in the 
intercept and the coefficients, it does not accommodate the censored nature of the WTP 
data like the tobit models do. Therefore, a random parameters tobit model is warranted. 
Such a model captures any unobserved individual random effects, while also satisfying 
any bid values that are negative or zero. 
Several interesting results are found in the output from this paramount 
estimation, which is displayed in Table 13. In reference to the product attributes of 
production method and color, organic production and red colored lettuce remain 
significant across models, as do the interaction effects of the information treatment on 
bids for organically grown lettuce and mixed color lettuce. More specifically, consumers 
are willing to pay a premium of $0.12 for organic lettuce compared to conventional 
green lettuce, whose average retail price is $1.47. This increase in WTP can be explained 
by the proliferation of organic versions of conventional products, as well as a growing 
desire and consciousness among consumers to fill their diets with a variety of healthy 
foods. Despite inconclusive findings in literature that compares organic and conventional 
products, the results in Table 13 support Yiridoe, Bonti-Ankomah, and Martin’s (2005) 
conclusions that most consumers were generally not willing to pay a premium more than 
20% for organically produced foods. 
Red colored lettuce receives deep price discounts of around $0.28 in WTP for 
lettuce, compared to conventional green lettuce. Because lettuce is known for its green 
color, this negative effect may be a result of consumers’ unfamiliarity with the deep red 
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hue of some of the products. This deep discount may be a result of individuals viewing 
red leaf lettuce as more of an ingredient salads or a complementary good to green leaf 
lettuce. 
While the blind tasting treatment and its interaction effects continued to be 
insignificant, the opposite is true for the information treatment. The dissemination of 
hydroponic production information continued to affect bids for specific lettuce products. 
Regarding the information treatment’s interaction effects, consumers are willing to pay 
$0.22 more for organically grown lettuce and $0.30 more for mixed color lettuce (which 
is a hydroponically grown product) after learning about hydroponic production and 
knowing each lettuce product’s respective production method. Regarding production 
information Mabiso et al. (2005) found a similar result when consumers expressed price 
premiums of $0.48 for tomatoes that were labeled “U.S. grown.” Segovia (2014) found a 
similar result when consumers were willing to pay more for domestic tomatoes 
compared to imported tomatoes after they knew where the growing location of the 
tomato products. Overall, these findings suggest that consumers are becoming more 
interested and conscious in how fresh fruits and vegetables are grown, but express price 
premiums only after they are provided with differentiating production information. 
The random parameters tobit estimation also provides interesting results regarding 
demographic and behavioral characteristics. Unlike previously estimated models, 
females now express a price discount of $0.07 compared to males for the lettuce 
products. Consumers who are married, older, individuals who are neither Caucasian nor 
Hispanic (Asian/Pacific Islander, African American, Native American/Indigenous, or 
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other race), and those who spend more on average weekly fruits and vegetable also 
express price discounts for the lettuce products. Specifically, married consumers are 
willing to pay $0.14 less for the lettuce products compared to those who are not married. 
Perhaps this negative effect occurs as a result of married individuals’ changed tastes and 
preferences and indicates an influence of their spouses’ tastes. Because the auctions 
focused on minimally processed heads of lettuce, the negative effects seen in married 
and older consumers may be negative because they may be comparing it to bagged 
lettuce and they may not usually buy heads of lettuce. Perhaps due to busy work and 
family schedules, married and older individuals may not purchase a head of lettuce 
because it takes more time to prepare. Alternatively, perhaps a head of lettuce provides 
too much lettuce for those who are married or older; therefore they may be discounting it 
from a practical standpoint. In contrast, Hispanic consumers and higher income 
individuals are willing to pay increases of  $0.12 and an average of $0.30, respectively. 
This may reflect the amount of lettuce in Hispanic consumers’ diets, relative to other 
individuals. The level of formal education attainment and household size revealed no 
significant effect on consumers’ WTP for the lettuce products. Segovia (2014) found 
similar results regarding the effects of income and weekly expenditures on consumers’ 
WTP for tomato products. 
Table 12 also provides estimations of the standard deviations of the random 
parameters. Consumers’ valuations are homogeneous for organic lettuce, red lettuce, and 
mixed lettuce after the blind tasting treatment. Consumers also reacted in a similar 
manner toward red lettuce following the information treatment. Additionally, a LR test 
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was performed to compare the random parameters tobit model with the standard tobit 
and random effects tobit models. Results from the test show that the random parameters 
model was more appropriate for the data than both of the tobit models (P<0.01). 
 
Table 13. Random Parameter Tobit Estimates of Willingness to Pay (WTP) for 
Lettuce Products 
 
 
Comparison of Estimated WTP Models 
A range of models was estimated in an effort to gain a better understanding of the 
factors that affect consumers’ valuations of the lettuce products. The OLS model 
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provides a good starting point, but ultimately cannot cope with the idiosyncrasies of the 
data and despite the random parameters linear model’s attempts to account for 
unobserved correlation and heterogeneity; its ignorance of the censored nature of the 
bids proved the estimation was ill-suited for the job. The opposite is true for the constant 
parameters tobit model – it deliberately accounts for bid censoring, but comes up short in 
accounting for the randomness of the data. In the estimated random effects tobit model, 
censored bids are accounted for and unobserved randomness between individuals was 
absorbed by the intercept; however, this model does not pick up on any unobserved 
randomness from the treatments or product characteristics that could affect consumers’ 
bids. Therefore, a random parameters tobit estimation seems to describe the data the 
best, because it recognizes the censored nature of the data and accounts for heterogeneity 
in both the intercept and coefficients. 
In the journey to find the most appropriate model, several findings revealed 
themselves to be robust across models. Significant variables such as organic production, 
red colored lettuce, and the effect of the information treatment on bids for organic lettuce 
and mixed color lettuce were all fairly consistent throughout the analysis. The 
insignificant effect of the blind tasting treatment might imply that consumers simply did 
not detect a large enough sensory difference to affect their bids for the lettuce products. 
Additionally, the demographic and behavioral variables had mixed effects on WTP 
across the several models that were estimated. 
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Implied Differences in Bids for Lettuce Products 
The econometric models estimated thus far used the full bids to estimate the 
different variables that affect WTP for the lettuce products. A narrower, refined 
approach that compares the differences in an individual’s WTP between treatments may 
provide more information about lettuce buying behavior.  
Differences in Bids between Treatments 
In analyzing WTP data from experimental auctions, one might be curious as to 
whether participants’ bid values changed after a specific treatment. To measure whether 
there was a difference in bids across rounds, Wilcoxon’s Paired t-tests (also called 
Mann-Whitney-U tests) were used to compare differences in bids values for each 
product from the baseline round to the designated treatment round. Results from the 
comparison tests can be found in Table 14. 
A null hypothesis that bids in each treatment round were statistically equal to 
bids submitted in the baseline round was tested. The resulting p-values in Table 14 
reveal mixed findings for each of the products. In comparing bids after the blind tasting 
treatment to bids submitted in the baseline round, the only products that saw significant 
differences in WTP were conventional red lettuce, conventional green lettuce, and 
hydroponic green lettuce (P < 0.05).  
One interesting point here is that consumers valued the conventionally produced 
lettuces differently after tasting them, but did not significantly adjust their bids for 
organically produced lettuces. Both sets of products were alike in color and were 
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purchased from the same vendor simultaneously; therefore, theoretically, the only 
explanation for this difference appears to be the production method.  
In reference to changes in bids from the baseline round to the information 
treatment, several differences should be noted. The WTP for both organic lettuces, as 
well as all hydroponic products were statistically different after receiving information 
about hydroponic production (P < 0.001). This result was expected as the hydroponic 
information made comparisons to conventional production. The information treatment 
also caused significant changes in bids for conventional green lettuce (P < 0.10). Recall 
that the production method and variety of each lettuce product were revealed after the 
participants reviewed the hydroponic production handout. Thus, these changes in the 
bids are also due to labeling information that would typically be available in any retail 
environment.  
 
Table 14. Results from Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests (a) 
 
 
The p-values in Table 14 only reflect comparisons made between each treatment and the 
baseline; therefore the estimates should not be compared between treatment rounds, as 
all participants did not receive the same treatment. Additionally, Table 14 does not 
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reveal which direction the treatments influenced WTP values – it simply shows whether 
or not they were significantly equivalent to the baseline.  
One way of analyzing the direction and magnitude of change in average WTP 
after a treatment is to measure the difference between the bids submitted in the baseline 
and the bids submitted during the treatment round. This process is also known as 
calculating the implied differences of WTP. Table 15 shows how the differences in bids 
between the baseline and the each treatment were calculated, as well as the proportion of 
bids that changed positively and negatively, as well as the percentage of bids that saw no 
change following the specified treatment.  
In the case of the blind tasting treatment, a large number of participants either 
increased or decreased their bids after tasting the lettuce products. This was expected, as 
individuals are assumed to be heterogeneous in their taste preferences and palates when 
it comes to lettuce. Table 15 also shows that a majority of bids increased after 
participants learned about how lettuce products were grown. About 25% of bidders’ 
WTP values were unaffected by the production information.  One surprising result was 
the percentage of negative differences in participants’ WTP after the information 
treatment. This result reveals that a portion of the sample decreased their WTP after 
learning about hydroponic production and after labeling information was made available. 
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Table 15. Proportions of Positive, Negative, and Zero Changes in Willingness to 
Pay (WTP) from Baseline Round, Summed for All Products 
 
 
 Summary statistics of the implied differences are provided in Table 16. 
Regarding the blind tasting treatment, median bids for all products reflect negative 
differences, which means that the median subject’s bid for every product decreased after 
tasting the products. In contrast, the only products to not receive a median value of zero 
after the information round were the conventionally grown lettuce products, which 
received negative values.  
Aside from median values, other factors in Table 16 provide insight into how the 
specified treatments affected participants’ bids for each product. For example, the range 
of differences illustrates the severity of the impact each treatment had on individuals’ 
baseline bids. Moreover, Table 16 points out how the mean bids in each round changed 
in relation to the baseline product, conventional green lettuce. In the blind tasting 
treatment, bid differences for all of the lettuce varieties except for the conventional red 
lettuce were negative. This implies that nearly all of the differences were either 
discounts or smaller premiums than the mean difference in bids for conventional green 
lettuce. Table 16 also shows all positive values for mean bid differences relative to the 
baseline product in the information round, which means that compared to conventional 
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green lettuce, consumers experienced increases in WTP for all of the products after they 
received the production and labeling information. 
 
Table 16. Summary Statistics for Implied Differences of Bids 
 
 
 Two random parameter linear models, one for each treatment, were estimated 
using the implied differences in WTP as the dependent variable and maximum 
likelihood simulation methods in NLOGIT 5.0©. In these models, the explanatory 
variables indicate how each individual’s bid changes depending on the treatment. In 
other words, these analyses will detect which product attributes and demographic 
characteristics significantly affect changes in WTP after each treatment. Results from the 
two estimations of bid differences are separately estimated and discussed by treatment in 
the following section.  
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Implied Differences in WTP: Blind Tasting Treatment 
 Based on whether subject like or dislike the taste of the lettuce products, their 
WTP may increase, decrease, or remain constant from the baseline bid value.  A random 
parameter linear model allows the dependent variable, implied differences, to vary in 
these directions while accounting for the individual randomness of tastes and 
preferences. Results for the random parameter linear estimation of implied differences 
for the blind tasting treatment are described in Table 17. 
 As previously mentioned, the difference in bids between the blind tasting round 
and the baseline round is considered the dependent variable. As a result, the parameter 
estimates in Table 17 reflect the differences in the parameters between the blind tasting 
and the baseline. For instance, compared to the baseline product (conventional green 
lettuce), the difference in WTP that was due to organic varieties and hydroponic 
products decreased in value by $0.19 and $0.23, respectively, from the baseline to the 
blind tasting round (P < 0.01). Table 17 also points out several demographic and 
behavioral factors that played a significant role in the difference of WTP between the 
baseline and tasting rounds. Specifically, household size, average weekly expenditures 
on fruits and vegetables, and individuals who were neither Caucasian nor Hispanic had 
significantly positive effects on the change in WTP that resulted from the blind tasting 
treatment (P < 0.05).  
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Table 17. Random Parameter Linear Model Estimates of Implied Differences in 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for Lettuce Products, Blind Tasting Treatment 
 
 
In addition to the parameter estimations and significance levels, it is clear that none of 
the random parameters’ standard deviations were significant, which means that any 
Parameter
Constant -0.324 ** 0.153
Organic -0.188 *** 0.060
Hydroponic -0.234 *** 0.061
Red 0.026 0.047
Mixed 0.087 0.088
AGE 0.001 0.002
DEDU2 0.238 * 0.124
DEDU3 0.239 * 0.127
DINC2 0.097 0.096
DINC3 -0.066 0.094
DRACE2 0.009 0.092
DRACE3 0.162 ** 0.063
FEMALE 0.011 0.049
MARRIED -0.058 0.088
HHSIZE 0.045 *** 0.017
AWFV 0.003 ** 0.001
Constant 0.235 *** 0.020
Organic 0.055 0.042
Hydroponic 0.028 0.035
Red 0.021 0.035
Mixed 0.005 0.066
0.608 *** 0.021
Log-Likelihood -712.088
Standard 
Error
Note: *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Demographics/ Behaviors
Means of Random Parameters
Standard Deviations of Random Parameters
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changes seen in WTP as a result of the product attributes were homogeneous at the 
individual level.  
Implied Differences in WTP: Production Information Treatment 
 Just like the blind tasting treatment, the hydroponic production handout and the 
products’ label information could affect participants’ WTP values positively, negatively, 
or not at all. Consequently, implied differences for the production information treatment 
were analyzed using a random parameter linear model. The information handout 
compares certain aspects of hydroponic production (i.e. water-use efficiency, cleanliness 
of final product, and reduced pesticide applications) to field production, and it was 
assumed that consumers might change the valuations positively, negatively, or not at all 
after reviewing this information. Results from the random parameter linear estimation, in 
Table 18, show that the product attributes of organic production and hydroponic 
production had a significantly positive effect on the change in WTP from the baseline 
round to the information treatment. 
In reference to the demographic characteristics that affected the difference in 
WTP between the baseline and information treatment, older individuals, those with at 
least some graduate education, and individuals who did not identify as Hispanic or 
Caucasian negatively impacted the change in WTP after the information treatment. The 
remainder of the demographic and behavioral factors did not have a significant effect on 
bids following the information treatment. Unlike the blind tasting treatment results in 
Table 17, all of the estimated standard deviations of the random parameters were 
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statistically significant, which implies that the effects of every product attribute varied 
for each individual. 
 
Table 18. Random Parameter Linear Model Estimates of Implied Differences in 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for Lettuce Products, Production Information 
Treatment 
 
 
Parameter
Constant 0.307 * 0.159
Organic 0.293 *** 0.061
Hydroponic 0.348 *** 0.060
Red 0.030 0.035
Mixed 0.074 0.085
AGE -0.005 *** 0.002
DEDU2 -0.171 0.114
DEDU3 -0.323 *** 0.118
DINC2 -0.022 0.069
DINC3 0.102 0.068
DRACE2 0.113 0.071
DRACE3 -0.267 *** 0.101
FEMALE 0.076 0.051
MARRIED -0.080 0.061
HHSIZE 0.019 0.022
AWFV 0.002 * 0.001
Constant 0.211 *** 0.022
Organic 0.411 *** 0.042
Hydroponic 0.350 *** 0.033
Red 0.145 *** 0.035
Mixed 0.653 *** 0.058
0.465 *** 0.011
Log-Likelihood -406.126
Standard 
Error
Note: *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Demographics/ Behaviors
Means of Random Parameters
Standard Deviations of Random Parameters
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Latent Class Analysis 
The random parameters models described thus far have revealed that unobserved 
heterogeneity does exist at the individual level for certain product attributes and 
treatments, but they are not equipped to describe the origins of heterogeneity. A latent 
class analysis (LCA) provides a useful tool to further describe the behavioral tendencies 
and lifestyle peculiarities of consumers. By using a set of observed indicators that 
provide insight into the prestige seeking and health-consciousness behavior of the 
sample, a LCA classifies participants into unobserved latent classes, or subgroups. This 
analysis can be particularly useful to help researchers visualize the potential sources of 
heterogeneity. Initially, a LCA was applied by using a combination of the health and 
prestige scale responses. Next, a LCA was estimated separately for the health scale 
responses and then for the prestige scale responses. Each LCA proceeded as follows: 1) 
identify the appropriate number of latent classes, 2) characterize the latent classes using 
the demographic and indicator variables, and 3) estimate each class’s WTP for lettuce 
using the random parameters tobit model.  
Health & Prestige Scales Combined 
The first LCA that was performed used a combination of the most relevant 
questions from the prestige scale and the health scale. The two scales were combined to 
investigate consumers’ views of health and prestige combined. That is, in the age of 
juicing trends and celebrities turning into clean-diet cookbook authors, what if now 
being aware and involved with one’s health has become a fashionable and prestigious 
product? If this is true, perhaps consumers can be described by their responses to the 
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health-consciousness questions and prestige-related questions. The first step was to 
estimate the appropriate number of latent classes (also known as subgroups) within the 
sample. A series of latent class models were estimated, with the number of latent classes 
ranging from 2 to 9. To choose the appropriate number of classes, several measurements 
were compared. Estimates for the log-likelihood values, AIC, BIC, and Adjusted BIC 
are specified for model in Table 19. In comparing the minimum Information Criteria 
(IC) for each number of latent classes, it can be seen that the minimum AIC and 
Adjusted BIC statistics favored a four-class model, while the minimum BIC favored a 
three-class model. When IC measurements differ, as they do in Table 19, a researcher is 
often uncertain as to which criterion is best to follow. Dziak et al. (2012) suggested that 
when ICs differ, AIC frequently tends to favor a large model (overfitting), whereas BIC 
presents risks because it often supports a smaller model (underfitting). However, if the 
sample size n is small, Dziak et al. (2012) stated that the error is usually underfitting and 
the preferred criterion is the one with lower rates of underfitting, in this case the AIC. 
Additionally, the estimated class-membership probabilities for the three-class model 
were 40.72%, 27.04%, and 32.23% for each class, while the probabilities for the four-
class model were a were 37.38%, 24.16%, 32.60%, and 5.85%. Regarding the size of 
each class in the two models, Lanza et al. (2007) suggested that the probabilities of each 
class should be nontrivial and differentiable such that the division of classes can easily 
be seen.  Therefore, based on the IC values, guidance from the LCA literature, and the 
class membership probabilities, a four-class model was chosen. 
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Table 19. Comparison of Latent Class Models: Combination of Health-
Consciousness and Prestige-Seeking Scales 
 
 
Following the process of identifying the most appropriate number of latent 
classes, the estimated class membership probability and indicator-response probabilities 
for each of the four classes were organized and can be seen in Table 20. The class-
membership probabilities show that 37.38% of participants gained membership to Class 
1, 24.16% of participants were members of Class 2, 32.60% of participants were 
members of Class 3, and 5.85% of participants were members of Class 4. The indicator-
response probabilities reflect the probability of observing a specific indicator variable in 
each latent class. The purpose of using the relevant questions from both the health and 
prestige scales was to investigate whether the differences between consumers can be 
defined by their prestige-seeking and health-conscious lifestyle habits. 
2 -1215.0 701.7 784.3 705.1
3 -1158.0 613.7 739.3 618.9
4 -1132.4 588.5 757.0 595.4
5 -1125.7 601.2 812.6 609.8
6 -1112.1 600.1 854.4 610.5
7 -1101.2 604.2 901.5 616.4
8 -1092.8 613.4 953.7 627.4
9 -1081.6 616.9 1000.1 632.6
Note: Boldface type indicates the selected model
a AIC (Akaike Information Criterion)
b BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion)
Adjusted 
BIC
Number 
of latent 
classes 
(S)
Log 
Likelihood 
at 
convergence
AICa BICb
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Regarding individuals in Class1, Table 20 shows there is a 49% probability that 
they exercised four times per week or more and there is a 21% probability that 
consumers in this class spent more than $50 per week on fruits and vegetables. 
Additionally, 96% of consumers in this class identified with being involved with their 
health and there is a 91% probability that the consumers in this class are very self-
conscious about their health.  Moreover, there was 100% probability that consumers in 
Class 1 were aware of their health. Class 1 was relatively not affected by prestige, as 
only 15% of the members in Class 1 thought people notice when they buy the most 
expensive brand of a product, only 5% of the class were likely to think other people 
make judgments about them by their purchases, and there was a 9% probability that 
Class 1 consumers thought buying high priced versions of products evoked an emotion 
in other people. Class 1’s relatively low preference for prestige can be seen more clearly 
in the fact that there was zero chance of observing a consumer who enjoyed the prestige 
of buying a high priced product and thought buying costly versions of inexpensive goods 
was impressive. Due to this description, Class 1 was characterized as “High Health, Low 
Prestige.” 
Class 2 was relatively similar to Class 1 in terms of habits related to health, such 
as weekly exercise and fruit and vegetable expenditures, and the indicators relating to 
health consciousness and awareness. However, the most obvious difference between 
Class 1 and Class 2 can be seen in the indicator response probabilities for the prestige 
variables. There was a 72% probability that members of Class 2 think people notice 
when they buy the most expensive brand of a product, compared to a 15% chance that 
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consumers in Class 1 agreed with this statement. A similar result is found when it comes 
to evoking emotion in others by purchasing the high priced version of a product, with a 
72% probability of observing consumers who agreed with this notion in Class 2, 
compared to a paltry 9% in Class 1. Moreover, there was a 60% probability that 
consumers in Class 2 thought others make judgments about them by the products they 
buy, compared to just 5% in Class 1. Given these comparisons, Class 2 was named 
“High Health, High Prestige.” 
Class 3 represented 32.60% of participants and the probabilities of observing 
strong preferences toward healthy, active lifestyles and prestige-seeking behavior were 
relatively low compared to the other classes. For example, Table 20 shows that 28% of 
the consumers in Class 3 were likely to exercise four or more times per week and there 
was only a 3% probability of observing consumers who spent more than $50 per week 
on fruits and vegetables. Preferences for prestige in Class 3 were similar to those of 
Class 1, as Class 3 mirrored Class1’s relatively low probability (15%) of consumers who 
thought people notice when they the most expensive brands. Single-digit probabilities 
were also observed in Class 3, as only 6% enjoyed the prestige of buying a high-priced 
product, 8% thought it says something to people when they buying the high-priced 
version of a product, and a mere 2% thought that it was impressive to buy the costly 
brand of a relatively inexpensive good. However, response probabilities to the health 
questions are not the same as those in the “High Health” groups (Class 1 and Class 2). 
For instance, there was only a 17% probability of consumers in Class 3 being very self-
conscious about their health and only 2% agreed that they constantly examine their 
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health, compared to respective 83% and 55% indicator-response probabilities seen in 
Class 2. In addition, there was only a 37% probability that consumers in Class 3 
identified with being very involved with their health, which intuitively supports the 
relatively low probabilities of frequent exercise habits and larger expenditures on fruits 
and vegetables. For these reasons, Class 3 was named “Low Health, Low Prestige.” 
The final class in the four-class LCA possesses similar characteristics of Class 2 
and Class 3. Class 4 is similar to Class 2 in the sense that relatively high probabilities are 
seen in the indicator variables relating to prestige-seeking behavior. For example, there 
is a 64% probability that consumers in Class 4 think that others make judgments about 
them by their purchases, compared to a 60% probability in Class 2. Consumers in both 
classes agreed with questions regarding what others thought of them by their high-priced 
purchases (i.e. people notice when they buy the most expensive brand of a product; it 
says something to people when you buy the high priced version of a product). However, 
Class 4 exhibited similar probabilities to Class 3 with regard to the health-awareness and 
fruit and vegetable purchases. For example, there was an 18% probability of consumers 
in Class 4 being very self-conscious about their health, compared to a 17% probability in 
Class 3.  Additionally, there is a zero probability that consumers in Class 4 constantly 
examined their health, compared to a 2% probability in Class 3. However, in terms of 
being involved with their health and being aware of their health, consumers in Class 4 
exhibited the lowest probabilities of all the classes. Given this description, Class 4 was 
characterized as “Low Health, High Prestige.” 
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Table 20. Latent Class Parameter Estimates for Four-Class Model: Combination of 
Health and Prestige Scales 
 
 
The demographic and behavioral characteristics of each class can be seen in 
Table 21. On average, individuals in Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 were around 
44 years old, 33 years old, 44 years old, and 32 years old, respectively. In reference to 
gender and marital status, Class 1 was made up of mostly females who were not married, 
Class 2 was composed of mostly males who were not married, Class 3 primarily 
included females who were not married, and Class 4 was made up of equal parts male 
and female, most of whom were not married. 
The four classes can be grouped into two trends when it comes to analyzing 
average household size and income. Meaning, these statistics for Class 1 and Class 2 are 
higher than the sample mean for household size and income, while Class 3 and Class 4 
average household size and income are lower than the means of the sample. The 
households of Class 1 and Class 2 were 2.58 and 2.71, which are on average larger than 
the sample mean household size of 2.54. A similar trend can be seen in the average 
annual incomes of Class 1 and Class 2, which are $55,000 and $53,085 – higher than the 
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sample mean income of $51,599. On the other hand, households in Class 3 and Class 4, 
2.37 and 2.40 respectively, were on average smaller than the sample mean household 
size of 2.54. Following in a similar manner, average annual incomes of Class 3 and 
Class 4 were $48,281 and $41,363, respectively, which fall below the sample mean 
income of $51,599. 
With regard to education attainment, Class 2 was the most educated class, as 
100% of the individuals in Class 2 had an education level that was higher than just a 
high school diploma (64% had a Bachelor’s degree or at least some college and 36% had 
a graduate education). Based on the percentage of individuals with a high school 
education only, Class 1 was also highly educated, followed by Class 4, and lastly Class 
3. It is worth mentioning that although only 6% of participants belonged to Class 4, it 
held the highest percentage of post-graduate education as 50% of its members had a 
graduate education or some graduate school. Classes 1 and 2 were mainly comprised of 
Caucasian individuals (approximately 76% and 65%, respectively) and Asian/ Pacific 
Islander, African American, Native American or other races (about 15% and 23%, 
respectively). Classes 3 and 4 also mostly consisted of Caucasian consumers (75% and 
70%, respectively) and Hispanic individuals (around 15% and 20%, respectively). Each 
class’s indicator-response probabilities for weekly fruit and vegetable expenditures in 
Table 20 are echoed in each class’s means for fresh produce on hand as a percentage of 
their full stock in Table 21. In other words, it was expected that Class 1 would have the 
highest percentage of fresh vegetables on hand as a percentage of full stock compared to 
the other classes, because Class 1 had the highest probability of consumers who spent 
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more than $50 weekly on fruits and vegetables in Table 20. Class 2 had the next highest 
percentage of fresh vegetables on hand, followed by Class 4 and finally Class 3.  
After the demographics and behavioral characteristics of the latent classes were 
characterized, the WTP for lettuce was estimated for each class using a random 
parameters tobit model. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 22 for each 
class and juxtaposed by estimates for all participants. All participants valued organically 
grown lettuce (P < 0.05), especially after learning about production and labeling 
information. Marginal effects indicate that increases in WTP for organic lettuce reached 
nearly $0.10. Participants’ WTP values for the mixed and organically grown lettuce 
were positively affected (P< 0.05) after they learned about production and labeling 
information – WTP values for mixed and organic products increased by $0.28 and $0.21, 
respectively. Red colored lettuce evoked a significant discount in consumers’ valuations 
– their WTP decreased $0.29 due to the red hue. 
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Table 21. Demographic and Behavioral Characteristics of Participants by Latent Class: Combination of Health and 
Prestige Scales 
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In addition to analyzing the parameter estimates for the whole sample, further 
insight may be gained by estimating WTP for each of the latent classes. As can be seen 
in Table 22, all classes expressed significant price discounts for red lettuce. The red 
color had the smallest negative effect on consumers in Class 1 (around 37% of the 
participants), who decreased WTP by $0.18. With a decrease in WTP of $0.74, Class 4 
(around 6% of the participants) expressed the largest discounts in WTP for red lettuce. 
Neither the blind tasting treatment nor the production information had a significant 
effect on WTP, but Class 3 (around 33% of the participants) increased their WTP for 
organic lettuce by $0.34 (P < 0.05) after they learned about hydroponic production and 
what the products were. Class 3’s (Low Health, High Prestige) relatively unhealthy 
classification coupled with significant premiums for organic lettuce after the production 
information treatment indicate their tendency to “redeem” their sedentary lifestyles by 
placing value on unconventionally produced lettuce and thus perhaps communicating a 
desire or intention to eat what they perceive to be healthier lettuce.  This result echoes 
Segovia’s (2014) findings that consumers are willing to pay a price to redeem 
themselves and make up for their unhealthy habits. 
A positive relationship was found between household size and WTP for lettuce 
for all classes except for consumers in Class 4, who decreased WTP by $0.27. Recall 
that Class 4 was comprised of individuals who were not very aware of or involved with 
their health, but did indicate prestige-seeking behavior through their purchases. 
However, in comparing the mean WTP (E[y]) across all classes, Class 4 has the highest 
value, followed by Class 1, then Class 2, and finally Class 3. 
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Even more detailed information when the classes are compared against a baseline 
class. Table 23 organizes results from a random parameters tobit model in which Classes 
1, 2, and 4 were compared to Class 3. Relative to Class 3 (Low Health, Low Prestige), 
significant differences in WTP for the lettuce products can be seen with Classes 1 and 2, 
but not Class 4. More specifically, marginal effects reveal that consumers of Class 2 and 
Class 1 (the more health-conscious groups compared to Classes 3 and 4) were willing to 
pay $0.32 and $0.09 more for the lettuce products, respectively, than Class 3.  On the 
other hand, no statistical difference exist between the WTP values submitted by 
consumers in Class 4 (Low Health, High Prestige) and the values submitted by 
individuals in Class 3, which was considered the baseline group. Findings from Table 22 
and Table 23 not only provide a look at the behavior of each class, but also offer 
valuable marketing insight into how the classes relate to each other.
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Table 22. Random Parameters Tobit Estimates for Willingness to Pay (WTP) for Lettuce Products by Latent Class: 
Combination of Health and Prestige Scales 
  177 
Table 23. Random Parameters Tobit Estimates for Willingness to Pay (WTP) for 
Lettuce Products: Class 3 as Baseline, Combination of Health and Prestige Scales 
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Health Consciousness Scale 
Although the first LCA classified consumers based on a combination of the 
health and prestige information elicited from scale-style questions, perhaps health-
consciousness and prestige-seeking behaviors are mutually exclusive. Therefore, the 
second LCA that was performed only used responses to the full health-consciousness 
scale, as well as information about weekly exercise and fruits and vegetable spending 
habits. The same process as the combination LCA was used to determine the number of 
latent classes, characterize the classes, and to estimate each class’s WTP for lettuce 
using a random parameters tobit model. 
Similar to the previous analysis, a sequence of models ranging from 2 to 9 
classes was estimated to determine the appropriate number of classes. The corresponding 
log-likelihood values and Information Criteria (IC) are listed in Table 24. It can be seen 
that the minimum AIC and Adjusted BIC both favored a four-class model, while the 
minimum BIC suggested a three-class model. Keeping consistent with the methods used 
in determining the best number of classes for the previous LCA, the model chosen for 
this LCA was a four-class model. 
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Table 24. Comparison of Latent Class Models: Defined by Health-Consciousness 
Scale 
 
 
Table 25 shows the approximate class membership probabilities and indicator-
response probabilities for the four-class model. Based on their responses to questions 
regarding perceived health-consciousness, weekly exercise, and weekly fruit and 
vegetable spending habits, it can be seen that around 43% of the participants are 
members of Class 1, roughly 20% of the sample belongs to Class 2, another 20% are 
members of Class 3, and about 18% of subjects are members of Class 4. Compared to 
the other classes, consumers in Class 1 were likely to be highly active (48% probability 
that they exercised four times per week or more) and relatively healthy eaters (17% 
probability that they spend more than $50 per week on fruits and vegetables). In addition 
to being active in their health, consumers in Class 1 were most likely to be conscious and 
  180 
aware of their health on a daily basis. For these reasons, consumers in Class 1 were 
dubbed “Health Fanatics.” 
Alternatively, consumers in Class 2 were the least active out of all the classes, 
within only a 15% probability that they regularly exercised. The same trend is observed 
in Class 2’s fruit and vegetable purchasing behavior, as there was only an 8% probability 
that consumers spent more than $50 per week on produce. Similar to Class 1, individuals 
in Class 2 were likely to be aware of their health and sensitive to changes in their health. 
However, consumers in Class 2 were less likely than Class 1 to constantly examine their 
health or be involved with their health. Given that they were highly likely to be aware of 
their health, but were relatively less likely to act on improving their health through 
exercise and a diet heavy in fruits and vegetables, consumers in Class 2 were named the 
“Health Ponderers.” 
Consumers in Class 3 were fairly active, as they exhibited exercise habits similar 
to Class 1, but the 8% probability that individuals in Class 3 spent more than $50 per 
week on fruits and vegetables was the same as Class 2. Although 100% of Class 3 
agreed that they constantly examined their health, they were the least likely out of all the 
classes to be involved with their health and be aware of their health, especially on a daily 
basis (8% probability, 31% probability, and 3% probability, respectively). Despite their 
tendency to exercise regularly, individuals in Class 3 do not entertain other habits 
becoming of a health-conscious lifestyle, such as consuming a diet largely based fruits 
and vegetables and being aware of, conscious of, or involved with their health. Given 
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their interest in exercising but failure to incorporate other elements of a healthy lifestyle, 
consumers in Class 3 were named the “Vanity Seekers.” 
Class 4 is relatively similar to Class 1 in its exercise behavior and fruit and 
vegetable spending habits (41% and 16% probabilities were respectively observed for 
Class 4). Consumers in Class 4 also exhibited relatively high probabilities when it comes 
to their consciousness, awareness, and involvement with their health. Although there 
was an 86% probability that members of Class 4 were aware of their health, there was 
only a 3% probability that they were aware of it throughout their day. Class 4 is similar 
to Class 3 in that there is a 41% probability that consumers in the former notice how they 
feel physically as they go through the day, which reinforces the idea that consumers in 
Class 4 were aware of and paid attention to their health, but not necessarily throughout 
the day.  Therefore, due to their activity level, healthy eating habits, and general 
consciousness and awareness of their health, Class 4 is labeled as “Health Conscious.” 
 
Table 25. Latent Class Parameter Estimates for Four-Class Model: Health Scale 
Only 
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Table 26 depicts the demographic and behavioral characteristics for each of the 
four latent classes, as well as for the sample. Demonstrating general consistency, the 
estimated average ages of Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 were 41 years old, 42 
years old, 39 years old, and 42 years old, respectively. Classes 1, 2, and 3 were mostly 
consisted of females who were not married, while married females predominantly 
occupied Class 4. 
Compared to the other classes, consumers in Class 4 had the largest households 
and income levels on average (2.7 individuals per household with an average of $58,750 
annually), while Class 2 represented, relatively, the smallest households (2.4 individuals 
per household) and consumers in Class 3 had the lowest annual incomes ($41,923 on 
average) compared to the other classes. Individuals in Classes 2 and 3 were mostly 
Caucasian or Hispanic, while 93.51% of the individuals in Class 1 and 87.51% of 
consumers in Class 4 were either Caucasian, Asian/Pacific Islander, African American, 
Native American or of other races. The percentage of fresh vegetables that consumers in 
Class 1 and Class 4 had on hand, roughly 40% and 34% respectively, reflected the high 
weekly fruit and vegetable expenditures expressed by these consumers in Table 24.
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Table 26. Demographic and Behavioral Characteristics of Participants by Latent Class: Health Scale Only 
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Just as in the first LCA, the WTP for lettuce was estimated for each latent class 
following the characterization of each class. Results from the random parameters tobit 
model are organized in Table 27 by latent class. It is evident from the parameter 
estimates for the full sample model that all participants placed a premium on organic 
lettuce, but discounted red lettuce. Additionally, participants expressed increases in WTP 
for organic and mixed varieties of lettuce after learning about hydroponic production and 
the color and production method of each lettuce product. Bear in mind that the one 
product that was of mixed color was also hydroponically produced. As expected, 
average weekly fruit and vegetable expenditures had a slightly negative effect on all 
participants’ WTP for lettuce. 
In the case of Class 1 (Health Fanatics, 42.8% of participants), red lettuce 
garnered WTP discounts of $0.22. The only lettuce products that saw a change in WTP 
after consumers learned about production and labeling information were the organic 
varieties. Health Fanatics’ WTP for organic lettuce increased by $0.33 following the 
information treatment, but their valuations for hydroponic and mixed color (hydroponic) 
varieties were unaffected by the information treatment. 
Similar to Class 1 (Health Fanatics), consumers in Class 2 (Health Ponderers, 
around 20% of the participants) expressed deep discounts in WTP for red lettuce and 
increased their WTP for organic lettuce after learning about hydroponic growing 
methods, as well as the production method and color of each lettuce product. Compared 
to the other classes, consumers in Class 1 (Health Fanatics) and Class 2 (Health 
Ponderers) increased their WTP for organic lettuce by $0.33 and $0.46, respectively 
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after the information treatment. In contrast, consumers’ WTP in Class 3 (Vanity Seekers, 
around 20% of the participants) and Class 4 (Health Conscious, about 18% of the 
participants) did not significantly change after they learned about hydroponic production 
and the growing method of each lettuce product. 
In addition to displaying the econometric output of each class, Table 27 shows 
the average amount each class was willing to pay for each lettuce product. Consumers in 
classes 2, 3, and 4 (Health Ponderers, Vanity Seekers, and Health Conscious, 
respectively) were all willing to pay similar amounts of around $1.37 per head of lettuce, 
which is below average for all participants of $1.45. Consumers in Class 1, on the other 
hand, were willing to pay an average of $1.56 per head of lettuce. This is expected as 
they were classified as “Health Fanatics” due to their strong tendencies toward a health-
motivated lifestyle compared to the other classes. 
Table 28 displays the WTP estimates from a Random Parameter Tobit model in 
which Classes 1, 2, and 4 (Health Fanatics, Health Ponderers, and Health Conscious, 
respectively) were compared to Class 3 (Vanity Seekers acted as a baseline).  Unlike the 
previous LCA (in which participants were classified by a combination of the health and 
prestige classes), all classes were significantly different from consumers in Class 3 in 
their WTP for lettuce. For example, the Health Fanatics in Class 1 were willing to pay 
$0.11 more for lettuce, compared to the Vanity Seekers in Class 3. This result was 
expected as consumers in Class 1 (Health Fanatics) spent more on fruits and vegetables 
weekly, and overall indicated more health-centered lifestyles compared to Class 3 
(Vanity Seekers). Alternatively, Class 2 (Health Ponderers) and Class 4 (Health 
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Conscious) were willing to pay less for lettuce ($0.19 and $0.12, respectively) compared 
to Class 3. Class 2, the Health Ponderers, had the same low probability of spending more 
than $50 per week on fruits and vegetables as the Vanity Seekers in Class 3, but the 
Health Ponderers of Class 2 did have a lower percentage of fresh vegetables relative to 
their full stock than the Vanity Seekers in Class 3. One peculiar result was Class 4’s 
lower WTP compared to Class 3. Class 3 and Class 4 had similar ratios of fresh 
vegetables on hand relative to their full stock. However, the Health Conscious 
individuals in Class 4 had higher probabilities of overall more health-centered lifestyle 
compared to the Vanity Seekers in Class 3 (i.e. Class 4 had higher probabilities of 
spending more than $50 on fruits and vegetables per week and overall greater health 
consciousness and awareness). 
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Table 27. Random Parameters Tobit Estimates for Willingness to Pay (WTP) for Lettuce Products by Latent Class: 
Health Scale Only 
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Table 28. Random Parameters Tobit Estimates for Willingness to Pay (WTP) for 
Lettuce Products: Class 3 as Baseline, Health Scale Only 
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Prestige-Seeking Scale 
 In an effort to investigate how consumers’ prestige-seeking behavior and their 
WTP for lettuce grown a variety of ways, a third LCA was performed using the full set of 
questions in the prestige scale. How do consumers who are concerned about the prestige 
that their purchases bring them respond to lettuce that is produced using a novel method? 
In other words, is there a connection between individuals who buy goods to be 
fashionable in the eyes of others and their WTP for unconventionally produced lettuce? 
 To help answer these questions, the final LCA used the full prestige scale, weekly 
exercise behavior, and weekly fruit and vegetable expenditures to define several classes, 
ranging from 2 to 9. Values for the log-likelihood, AIC, BIC, and Adjusted BIC for each 
class are included in Table 29. In a similar manner as the previous LCAs, Table 29 shows 
that the Information Criteria (IC) produce contradictory results for the optimal number of 
classes – the minimum BIC suggested a two-class model, while the minimum Adjusted 
BIC and AIC proposed a four-class model. To be consistent in selecting the appropriate 
number of classes, the same methods that were used in the previous LCAs were used for 
this analysis as well and a four-class model was chosen to be most appropriate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  190 
Table 29. Comparison of Latent Class Models: Defined by Prestige-Seeking Scale 
 
 
Table 30 shows the estimated class membership and indicator-response 
probabilities for the four-class model. Participants were categorized based on their 
responses to questions about their buying behavior as it pertains to feelings of prestige. 
Information about participants’ weekly exercise and weekly fruit and vegetable spending 
habits was also used to define the latent classes. Table 30 indicates around 12% of the 
participants are members of Class 1, about 69% of the sample is represented by Class 2, 
9% are members of Class 3, and another 9% are members of Class 4. Relative to the 
other classes, consumers in Class 1 were the most active, as they had the highest 
probability of exercising four times per week or more. However, they also demonstrated 
the lowest probability of spending more than $50 per week on fruits and vegetables. 
Consumers in this class largely agreed with statements regarding others’ perceptions of 
them by the type, price, or brand of the products they buy, but low probabilities were 
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observed in the indicators that asked about gaining personal satisfaction through their 
purchases. For example, there was a relatively high probability that individuals in Class 1 
thought that people notice when they buy the most expensive brand of a product 
(91.30%), it says something to people when you buy the high priced version of a product 
(95.65%), and that others make judgments about them based on the kinds of products and 
brands they buy (78.26%). Although the demographics of each class will be explained 
later, the average income of consumers in Class 1, $38,043, was the lowest of all classes. 
Their relatively low income, but high regard toward what others thought of them through 
their materialistic purchases led to Class 1 being named “Ambitious Shoppers.”  
 In contrast, consumers in Class 2 (69.48% of participants) were least likely to be 
concerned about prestige when they purchase goods. For instance, there is a 0% 
probability that individuals in this class were emotionally affected by buying higher 
priced brands. Additionally, only 1.37% of Class 2 agreed that they enjoy the prestige of 
buying a high priced product and only 2.74% agreed that even for a relatively 
inexpensive product, buying a costly brand was impressive. Compared to the other 
classes, members of Class 2 were least concerned about what others thought about them 
and their purchases. Their exercising habits were most similar to Class 1, while their fruit 
and vegetable buying behavior was most analogous to Class 3’s habits. As a result of 
their disinterest in prestige, members of Class 2 were labeled as “Utilitarian Buyers.” 
 Individuals in Class 3 (9.19% of participants) were relatively least likely to 
exercise four or more times per week, but compared to the other classes they were likely 
to spend more than $50 on fruits and vegetables each week. Compared to the other 
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classes, consumers in Class 3 earned the most in average annual income, $57,307. They 
also exhibited relatively high prestige-seeking behavior, but only for expensive brands. 
For example, there was a 69.23% probability that expensive brands of a product make 
them feel good about themselves and there was a 46.15% chance that buying the most 
expensive brand of a product makes individuals in Class 3 feel classy. Given their 
relatively high incomes and preference toward expensive brands, Class 3 was named the 
“Affluent Elitists.” 
 All individuals in Class 4 (9.26% of participants) were likely to feel an increase in 
self-esteem and enjoy the garnered prestige after buying high priced products. 
Additionally, there was an estimated 47% probability that consumers in this class agreed 
that even for a relatively inexpensive product, buying a costly brand was impressive. 
Compared to the other classes, consumers in Class 4 were most concerned that their 
friends would think they were cheap if they consistently bought the lowest priced version 
of a product. As a result of their high regard toward prestige-seeking consumption 
behavior, Class 4 was named the “Prestige Lovers.” 
Table 31 describes the demographics and behavioral characteristics of each latent 
class, as well as for all participants. The average age of Class 1, around 28 years old, was 
relatively low when compared to the average age of the other classes: 44 years old, 38 
years old, and 35 years old. Consumers in Class 1 were primarily male who were not 
married, while females who were not married made up most of Classes 2, 3, and 4. 
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Table 30. Latent Class Parameter Estimates for Four-Class Model: Prestige Scale Only 
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The smallest average households occurred in Class 3 (2.00 individuals), while 
households were largest on average in Class 4 (2.65 individuals). Average annual 
income for Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 were $38,043, $52,922, $57,307, and 
$54,210, respectively. The relatively high-income levels of Class 3 consumers 
rationalize the name “Affluent Elitists,” while the relatively low-income levels of 
consumers in Class 1 provide context to the name “Ambitious Shoppers.” Despite their 
relatively low average income level, Class 1 was the most educated group, as 100% of 
its members had at least some college education or a Bachelor’s degree (61.90%), or had 
completed at least some graduate school or a Graduate degree (38.10%). Consumers in 
Class 4 were also highly educated compared to all participants, as nearly 95% had more 
than a high-school education. Although they were still fairly educated individuals, a 
greater proportion of Class 2 and Class 3 only had a high school education relative to all 
participants. Class 4 had the smallest share of fresh vegetables relative to their full stock 
(25.29%), which could be related to household size as individuals in this class had the 
largest households (2.65 individuals). This negative relationship between household size 
and fresh vegetables on hand is also seen with consumers in Class 3, who had the 
smallest household sizes (2.00 individuals) and highest amount of fresh vegetables on 
hand as a percentage of their full stock.  
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Table 31. Demographic and Behavioral Characteristics of Participants by Latent Class: Prestige Scale Only 
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 Similar to the previous LCA applications, the WTP for lettuce was estimated for 
each latent class after the classes were characterized. Output from the random 
parameters tobit model is organized in Table 32 by each latent class, as well as for all 
participants.   
The coefficient estimates for the full sample in Table 32 indicate that all 
participants were willing to pay an average of $1.45 per head of lettuce and they place 
value on organic lettuce, especially after learning that it was organically grown and after 
learning about hydroponic lettuce production. All participants were willing to pay 
premiums for mixed (also hydroponic) lettuce after learning how it was grown. As seen 
in previous estimations, all participants express strong decreases in WTP for lettuce 
when it is red.  
To gain more information about the participants, separate WTP estimations were 
calculated for each class. Relative to the other classes, consumers in Class 1, the 
Ambitious Shoppers, were willing to pay the highest in WTP, an average of $1.61 per 
head of lettuce. Class 1 (12.07% of participants) also expressed the highest discounts for 
red lettuce – they decreased WTP by $0.57. At first glance, the information treatment did 
not seem to have a significant effect on WTP. However, once the marginal effects were 
calculated, the information treatment had a positive significant effect at the 90% 
confidence level.  As expected, larger households were willing to pay less for lettuce.  
Table 32 shows interesting results for consumers in Class 2. The Utilitarian Buyers 
(69.48% of participants) placed premiums on organic lettuce, especially after the 
production information treatment. Perhaps this result implies that even consumers who 
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are more concerned about function than prestige find organically grown lettuce 
attractive. After learning about hydroponic production and learning the growing method 
of each product, consumers in Class 2 increased their WTP for organic lettuce and mixed 
lettuce (which was grown hydroponically) by around $0.24 and $0.31, respectively. The 
information treatment had a significant effect on WTP for hydroponic lettuce (P < 0.10) 
as well. Significant decreases of around $0.22 in WTP for red lettuce were also observed 
in Class 2. These results may suggest that consumers who are not necessarily motivated 
by gaining prestige through their purchases find the attributes of hydroponic production 
and unconventional growing methods attractive and valuable. Unlike Classes 1, 3, and 4, 
average weekly expenditures on fruit and vegetables have a positive effect on 
consumers’ WTP for lettuce in Class 2.  
A small number of significant effects were found in Class 3 (9.19% of 
participants). Table 32 indicates that Affluent Elitists decrease their WTP for lettuce as 
their households grow larger and as they spend more on fruits and vegetables. Unlike the 
other classes, consumers’ WTP values were not negatively affected by red colored 
lettuce. Effects from the product attributes and the treatments were homogeneous across 
participants, with the exception of the red color attribute. 
Lastly, consumers in Class 4, the Prestige Lovers, exhibited significant increases 
in WTP for organic lettuce (P < 0.10). However, unlike Class 2  (Utilitarian Buyers), 
consumers’ WTP values for organic lettuce and mixed lettuce in Class 4 (Prestige 
Lovers, 9.26% of participants) were not significantly affected by the information 
treatment. Also dissimilar to the other classes, larger households positively affected 
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Class 4’s WTP for lettuce – WTP increased by nearly $0.49. Like Class 3, average 
weekly expenditures on fruits and vegetables had a negative effect on WTP for lettuce in 
Class 4 (Prestige Lovers).  
 Table 33 displays the WTP estimates from a Random Parameter Tobit model in 
which Classes 1, 2, and 4 (Ambitious Shoppers, Utilitarian Buyers, and Prestige Lovers, 
respectively) were compared to Class 3 (Affluent Elitists acted as the baseline). The 
coefficient estimates in Table 33 indicate that all classes’ WTP for lettuce were 
significantly different from Class 3. For instance, compared to the Affluent Elitists in 
Class 3, the Ambitious Shoppers in Class 1 were willing to pay $0.19 more for lettuce. In 
contrast, the Utilitarian Buyers consumers in Class 2 and the Prestige Lovers in Class 4 
were willing to pay around $0.30 and $0.42 less than the Affluent Elitists in Class 3. 
Latent Class Analyses Conclusion 
In general, the classes defined by the prestige scale, the health scale, and a 
combination of the two scales varied in terms of their prestige and health related 
behavior, socio-economic characteristics, preferences, and willingness to pay for lettuce. 
Ignorance of the differences in the peripheral characteristics of consumers may lead to 
flawed conclusions about consumers’ product valuation. By recognizing the differences 
in consumers’ complex behavior, researchers can gain valuable insight into the sources 
of unobserved individual heterogeneity, which may have subsequent effects on the 
marketing and promotion efforts of agribusinesses.
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Table 32. Random Parameters Tobit Estimates for Willingness to Pay (WTP) for Lettuce Products by Latent Class: 
Prestige Scale Only 
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Table 33. Random Parameters Tobit Estimates for Willingness to Pay (WTP) for 
Lettuce Products: Class 3 as Baseline, Prestige Scale Only 
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Secondary Market Results 
After the auction rounds were completed, the external validity of the Vickrey 2nd 
price auction was tested through the use of an on-site secondary market. Recall from the 
methodology chapter that a farmers’ market-like stand was revealed following the 
conclusion of the auction rounds and participants used their assigned price to either 
make or forego a purchase in the secondary market. Similar to purchases made in the 
auction rounds, subjects were made aware that any transactions made in the secondary 
market would be deducted from their participation fee. Theoretically, an individual 
should make a purchase if their WTP value, or their bid, is greater or equal to the price 
they are offered in the secondary market, also known as their assigned values, vi, 
whereas those whose last bid was not greater or equal to their assigned value were 
hypothesized to forego a purchase in the secondary market. Consumers whose last bid 
was equivalent to their assigned price (previously referred to as induced value) were 
expected to make a purchase in the secondary market, because they were being offered a 
good for the maximum amount they were willing to pay to obtain it. Table 34 shows the 
breakdown of observed behavior in the secondary market by gender and Table 35 
displays secondary market behavior by income level.  
 It can be seen in Table 34 that 35% of the 71 participants who had a consumer 
surplus (that is, their last bid was greater or equal to their assigned price) made 
purchases and of this group, 84% were female. Alternatively, most of the 119 
individuals who had negative consumer surplus (that is, their last bid was less than their 
assigned price and resulted in a net loss, or consumer deficit) were female. Of the 5 
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individuals who made purchases even though their net consumer welfare was in the 
negative, 60% were female. As Table 34 points out, the majority of participants (119 
individuals, 59.20% of the sample) had a loss of consumer welfare, which means that 
these participants’ valued the binding product less than the price that was being offered 
to them. 
 
Table 34. Secondary Market Behavior: Gender Statistics 
 
 
With regard to income, Table 35 shows of those who experienced a gain in 
consumer welfare (positive consumer surplus) and those who experienced a loss in 
consumer welfare (negative consumer surplus), 62.31% and 64.1% were considered low 
income, respectively. Over a third of the individuals who had positive consumer surplus 
made purchases (25 individuals), while 2.5% of the individuals who had a negative 
consumer surplus made purchases anyway (5 individuals).  
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Table 35. Secondary Market Behavior: Income Statistics 
 
 
 Table 36 displays a tabulation of the number of participants who should have 
made a purchase in the secondary market (those who received an assigned price that was 
less than their last bid), those who should not have made a purchase (their assigned price 
was greater than last bid), the number of individuals who actually made a purchase, and 
those who did not make a purchase. If consumers’ their last bid equaled their assigned 
price, individuals should have made a purchase because it would be irrational for an 
individual to refuse a product if it was being offered to them for the maximum amount 
they were willing to pay. Table 36 shows that a majority of the 82 participants who were 
theoretically expected to make a purchase did not. Additionally, recall that the 
distribution of assigned prices reflected retail prices of the auction products in local 
grocery stores. Clearly, 119 participants theoretically should have not made a purchase, 
which means their maximum WTP (last bid) for the product for sale in the secondary 
market was less than their assigned price, which represented the price of a lettuce 
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product in local grocery stores. This implies that a majority participants valued the 
lettuce products less than what they would normally face in a retail environment. 
However, because the full selection of lettuce products was not offered in the secondary 
market, this conclusion should be further investigated. 
 
Table 36. Tabulation of Individuals' Expected Behavior versus Actual Behavior 
 
 
Probit Model 
 The probability that an individual made a purchase in the secondary market was 
analyzed using several probit-style models. The probability of an individual making a 
purchase in the secondary market was estimated twice under each model, first as a 
function of several factors and secondly as a function of a subset of those factors.  
 To identify what motivates an individual to purchase in the secondary market, the 
probability that an individual actually made a purchase is first estimated using a ratio of 
the compensation fee to the subject’s average hourly income and whether or not they had 
purchased fruits and vegetables within the last four days. Four days was used as an 
indicator for new fruit and vegetable purchases because many fruits and vegetables, 
especially lettuce, deteriorate in quality after four days following preparation. Other 
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factors used include consumer surplus, age, whether or not the individual was a female, 
household size, and whether or not the individual was a student. With this standard 
probit estimation, individuals who value the fee relatively more are 17% less likely to 
purchase in the secondary market. As expected, those who have greater consumer 
surplus would be more likely to make a purchase and this is true – individuals with 
greater consumer surplus are have a 52% higher probability of making a purchase. This 
could imply that the more of a discount being offered to an individual, the more likely 
they are to purchase an item, which is in line with consumer theory. While older 
individual, females, and students were not revealed to be significant factors, larger 
households were significantly less likely to purchase in the secondary market. 
Household size may have a negative effect on the probability of making a purchase in 
the secondary market as a result of individuals choosing to purchase longer-lasting, less 
perishable food items.  
 
Table 37. Probit Model: Full Set 
 
  
  206 
Table 38 shows the estimated probit model using a subset of the variables used in 
Table 37. The condensed set of factors include the relative importance of the fee, 
whether or not the individual had purchased fruits and vegetables recently, consumer 
surplus, and whether or not the individual was a student. It was expected that the greater 
relative importance of the fee was the less likely individuals would be willing to make a 
purchase in the secondary market, which would decrease the total value of the 
compensation fee they received. This expectation held true – the more an individual 
valued the compensation fee, the probability that they would make a purchase in the 
secondary market decreased.  It was also hypothesized that if an individual had recently 
purchased fruits and vegetables, the probability of them making a purchase in the 
secondary market would decrease. This hypothesis also came true. Greater consumer 
surplus, or larger of a discount, was expected to increase the probability of an individual 
making a purchase in the market. Table 38 points out that as consumer surplus increases, 
the probability that an individual makes a purchase in the market increases by 50%.  
 
Table 38. Probit Model: Condensed Set 
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Random Effects Probit Model 
 Tables 39, 40, 41 and 42 investigate whether random effects are present at the 
individual level and also at the session level using both the full set and the condensed set 
of variables. Results from the four models reflect the findings of the standard probit 
model in Tables 37 and 38. Generally,   is a statistic that describes the percentage of 
variance in the model that is due to random effects at a specified and was used in the 
discussion of the random effects tobit WTP model. In the case of the random effects at 
the individual level,   in Table 39 and Table 40 takes the value of 0.000. This implies 
that 0% of the variance in the model is explained by random effects at the individual 
level. A similar result is found in Table 41 and Table 42, when random effects by 
session are investigated.  
 
Table 39. Random Effects Probit by Individual: Full Set 
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Table 40. Random Effects Probit by Individual: Condensed Set 
 
 
Table 41. Random Effects Probit by Sessions: Full Set 
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Table 42. Random Effects Probit by Sessions: Condensed Set 
 
 
Heteroskedastic Probit Model 
Many times, the variance of the unobservable factors is different for different 
groups of people. When variances of the error terms for two groups of people are 
assumed to be different, one can apply a heteroskedastic probit model, which uses 
maximum likelihood estimation and normalization to detect whether heteroskedasticity 
exists in the model. As discussed in the methodology chapter, normalization allows the 
variances of the unobservable factors for two groups to be compared against each other. 
A heteroskedastic probit model was estimated using the full set of variables and the 
condensed set to identify whether the variances of the unobservable factors of the 
individuals who should have made purchases and the group of individuals who actually 
made purchases are heteroskedastic, or different. 
Results from the maximum-likelihood estimation of a heteroskedastic probit 
model, shown in Table 43, indicate that the variance of the individuals who should have 
purchased is heteroskedastic. This was confirmed when a likelihood ratio test that tested 
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the model with heteroskedasticity against the model without rejects the null hypothesis 
at the 95% confidence interval that the two models are equal, therefore 
heteroskedasticity exists. The only factor that has a significant effect on the probability 
of an individual making a purchase in the secondary market is consumer surplus. 
 
Table 43. Heteroskedastic Probit: Full Set 
 
 
The heteroskedastic probit model was also estimated using the condensed set of 
variables. A likelihood ratio test that tested the null hypothesis that the model with 
heteroskedasticity is equal to the model without heteroskedasticity was rejected (P < 
0.01). This implies that the variance of the unobservable factors is different and this 
should be taken into account. The relative importance of the fee had a negative effect on 
the probability of an individual making a purchase in the secondary market, while the 
opposite is true for consumer surplus. 
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Table 44. Heteroskedastic Probit: Condensed Set 
 
 
In conclusion, the secondary market analysis indicates that while random effects 
are not present within individuals or sessions, the importance of unobservable factors 
vary for the participants. If the compensation fee was relatively larger than the 
individual’s average hourly income, the individual was less likely to make a purchase in 
the secondary market. This implies that the compensation fee has a significant effect on 
individual’s actions in the experiment and may be the primary reason they are 
participating. Further research may study the effect of different compensation levels and 
the effect of distribution on individual’s behavior. Additionally, the positive effect of 
consumer surplus on the probability of an individual making a purchase in the secondary 
market suggests that those consumers who value lettuce are more likely to purchase it 
when it is being offered at a discount. Likelihood ratio tests were performed in each 
probit analysis to compare the full model with the condensed model. In each test, the 
null hypothesis was not rejected, which means that the condensed set was a preferred 
representation of the data. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 A succinct summary and any final conclusions of this study will be presented in 
this chapter. First, readers will be provided with an abbreviated background of the study. 
Next, economic and marketing implications will be explored. Finally, this chapter will 
conclude with a nod to the limitations of this research and suggestions for future 
research.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Experimental auctions are among the most coveted methods used to elicit 
consumers’ valuations of goods. This study employed a non-hypothetical Vickrey 
second-price auction and an on-site site secondary market in an effort to analyze 
consumers’ willingness to pay for vegetable products and assess the external validity of 
the auction mechanism. More precisely, panel data, a number of econometric models, 
and a Latent Class Analysis (LCA) were used to accomplish the following objectives:  
 Estimate the impact of a blind tasting, production information, growing method, 
and color on consumers’ valuations of lettuce products  
 Segment experiment participants into different latent classes based on their 
response to scale-style questions relating to health-consciousness and prestige-
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seeking behavior, and compare the effects of product attributes and treatments 
across classes 
 Identify motivations and the factors associated with the probability of an 
individual participating in an secondary market in an effort to study the external 
validity of consumers’ valuations elicited in the experimental auction  
 
Regarding the study, a total of 201 individuals from the Bryan-College Station area 
of Texas participated in nine sessions over the course of three days. Individuals from the 
community were recruited to best represent the overall demographics of grocery 
shoppers in Texas. The primary requirements to participate in this study were that the 
participant had to be the primary shopper of their household, be at least 18 years of age, 
and have no known allergies to lettuce. Approximately 84% of participants were the 
primary grocery shopper of their household. 
 Once participants arrived to the experiment, they were asked to review and sign a 
consent form to sign and thereafter randomly assigned an identification number that 
ensured anonymity throughout the duration of the experiment. Before being seated, each 
participant was provided with a participation packet that contained instructions and the 
survey, as well as a packet that of blank bid sheets and an order form. The session 
monitor read aloud instructions and explained that because the experiment was non-
hypothetical, the participants would have to pay real money if they purchased any of the 
goods at the experiment site.  
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 Four examples (two verbal and two numerical) were provided in an effort to 
provide participants’ with a sound understanding of the intricacies of the Vickrey 
second-price auction. Following these examples, subjects completed one of two practice 
auction rounds, and completed a brief knowledge quiz while the market price (the 
second-highest submitted bid) for the was determined. Following the discussion of the 
answers to the knowledge quiz, subjects submit bids in the second practice round of 
auctions. After this, the monitor provided instructions for the first vegetable auction 
round and explained to participants that the next auction rounds would be real.  Eight 
vegetable products that varied in production method and color are considered close 
substitutes were used in the two vegetable auction rounds: conventionally grown green 
leaf lettuce, conventionally grown red leaf lettuce, organically grown green leaf lettuce, 
organically grown red leaf lettuce, hydroponically grown green leaf lettuce, 
hydroponically grown green leaf lettuce, hydroponically grown mixed leaf lettuce, and 
spinach as a reference good. Conventional and organic varieties of lettuce reflected the 
general choice set of leaf lettuce available to consumers as they purchased at a local 
grocery store and the hydroponic varieties were considered a novel good as they were 
produced using water-efficient methods by Texas A&M AgriLife Research and 
Extension Center in Uvalde, Texas.  
 Participants in each session completed two rounds of vegetable auctions, with the 
first round acting as a baseline in which they received no information and the second 
round acted as a treatment. Half of the sessions received a baseline as the first round and 
a blind tasting as the treatment round. Participants who received a blind tasting treatment 
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were given sample-sized amounts of each of the seven lettuce products to taste. The 
other half of the sessions received a baseline round and a treatment of production 
information, in which they learned about hydroponic vegetable production and the 
production method of each product was revealed. Participants were allowed to examine 
each vegetable product prior to submitting their bids in each round. Upon the completion 
of the two vegetable auction rounds and the collection of bids, participants were asked to 
complete a consumer survey regarding demographic information, fruit and vegetable 
purchasing behavior, perceptions about health-consciousness and prestige-seeking 
behavior. While participants were completing the survey, one of the two rounds was 
randomly selected to be binding. The hydroponic red leaf lettuce product was chosen to 
be binding for all sessions due to availability. Following the announcement of the 
auction buyer, the market price, and the binding product, participants were given the 
opportunity to purchase the binding product in a secondary market at a stand at the back 
of the room. This stand was not revealed to participants until after the conclusion of the 
auction and they were instructed to treat it like they would a stand at a farmers market. 
Subjects were referred to their order form, which listed the price they could purchase one 
unit of the binding product for, and were asked to indicate how many, if any, units they 
would like to purchase. Finally, after participants filled out their individual order form, 
they collected the $30, minus any purchases, in compensation and signed a receipt of 
funds form.  
 Several pieces of information were collected using the aforementioned 
experimental design. In addition to consumers’ valuations of vegetable products and 
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specific product attributes, the aforementioned auction mechanism and survey gathered 
data on participants’ demographic and behavioral characteristics. The results from 
inquiries about fruit and vegetable purchasing behavior revealed that a mean of around 
$126 was spent in household weekly food expenditures, of which an average of $29 was 
spent on fruits and vegetables. Additionally, a mean of 36% of participants’ full stock of 
food at home consisted of fresh vegetables. When buying lettuce, participants considered 
freshness, taste, and visual appearance as most important. 
 Because subjects were recruited for the study based on specific criteria relating to 
vegetable purchasing decisions, age, and allergies, readers should exercise caution when 
extending these results to the general population. As this study specifically addressed 
consumers’ valuations of lettuce products, readers should be careful not to extend these 
results to other fruit or vegetable products.  
 Bids from the vegetable auction rounds were pooled and resulted in a total of 
3,193 WTP observations. Valuations for one head of lettuce ranged from $0.00 to $5.50 
and participants were willing to pay an average price of $1.47 for all lettuce products 
across all rounds. Organic green lettuce commanded the highest average WTP in every 
round and became tied with hydroponic mixed lettuce in the production information 
treatment.  
  Individuals were allowed to bid any value for the auction products, including 
$0.00. Although the percentage of bids censored at zero was relatively low across all 
products and the auction rounds, these bids were not left out of the econometric analysis. 
Several models were estimated and each one provided a more refined representation of 
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the WTP data than the last: ordinary least squares, constant parameters tobit, random 
effects tobit, random parameters linear, and random parameters tobit.  Although results 
varied from model to model, the product attribute of red color often decreased 
consumers’ WTP for lettuce and consumers significantly increased their WTP for 
organic and mixed lettuce after they learned of its production method on a consistent 
basis. The WTP models also revealed that tasting the products had no significant effect 
on consumers’ valuations.  Heterogeneity was detected at the individual level by random 
effects tobit, random parameters linear, and random parameters tobit. This detection led 
to the inclusion of ordinary least square and tobit estimations strictly for comparison 
purposes as they do not account for the heterogeneous nature of the data.  
 Because the random parameters tobit model accounts for heterogeneity while 
simultaneously accommodating the censored nature of the data, it was considered the 
paramount model. This econometric model revealed several important findings. This 
model accounts suggests that unobserved heterogeneity exists and it should not be 
ignored. Other findings indicate that consumers express deep discounts for red lettuce. 
This may be due to the fact that consumers associate lettuce as being green in color and 
not red. Alternatively, this may suggest that consumers view red leaf lettuce as a 
complementary good to green lettuce. They may view red lettuce only as an ingredient in 
salad and thus may not value it as much as they do green lettuce. Additionally, this 
model’s findings reveal that consumers value organic lettuce, especially after are willing 
to pay premiums for organic lettuce before and after they know it is produced 
organically. Increased value was also seen in mixed lettuce, which was hydroponically 
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grown, after consumers learned about production methods. These increased valuation 
following the production information treatment indicate that consumers value 
information and they are willing to pay a premium for unconventionally produced 
lettuce. The increase in WTP seen in mixed lettuce may be a result of participants’ 
aversion to red lettuce. That is, consumers may value mixed lettuce because it is not 
completely red leaf lettuce, but it provides some variety compared to green lettuce. 
Factors related to age, income, race, gender, marital status, fruit and vegetable spending 
habits significantly affected consumers’ valuations of lettuce. 
 In addition to using the full bids to estimate the factors affecting consumers’ 
valuations of lettuce, the implied differences of the bid values were used to investigate 
the impact of different factors on the change in bid values from the baseline round to the 
treatment rounds. Results from this treatment indicate that organic varieties and 
hydroponic varieties negatively affected the change in WTP from the baseline to the 
blind tasting treatment. Conversely, these same varieties positively influenced the 
change in WTP from the baseline to the production information treatment. Regarding 
demographic factors, higher education levels and larger households influenced an 
increase in the change of WTP from the baseline to the blind tasting treatment, while age 
and a graduate education decreased the change in bids between the baseline round and 
the production information treatment. In both applications of implied differences, greater 
average weekly expenditures on fruits and vegetables contributed to an increase in bids 
in both implied difference applications.  
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 The third part of this study’s analysis included classifying individuals in to 
separate groups using three applications of Latent Class Analysis (LCA ) and estimating 
WTP through the random parameters tobit model separately for each class in each 
application. First, following the conjecture that having a healthy lifestyle may be 
associated with prestige and power, four latent classes of consumers emerged based on 
observed indicators relating to a combination of health-consciousness and prestige-
seeking behaviors, demographics and behavioral characteristics, and valuations of the 
vegetable products. The four classes for the combination of health and prestige 
motivations were characterized as follows: “High Health, Low Prestige” (37.38% of 
participants), “High Health, High Prestige” (24.16% of participants), “Low Health, Low 
Prestige” (32.60% of participants), and “Low Health, Low Prestige” (5.85% of 
participants). A second LCA was applied using only observed indicators relating to 
health-consciousness, demographic and behavioral characteristics, and individuals’ WTP 
estimates. Four latent classes of consumers were identified and characterized as “Health 
Fanatics” (42.84% of participants), “Health Ponderers” (19.63% of participants), 
“Vanity Seekers” (19.58% of participants), and “Health Conscious” (17.95% of 
participants). A third LCA application was used to classify consumers based on observed 
indicators relating to prestige-seeking tendencies, demographic and behavioral 
characteristics, and individuals’ WTP estimates. In a similar fashion as the other LCA 
applications, four latent classes of consumers were identified and characterized. 
Consumers were classified as “Ambitious Shoppers” (12.07% of participants), 
“Utilitarian Buyers” (69.48% of participants), “Affluent Elitists” (9.19% of participants), 
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or “Prestige Lovers” (9.26% of participants). The random parameters tobit models for 
each LCA application revealed similarities and differences between each application’s 
classes in their WTP estimates, socio-demographic profile, and motivations related to 
prestige and health. By recognizing the differences in consumers’ complex behavior, 
researchers can gain valuable insight into the sources of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, which may have subsequent effects on the marketing and promotion 
efforts of agribusinesses. 
 In an effort to fine-tune the external validity of experimental auctions, 
consumers’ behavior in an on-site secondary market and their valuations in treatment 
round of auctions was analyzed using several models: probit, random effects probit, and 
heteroskedastic probit. In estimating the probability that participants made a purchase in 
the secondary market, it was found that while no random effects existed at the individual 
or session level, the variance of unobserved effects varied for those who were expected 
to make a purchase and those who actually did. Consumer surplus and the relative 
importance of the compensation fee were identified as motivating factors in the 
secondary market analysis.  
 
Economic and Marketing Implications 
 A sound understanding of consumers’ preferences and valuations of quality-
differentiating attributes is necessary to nurture the increasing demand for 
unconventionally produced food products. This study provides valuable inferences about 
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the value consumers place on production methods and shows the impact of information 
on consumers’ decisions.  
 Findings in this study provide valuable information to producers, distributers, 
and retailers of lettuce and may have profound marketing implications for the fresh fruit 
and vegetable industry. For example, the most significant finding in this research is the 
impact of consumer education. In analyzing consumers’ willingness to pay for lettuce 
products that varied in production method and color, it was found that consumers were 
willing to pay significant premiums for organically grown lettuce and for hydroponically 
grown lettuce that was mixed in color after they learned about hydroponic production 
and after the production method of each product was revealed. This implies that 
consumers are willing to pay more for products that are produced organically and 
hydroponically and are labeled as such. The impact of information suggests producers, 
marketers, and distributers of hydroponic and organic lettuce should include production 
information in the labeling of the product such that it is visible to the targeted consumer. 
These results are aligned with the growth seen in the organic foods industry recently.  
Other results revealed that, ultimately, differences in the taste of the lettuce 
products did not lead to significantly affect willingness to pay and consumers may 
perceive red leaf lettuce as less valuable than green leaf lettuce. Additionally, individuals 
who are concerned about their health and those who view themselves as individuals who 
purchase goods for their practical use express premiums for organic lettuce after they 
learn it was produced organically. These results imply that consumers who have 
different consumption motivations desire the same product, but only after they have been 
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educated on how it was produced. The bottom line is: informing the consumer matters! 
If consumers know about hydroponic production and how vegetable products are 
produced, they are likely to make more informed choices which could result in higher 
revenues for the producers of those goods.  
Regarding the efforts made in advancing the field of experimental economic, this 
study contributed the external validity of experimental auctions by suggesting that the 
relative importance of the compensation fee matters when eliciting truthful valuations 
and incentivizing behavior. Furthermore, this study revealed that participants of 
experiments who place greater importance on the compensation fee are less likely to 
conform to utility maximizing behavior and suggested that participants have a combined 
utility for the fee and the auction products.  
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 Limitations of this study and suggestions for future research are listed below: 
This experiment consisted of seven lettuce products varying in production method and 
color. The choice set was imbalanced as the mixed color was only grown 
hydroponically, not conventionally or organically. Therefore, it is unclear whether the 
effects seen in the mixed product were due to its method of production or mixed color. 
Although the tasting treatment had no significant effect on participants’ valuations, more 
information might have been gained had the tasting occurred in a sensory analysis 
laboratory 
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To further contribute to the external validity of experimental auction 
mechanisms, future research should consider conducting a field experiment in a grocery 
store when consumers have an intention to purchase fruits and vegetables. Because this 
study found that the relative importance of the compensation fee matters to participants, 
future research may investigate how the timing and magnitude of payment affect 
participants’ behavior 
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STAGE 8: SURVEY 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please select only one answer by marking an “X” in the blank unless otherwise 
indicated. There is no right or wrong answer. Your survey responses are very important to the 
results of today’s sessions.  Please remember that all responses will be kept confidential.  
 
1. PRIMARY SHOPPER: Are you the PRIMARY grocery shopper for your household? 
a. ___ Yes    b.   ___ No 
 
2. WEEKLY FOOD EXPENDITURES: How much, on average, does your household spend 
on food PER WEEK?  (Include grocery, snacks, restaurants, and any other food 
purchases).  
a.    ___ $0-$49   f.    ___ $250 - $299 
b. ___ $50 - $99   g.   ___ $300 - $399 
c. ___ $100 - $149  h.   ___ $400 - $499 
d. ___ $150 - $199  i.    ___ $500 - $749 
e. ___ $200 - $249  j.    ___ $750 or more 
 
3. WEEKLY FRUIT AND VEGETABLE EXPENDITURES: How much, on average, does your 
household spend on fruits and vegetables PER WEEK? 
a. ___ $0-$24   d.   ___ $75 - $99 
b. ___ $25 - $49   e.   ___ $100 or more 
c. ___ $50 - $74 
 
4. FRESH FRUIT AND VEGETABLE EXPENDITURES: Approximately what portion of your 
fruit and vegetable purchases are for FRESH fruits and vegetables (Please exclude any 
canned, frozen, and/or processed fruits and vegetables). 
a. ___ None of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
b. ___ 1-24% of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
c. ___ 25-49% of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
d. ___ 50-75% of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
e. ___ 76-100% of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
 
5. LOCATION OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PURCHASES: Of the following options, where 
does your household make the LARGEST PORTION of its fruit and vegetable 
purchases? 
a. ___ Mass-merchandiser (e.g., Walmart, Target) 
b. ___ Supermarket/ Grocery Store (e.g. HEB, Kroger, Albertsons) 
c. ___ Roadside Fruit and Vegetable Stand 
d. ___ Farmers’ Market 
e. ___ Other (Please Indicate :_____________________________________) 
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6. LAST PURCHASE OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLES: When was the last time someone in 
your household purchased fruits and vegetables? 
a. ___ Less than 2 days ago  d.   ___ 8- 10 days ago 
b. ___ 2-4 days ago   e.   ___ 11-14 days ago 
c. ___ 5-7 days ago   f.    ___ More than 2 weeks ago 
 
7. FREQUENCY OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PURCHASES: How often does your household 
purchase fresh fruits and vegetables? 
a. ___ Less than once a month  d.   ___ Once a week 
b. ___ Once a month   e.   ___ More than once a week 
c. ___ Two to three times / month 
 
8. FRESH VEGETABLES ON HAND: Please estimate the amount of FRESH VEGETABLES 
that you currently have on hand in your home as a percentage of your full stock. 
a. ___ 0%     d.   ___ 50-74% 
b. ___ 1-24%    e.    ___ 75-100% 
c. ___ 25-49% 
 
 
9. How important are the following factors to you when making lettuce purchasing 
decisions? (Please select only one level of importance per row). 
  
Not 
Important 
At All 
Not Very 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Very 
Important 
A. PRICE         
B. TASTE         
C. NUTRITION         
D. CONVENIENCE         
E. VISUAL APPEARANCE         
F. SIZE         
G. FRESHNESS         
H. GROWING LOCATION      
I. CERTIFIED PRODUCTION 
PRACTICES     
 
10. How often do you exercise? (Include only periods of exercise longer than 20 minutes). 
a. ___ Never                                                                            e.  ___4-6 times per 
week  
b. ___ Once a month                                                             f.   ___ Once a day 
c. ___ Once a week                                                                g.   ___More than 
once a day 
d. ___ 2-3 times per week 
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11. Do you currently have any serious health issues (including any conditions which 
require regular doctor visits and/or prescription medication)?   
a. ___ Yes                        
b. ___ No (Skip to question 14) 
 
12. If you have health issues that you would consider serious, are any of them nutrition 
related? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
 
13. If you have health issues that you would consider serious, do any of them require 
specific diet? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
 
14. Have you ever experienced food poisoning from consuming fruits and vegetables? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
c. ___ Don’t Know 
 
15. Do you believe there are benefits of consuming fruits and vegetables that have been 
certified for appropriate food safety?   
a. ___ Yes                        
b. ___ No 
c. ___Don’t Know/Not Sure 
 
16. AGE: Please indicate your age in years:   __________ years  
 
17. WEIGHT: Please indicate your weight in pounds: 
___ lb.     
 
18. HEIGHT: Please indicate your height in feet: 
___ ft. ___in  
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19. EDUCATION: Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed: 
a. ___ Some High School or less  e.   ___ 4 year/ Bachelor’s Degree 
b. ___ High School Diploma  f.    ___ Some Graduate School 
c. ___ Some College   g.   ___ Graduate Degree 
d. ___ 2 year/ Associates Degree 
 
20. HOUSEHOLD SIZE: Including yourself, how many people live in your household?   
___ People  
 
  
 
21. CHILDREN: How many children live in your household, if any? 
 ___ Children 
 
22. GENDER: Please indicate your gender: 
a. ___ Female                                b.  ___ Male 
 
 
23. RACE: Please indicate your race: 
a. ___ Asian/Pacific Islander 
b. ___ African American 
c. ___ Caucasian/White  
d. ___ Native American/ Indigenous 
e. ___ Hispanic 
f. ___ Other (Please List: _______________________________________) 
 
 
24. MARITAL STATUS: What is your current marital status? 
a. ___ Single    b.   ___ Married 
 
25. INCOME: Please indicate your household yearly income for 2013.  (Include all forms of 
income, including salary, interest and dividend payments, tips, scholarship support, 
student loans, parental support, social security, child support, and allowance). 
a. ___ Less than $30,000   f.    ___ $70,000-$79,999 
b. ___ $30,000-$39,999   g.    ___ $80,000-$89,999 
c. ___ $40,000-$49,999   h.   ___ $90,000-$99,999 
d. ___ $50,000-$59,999   i.    ___ $100,000-$149,999 
e. ___ $60,000-$69,999   j.    ___ More than $150,000 
 
 
26. EMPLOYMENT: Which of these best describes your employment status?  
a. ___ Unemployed   e.   ___ Retired 
b. ___ Stay-at-Home Parent  f.   ___ Disabled 
c. ___ Part-time Employed  g.  ___ Student 
d. ___ Full-time Employed             
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27. Do you currently participate in any Food and Nutrition Assistance programs?  
(ex. SNAP, WIC, etc.) 
a. ________ No     b.________ Yes 
 
28. Mark with an “X”  the appropiate box according to how strongly you agree or disagree 
with the following statements 
1 = Extremely Disagree 
2 = Disagree  
3 = Disagree Somewhat 
4 = Neutral 
5 = Agree Somewhat 
6 = Agree 
7 = Extremely Agree 
 
 
A. People notice when you buy the most expensive brand of a product. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Extremely 
Disagree 
Neutral Extremely  
Agree 
 
B. Buying a high price brand makes me feel good about myself 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Extremely 
Disagree 
Neutral Extremely  
Agree 
 
C. Buying the most expensive brand of a product makes me feel classy. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Extremely 
Disagree 
Neutral Extremely  
Agree 
D. I enjoy the prestige of buying a high priced product. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Extremely 
Disagree 
Neutral Extremely  
Agree 
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E. It says something to people when you buy the high priced version of a product. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Extremely 
Disagree 
Neutral Extremely  
Agree 
 
F. Your friends will think you are cheap if you consistently buy the lowest priced version 
of a product. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Extremely 
Disagree 
Neutral Extremely  
Agree 
 
G. I think others make judgments about me by the kinds of products and brands I buy. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Extremely 
Disagree 
Neutral Extremely  
Agree 
 
H. Even for a relatively inexpensive product, I think that buying a costly brand is 
impressive. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Extremely 
Disagree 
Neutral Extremely  
Agree 
 
 
29. Mark with an “X”  the appropiate box according to how well the following statements 
describe you: 
0 = statement does not describe you at all 
1 = statement describes you a little  
2 = statement describes you about fifty-fifty 
3 = statement describes you fairly well 
4 = statement describes you well 
 
A. I reflect about my health a lot. 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
Does not describe 
you at all 
 Describes 
you well 
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B. I’m very self-conscious about my health. 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
Does not describe 
you at all 
 Describes 
you well 
 
C. I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings about my health. 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
Does not describe 
you at all 
 Describes 
you well 
 
D. I’m constantly examining my health. 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
Does not describe 
you at all 
 Describes 
you well 
 
E. I’m alert to changes in my health. 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
Does not describe 
you at all 
 Describes 
you well 
 
F. I’m usually aware of my health. 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
Does not describe 
you at all 
 Describes 
you well 
 
 
G. I’m aware of the state of my health as I go through the day. 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
Does not describe you 
at all 
 Describes 
you well 
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H. I notice how I feel physically as I go through the day. 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
Does not describe you 
at all 
 Describes 
you well 
 
 
I. I’m very involved with my health. 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
Does not describe 
you at all 
 Describes 
you well 
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APPENDIX C 
BIDDING SHEETS & ORDER FORM 
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A. 
  
1 
 
B. 
 
2 
C. 
 
3 
D. 
 
4 
E. 
 
5 
F. 
 
6 
G. 
 
7 
H. 
 
8 
BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
A. 
  
1 
 
B. 
 
2 
C. 
 
3 
D. 
 
4 
E. 
 
5 
F. 
 
6 
G. 
 
7 
H. 
 
8 
BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ 
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A. 
  
1 
 
B. 
 
2 
C. 
 
3 
D. 
 
4 
E. 
 
5 
F. 
 
6 
G. 
 
7 
H. 
 
8 
BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
A. 
  
1 
 
B. 
 
2 
C. 
 
3 
D. 
 
4 
E. 
 
5 
F. 
 
6 
G. 
 
7 
H. 
 
8 
BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ 
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APPENDIX D 
HYDROPONIC PRODUCTION INFORMATION 
 
 Hydroponic lettuce is grown in greenhouses, without soil.  
 
 Plants are propagated and grown in inert, inorganic material (free of soil 
borne diseases). 
 
 Roots are constantly exposed to nutrient solution or humidified air. 
 
Compared to field production… 
 
 They have a shorter production cycle (e.g. 60 days vs. 90 days in field). 
 
 They use much less water (The amount of water used per plant is 5 to 
10% of what is used in the field...which means that hydroponics have a 
higher water use efficiency such as 90%) 
 
 Hydroponic systems offer better control of environmental conditions, 
nutrition and water requirements. 
 
 Hydroponic plants have much lower incidence of pests and diseases, and 
fewer to minimum pesticide applications. 
 
 Better cleanliness of the final product.  
